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Preface
Sometime last year, in a conversation on the value add of having African 
institutions disburse funds that have originated outside the continent, 
I was asked: Why African philanthropy? What makes TrustAfrica more 
than just a fiscal intermediary? In response, reflecting on what I saw as 
the value add of the institution beyond its ability to disburse funds; I 
recall thinking about the written evidence for this, and knew that we fell 
short in this regard. 
A few months later, TrustAfrica was approaching its 10th anniversary 
and wanted to explore how it might do three things: (i) undertake an 
interrogative and critical reflection that would help the philanthropy and 
development sector better understand the nature of its approach; (ii) cel-
ebrate the work that TrustAfrica, together with its partners, had been able 
to achieve and contribute towards, while simultaneously learning from its 
blind spots and challenges; and (iii) contribute towards an evidence-based 
body of knowledge and inquiry that would help advance the agenda for 
African philanthropy. And so the idea of a book was born.
With African philanthropy increasingly coming of age and with a 
growing body of theoretical and conceptual writing, but not enough 
evidence-based knowledge interrogating its value, I knew this book 
represented a moment whose time had come. Developing this concept 
with TrustAfrica’s Executive Director, Tendai Murisa, and my co-edi-
tor, Elizabeth Coleman, we immediately agreed that a praise book of 
TrustAfrica’s accomplishments would not serve any larger purpose, nor 
would it be fruitful for our own learning. We also knew that an overall 
evaluation, while certainly useful for the institution, would not really 
have relevance for, or contribute towards, discussion and debate in the 
field more broadly. We thus decided on a publication that would in-
terrogate TrustAfrica’s work from the perspective of two themes that 
lie at its roots: African agency, and the belief in the potential of African 
philanthropy to do things differently. 
We knew that we wanted a rigorous examination of the work; we 
also knew that this would mean letting go of some of the powers we had 
to craft a narrative, and so we invited independent authors to examine 
some of our key programme areas, through a combination of TrustAfrica 
documents and interviews with TrustAfrica’s staff, donors and funded 
xpartners, asking them very specifically to interrogate TrustAfrica’ s work 
– both the positives and negatives – and draw out the lessons learned. 
We must note here, that although this book looks at the work of 
six particular programme areas, there are many others. TrustAfrica, for 
instance, has also made a significant input towards supporting edu-
cation, looking at both early learning and higher education. In fact, 
TrustAfrica hosted alongside others, one of the biggest continental 
summits on higher education in 2015. TrustAfrica has also worked to 
nurture the development of small to medium scale enterprises through 
its ICBE Research Fund. The six areas in the book, however, provide 
a broad reflection of the nature of the type of work undertaken by 
TrustAfrica. We should also note that while one of TrustAfrica’s three 
core focus areas is philanthropy, we have not included a specific chapter 
on that, and have sought instead to use it as a lens through which to 
view the overarching exploration. 
While this book is a reflection on TrustAfrica in particular, we see 
TrustAfrica as one of a set of like-minded African institutions which, 
despite receiving funds from the global north, are committed to leading 
with African agendas – and so we hope that this book will provide a 
learning agenda not just for TrustAfrica, but for the many who support, 
fund or work for foundations in Africa.
***
While this is a book about TrustAfrica as a philanthropy institution that 
aims to mediate resources – fiscal and otherwise – towards a more just 
society, we are but one cog in the wheel; the programme achievements 
are a testament to the cumulative efforts of the hundreds of partners on 
the ground who are working every day to address these critical challeng-
es, in what are fluid and challenging contexts. 
TrustAfrica is also indebted to its donors – to the Ford Foundation 
and its staff for forging ahead and enabling this idea of a multi-pro-
gramme pan-African foundation to become a reality, and to the many 
other donors who have worked and continue to work with us in our 
efforts to help forge a different development path.
The work of TrustAfrica would not have been possible without the 
anchoring and direction of its founding Executive Director, Akwasi 
Aidoo, its Board (both former and present members) and the dedication 
of the staff who have been, over the years, such valuable flag bearers for 
the potential of this institution and the realisation of its aims. 
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Elizabeth and I would like to thank the authors who agreed to take 
on this task; their contributions provide a rich and expansive window 
into TrustAfrica’s work, the key programmatic issues at hand, and the 
practice of African philanthropy. We thank TrustAfrica’s programme 
staff for the many chapter reviews and feedback, and its Executive Di-
rector, Tendai Murisa, for the freedom to pursue this independent re-
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this nature, within the timeframe we had, has been a challenging effort, 
but one so well worth it.
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African Agency at Work
Halima Mahomed and Elizabeth Coleman
‘There’s a dignity in influencing your own destiny.’1
The topic of African philanthropy might strike some as abstract. But 
very real images rise from the pages of this book. In Ghana, a smallhold-
er farmer influences her nation’s agriculture policies. In Liberia, advo-
cates work with officials to make resource extraction more transparent 
and beneficial to communities. At the African Union, activist researchers 
advance a new initiative to stem illicit flows of money from the conti-
nent. These are just three examples of work supported by TrustAfrica, 
one of the continent’s few multi-programme, pan-African philanthropic 
institutions. If you factor in the multitude of similar actions that the 
foundation has supported over the course of a decade, you get a pal-
pable sense of African agency – people across the continent who have 
taken it upon themselves to deepen democracy and promote the kind of 
economic development that benefits all people.
It was with this in mind – the belief in and capacity of Africans to 
make their own choices about their future – that TrustAfrica was estab-
lished. What began in 2001 as the Special Initiative for Africa incubated 
at the Ford Foundation in New York, became, in 2006, an independent, 
pan-African foundation based in Dakar. Today, with a focus on three 
1  Theo Sowa, the CEO of the African Women’s Development Fund, in Sowa 
(2013). 
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overarching thematic areas – governance, equitable development and 
African philanthropy – TrustAfrica has, through partnerships with and 
resourcing from a range of donors, made more than 500 grants worth 
over $25 million, reaching more than 300 organisations in all regions of 
Africa and the diaspora.2
The idea of TrustAfrica was seeded at a time when, despite several 
years of democratic progress and a new wave of optimism about the 
continent and the potential for its leadership, power was once more be-
coming concentrated in elites. In many places, governance was moving 
further away from its mandate to serve all people and the objective of 
economic growth was superseding that of social justice, resulting in a 
rise in inequality. Increasingly, African people across the continent were 
finding themselves without much say in the decisions that would affect 
their lives – decisions that were, in many cases, being made by the new 
political and business elites, whose priorities did not necessarily match 
those of the continent’s citizens at large. 
In terms of resourcing, this was also the era of international develop-
ment aid, but despite the billions of dollars flowing to the continent, the 
aid system too had failed to address the systemic challenges inhibiting 
Africa’s progress. Part of the problem has been that those disbursing 
the aid often control the agenda3 – whether it originates from private 
sources, bilateral and multilateral agreements or international finance 
institutions. Moreover, a major portion of international aid for Africa 
was (and still is) routed through global north or international non-gov-
ernmental organisations that then decide where and how that aid should 
be spent on the continent.4 Given these dynamics, solutions to Africa’s 
challenges were often developed outside its contexts. Whilst some gains 
were certainly achieved, by and large, international aid fell far short of 
the transformative promises it had made. 
This was a time when the role of civil society would be critical to 
holding governments to account on their mandates, to ensuring that the 
interests of citizens were paramount in key governance decision-making 
2  This excludes funds directly spent on research, convenings and technical sup-
port. And it is over and above the initial $5 million that was distributed under the 
auspices of the Special Initiative for Africa. 
3 See Tendai Murisa’s discussion in Chapter 8 of the structural flaws of bilateral 
and multilateral aid agreements.
4  In Chapter 2, Bhekinkosi Moyo writes that currently more than 75% of U.S. 
foundation funding to Africa is administered by intermediary organisations head-
quartered outside Africa.
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processes and to ensuring that development priorities were informed 
by those most affected. But the kind of civil society organisations that 
would take forward such a role required the independence to do so – 
independence of resources, independence of action and independence 
of priorities and solutions. It was thought that such independence could 
best be gained through the philanthropic sector.
TrustAfrica came into this context as an African philanthropic in-
stitution committed to enabling African solutions to the continent’s 
challenges. The strategic entry point for its work was to support an in-
dependent civil society to advance its own priorities and craft its own 
solutions. From its first days, TrustAfrica set out to do things different-
ly, and its founders had a conviction that TrustAfrica would represent 
something that was alternative to the norm. Indeed, the TrustAfrica 
Chronicle quotes Tade Aina,5 reflecting a key element behind the institu-
tion as ‘…the desire and motive to establish an independent African-led 
foundation focused on engaging Africans in Africa and the diaspora in 
creating solutions together’ (Barya and Richardson, 2012). Moreover, 
based on the continent, with a staff and board comprising individuals 
who themselves were active in Africa’s development processes, the new 
foundation saw the potential of having a frontline view that would en-
able it to tap into and leverage the unique opportunities available for 
African agency to address the development challenges facing Africa. 
TrustAfrica thus saw its work grounded in a collaborative approach 
with civil society and, from inception, held that the institution would 
listen to and create the space for African thought leaders to debate press-
ing issues and help set the agenda for TrustAfrica’s programmes. Murisa, 
in his chapter, reflects this as a core role of acting as both ‘a catalyst and 
collaborator’ that would foster dialogue and strengthen civil society to 
claim democratic space. This was critical: the work would not just ben-
efit people, but include them. 
Given these founding values, this book reflects on whether and how 
TrustAfrica has indeed done things differently over the course of the 
last ten years. It interrogates the extent to which its work counters the 
mainstream philanthropic approach and if that way of working enables 
a different trajectory of impact for those who bear the brunt of Africa’s 
social justice challenges. Does its work, in fact, enable a different agen-
5  Tade was a Ford Foundation Representative intimately involved in the found-
ing discussions that led to the establishment of TrustAfrica, and later served as one 
of its founding Board members. 
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da? The book further interrogates the implications for the foundation’s 
future work and for institutionalised African philanthropy.
Why this book now? 
TrustAfrica has always recognised that its work, together with that of 
other like-minded African philanthropies,6 represented a somewhat al-
ternative approach to the norm, and has recognised the need to be ev-
er-mindful of how it is undertaking its work and vigilant that it stays 
true to its course. To this end it has engaged in several learning endeav-
ours; as the work of TrustAfrica and its partners has taken root across 
the continent, its work and impact has been documented in institution-
al reviews, programme evaluations and other publications. This book, 
however, is different. With TrustAfrica’s 10th anniversary coming up, 
it sought to explore a slightly different learning agenda than previous 
reviews – an agenda that allowed for the application of a critical and 
interrogative lens through which to examine the premises underlying 
TrustAfrica and see how it has fared against them; and whether in fact 
those premises have had the intended impacts.
Accordingly, at the ten-year mark, with a decade of work in hand, 
TrustAfrica reached out to five independent authors to each undertake 
an external reflection on the evolution of particular areas of program-
ming. Its mandate to these authors was to interrogate TrustAfrica’s work 
under the concepts of African philanthropy and African agency, using a 
combination of primary internal documents as well as interviews with 
TrustAfrica staff, donors and funded partners.7 The brief called not for 
an overall internal evaluation, but a specific reflection from these two 
angles, in the hope that collectively it would begin to tell us the story 
of TrustAfrica’s approach. Finally, in the spirit of being open to criti-
cal reflection and constructive criticism, the authors were encouraged 
to examine the challenges, limitations and blind spots that emerged in 
TrustAfrica’s work – in the hope that it would enable TrustAfrica both 
to learn and to provide broader lessons for the sector. The brief to the 
authors was one of independent review; the findings were their own.
Hence five chapters of this peer-reviewed book look at the institu-
6 For instance, the Southern Africa Trust, the African Women’s Development 
Fund, the Kenya Community Development Foundation, and Akiba Uhaki.
7 TrustAfrica deliberately chooses to see those it funds as ‘partners’ and not ‘grant-
ees’. For TrustAfrica, the former term denotes more appropriately the nature of the 
collaborative relationships at hand, while the latter is often seen to denote a fiscal 
relationship only. 
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tion’s contributions to strengthening a particular ecosystem or civil soci-
ety initiative(s) intent on resolving critical democracy and development 
issues in Africa. Two additional chapters, by former and current staff, 
address the bigger picture; one surveys the history and potential of the 
fast-growing field of African philanthropy, and the other draws lessons 
from the other chapters to discuss how TrustAfrica and institutional 
philanthropy as a whole can build effective movements to advance so-
cial change.
While the occasion of the 10th anniversary provided the opportune 
moment to examine its work, there was another underlying, much more 
pressing reason to undertake this book. Now, even more than when 
TrustAfrica was founded, we are witnessing increasing threats to the 
independence of civil society. These threats come in many forms – from 
a narrowing regulatory environment for civil society, to restrictions in 
the nature of the activities civil society can undertake, restrictions in 
amounts of foreign philanthropy and the voluntary withdrawal of pri-
vate funding. These threats affect, in particular, civil society organisa-
tions which are working to address systemic challenges and advance 
social justice; by the very nature of their work, they are often challeng-
ing government and holding it to account. Such work, in Africa, is not 
easily resourced.
A different kind of philanthropy
Lately, the African development sector has been pinning its hopes on 
an expanded philanthropic arena – especially emergent African high net 
worth individuals – who, it is hoped, will play a role in enabling a more 
independent, vibrant and sustainable civil society. While institutional 
philanthropy in Africa has indeed increased, with some exceptions most 
of it is not directed at addressing the systemic issues that drive injustice, 
focusing instead on more ameliorative and reactive responses to injustice. 
Now, more than ever, is the time for the rise of a different kind of institu-
tionalised philanthropy, and this book hopes to reflect the potential role 
of that kind of philanthropy – while still being mindful of its challenges 
and limitations, particularly in regard to African philanthropic institu-
tions that derive funding from outside the continent. 
African philanthropy, in its different forms, has long played an im-
portant role on the continent. As Bhekinkosi Moyo explains in Chapter 
2, philanthropy has deep roots in Africa and has served as a key vehicle 
for social cohesion in contexts where people have been oppressed and 
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marginalised. Any discussion of the field must thus recognise its links 
to notions of solidarity and mutuality, and this extends to the current 
proliferation of institutionalised philanthropy as well. This institution-
alised space includes private, corporate, family and community-based 
institutions as well as public foundations such as TrustAfrica, the Afri-
can Women’s Development Fund, and the Southern Africa Trust. This 
book reflects on the potential for a distinct role for African philanthropic 
institutions, not just because they represent development decisions and 
resource allocations being made on the continent, but because of the 
potential they hold to focus the power of their resources and freedom 
of decision-making on addressing the structural or systemic causes of 
injustice and inequality.
Addressing systemic issues, however, requires challenging the status 
quo, and facing head-on the issue of power (including speaking truth 
to power as Tendai Murisa posits in Chapter 8). Indeed, at a time when 
development resources are shrinking, Moyo envisions the field’s poten-
tial to use its leverage with governments ‘to reclaim local agency for 
civil society [and] reform restrictive laws’. However, collaborating with 
government can be difficult terrain. If it is to support the transformation 
of power relations between elites and ordinary people, the sector must 
keep the issue of power front and center. Moyo reminds us that as ‘a 
constitutive part of civil society’, philanthropy is and should be directly 
linked to its struggles. 
Power, agency and African money
We all have power, different types of power. When we don’t 
acknowledge that power, it’s easier for others to step all over us. 
…. We’re not good at talking about power, and because we don’t 
talk about it, we don’t learn to use it well (Sowa, 2015). 
For civil society, true power plays out in the form of agency, loosely 
translated as the belief in and capacity of people to make their own 
decisions. In Chapter 3, Humphrey Sipalla surveys how the discourse 
on African agency has changed over time, from the cultural pride of the 
Negritude movement in the 1920s and the wave of political indepen-
dence in the 1960s to today’s focus on accountability advocacy in which 
people are driving their own solutions and holding those in government 
as well as other duty-bearers to account. Enabling this requires, as Si-
palla goes on to say: ‘centralised African decision makers be humble 
enough to allow knowledge to flow from the local and the periphery to 
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the centre’. In Chapter 6, Chipo Mubaya anchors the concept of agency 
in the academic literature of sociology and community development, 
which sees ‘farmers’ actions transcending specific planned technical be-
haviours on farms to performing roles as members of social networks 
and collectivities’. She contends that this view of farmers’ ‘creative ca-
pacities to respond to both socioeconomic and environmental shocks’ 
is very much at the centre of the efforts by TrustAfrica and its partners 
that are enabling farmers to have a say in policy changes that boost their 
productivity and improve their livelihoods.
Why is it important to promote African agency? Yao Graham of Third 
World Network has said: ‘If you don’t have clarity of your own agency, 
you become someone else’s project’8. Broadly speaking, this has been 
the case with Africa’s development agenda, which has long been shaped 
by the priorities and views of Western donors. Indeed, this outsourcing 
of the continent’s development challenges, as Fambai Ngirande puts it 
in Chapter 5, is what gave rise to TrustAfrica’s focus on African agency 
as core driver of solutions. This is further emphasised by Hakima Ab-
bas, who writes in Chapter 7, ‘Given that resources yield agenda-setting 
power, their distribution cannot be dictated by people or entities re-
moved from the continent and with multiple interests that may or may 
not align with African peoples.’
At the same time, it is still true that most funding for social justice 
work emanates from outside the continent. Is it possible to programme 
the distribution of these external funds in a way that nevertheless fosters 
African agency? In a context where civil society is under threat, and 
where foreign funded institutions are being labelled as imperialist agents 
(see Murisa’s chapter), how do we separate the issue of agency from 
the geographic source of funds? Which begs the question: Is African 
philanthropy about the source of resources or the control of resources 
irrespective of the source? 
In Chapter 8, Murisa reflects on TrustAfrica’s experience to empha-
sise that the geographical source of the funds is not the ultimate en-
abler – or dis-enabler – of agency. Sipalla too, interrogates the notion of 
whether one can nurture African agency without spending African mon-
ey, and his chapter reflects well how foreign funds enabled rather than 
distorted TrustAfrica’s agency, and in turn the agency that was support-
ed on the ground. At a time when international criminal justice efforts 
8 Graham said this at the Power Panel at the AGN Assembly in 2012. As cited in 
Mahomed and Moyo (2013).
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in Africa were being vilified as imperialist, TrustAfrica and its partners 
were able to build an authentic African response by supporting process-
es based on and led by the continent, and by bringing victims’ voices to 
the fore. Sipalla concludes that the fact that donors have an agenda ‘does 
not necessarily mean that they act to the detriment of African agency’; in 
essence, it depends on how that agenda aligns with local priorities and 
how flexible that agenda is to being changed as needed. Similarly, Fam-
bai Ngirande’s chapter on work to stem illicit financial flows (IFFs) from 
Africa shows how funds initially provided by a Western donor, through 
TrustAfrica, supported research and led to the articulation of a distinctly 
African agenda with input from across the continent. This new point of 
view attracted new constituencies, led to a multi-country people’s cam-
paign and is being advanced at the African Union, in consultation with 
TrustAfrica and its partners.
While the above examples, and others in this book, paint one view 
of the positive potential of donor funds on African agency, the reality 
with much philanthropy is that donors – local and global – too often 
play a very constraining role on local agency. Civil society organisations 
are replete with examples of how donor funding, no matter how well 
intentioned, has come with very particular strings attached. At times 
these strings are reflected in ideological or theoretical assumptions that 
may apply well in the global north but are not appropriate to the African 
context; at other times they are seen in demands that a particular type 
of strategy or programme focus be included in the work. Restrictions on 
flexibility of funding and preference for project-based rather than insti-
tutional support, coupled with the insecurity of short-term grant cycles, 
can severely constrain the agency of funded institutions to respond and 
programme in ways that are, in fact, demanded by very fluid and com-
plex contexts, thus boring into the very heart of the notion of agency, 
and in fact limiting its scope. 
These issues could equally apply to institutions such as TrustAfrica, 
which are both recipients and dispersers of funds. TrustAfrica, as an 
institution that receives funds from others, is itself vulnerable to some 
funding parameters from its own donors, which in turn places restric-
tions on its own agency to act freely. In turn, as a funder, it must also be 
mindful of the way in which its own funding processes, at times, have a 
constraining effect on the agency of its partners.
Alice Brown, looking quite intimately at the issue in Chapter 4, inter-
rogates the notion of being both a funded and funding institution, and 
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the complexities and challenges that arise. She asks: how much agency 
is really possible for an institution like TrustAfrica when it must nego-
tiate funding parameters and timelines with its own donors? And what 
limitations do the negotiations then impose on how TrustAfrica engages 
with its own funded partners? One important implication is that it lim-
its their ability to plan and strategise together over a multi-year period. 
Another is that it may prohibit follow-up activities that could expand 
shorter-term gains into longer-term victories. In some cases, these fund-
ing parameters have affected a partner’s ability to retain its staff or jeop-
ardise its ability to survive as an institution. A further consideration is 
that such funding restrictions can, at times, act as a barrier to more flex-
ible and proactive work, with funded institutions playing what Abbas 
calls ‘a firefighter role’ rather than developing longer-term preventative 
strategies to tackle the issues. This speaks to the need for philanthropic 
institutions to invest in what Alicia Garza, a founder of the Black Lives 
Matter movement, calls ‘long-term power building’ (Friedman, 2016). 
In the absence of their own long-term sustainable resources, howev-
er, TrustAfrica and other like institutions find themselves navigating a 
tricky place: needing to advocate for and negotiate their own agency 
with their donors while simultaneously aiming to ensure that they de-
volve the power this agency brings with it. 
The need for reliable, long-term funding emerges as a major issue 
in these chapters. As Abbas and Brown point out, promising move-
ment-building work slowed considerably when donors ceased their 
funding, when the grant terms expired or when donors changed fund-
ing priorities. Several authors conclude that African philanthropic insti-
tutions need to have their own independent resources that they are able 
to use in a flexible way in response to real-time opportunities and needs 
they see on the ground. Control over the distribution of resources, irre-
spective of source, is thus a critical issue. In addition, cultivating local 
resources will reduce dependency on outside donors and, if combined 
with a ceding of power downwards, can enable a long-term focus on 
promoting agency and advancing social justice. 
To be sure, African resources could easily replicate the power struc-
tures and modalities of the international aid system or international pri-
vate philanthropy. What really matters is the way in which the funds 
are used: an approach that is rooted in locally dictated priorities, with 
decisions being informed by those most affected – an approach that in 
ideology is Africanist and in perspective is intersectional. 
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What does African agency look like? 
Beyond the conceptual, the chapters in this volume add greatly to the 
understanding of what it means in practice to foster African agency. 
The diversity of approaches makes clear that there is no one way to do 
it. TrustAfrica’s theory of change holds that civil society movements, if 
empowered, informed, networked and resourced, can effectively mobil-
ise people to hold all levels of government – as well as other holders of 
power such as the private sector – to account. We see this play out in a 
myriad of ways in the book.
So what do these chapters tell us about TrustAfrica’s work? The 
programmatic chapters collectively point us towards a set of ‘ways of 
working’. While each factor is valuable in and of itself, their full impact 
emerges when they are presented together. These ways of working are 
by no means unique to TrustAfrica or to African philanthropy, but they 
are not the norm for philanthropy generally. Since the chapters them-
selves review these factors, this introduction will not go into detail but 
will rather illustrate some of the core elements and reflect on the issues 
and questions they raise. 
Two uniting threads lie at the heart of TrustAfrica’s work. These 
threads represent the very make-up of the institution and have carried 
through since inception, irrespective of changes in programmatic direc-
tion. The first is the idea of rootedness, which is linked to TrustAfrica’s 
core identity as an African-led institution. The chapters in this book 
indeed reflect rootedness as one of the critical factors underlying its ap-
proach: it is based on the continent, in proximity to the issues and chal-
lenges, with staff committed to directly and indirectly supporting and 
enabling the work, not just resourcing it from afar. The chapters show 
that the impact of this rootedness plays out in several ways. For instance, 
Sipalla reflects on how having an African funder supporting interna-
tional criminal justice work has not only opened doors and transferred 
a sense of legitimacy to its partners but also resulted in the creation 
of spaces for an African narrative to emerge. Brown reflects on how, 
through its physical presence in Liberia and Zimbabwe, TrustAfrica has 
been able to develop intimate relationships with multiple role-players 
and keep a finger on the pulse. She reflects, ‘Its position on the frontlines 
allows it to be an integral part of the strategising and co-creation of solu-
tions alongside civil society and other democratic actors’.
But is geographical location an adequate criterion of rootedness? We 
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see many instances of local funding institutions advancing the idea that 
because they are locally based, they themselves (and not the partners 
doing the work or beneficiaries being affected by the issues) are ex-
perts and know best the nature of the development solutions that are 
required and need to be implemented. In such cases, rootedness can be 
used as a justification for centralising funding power to make decisions 
rather than reaching out to constituency voices to inform those funding 
decisions. The argument of rootedness thus needs always to be seen in 
context, and funders in general need to be mindful of geographic root-
edness not being used as justification for holding on to power rather 
than disbursing it.
Hence it is important that rootedness be accompanied by something 
else. The second uniting thread is the idea of agency, which was earlier 
conveyed as the belief in and capacity of Africans to make their own 
choices about their future. How a philanthropic institution understands 
the agency of its partners is a key determinant of the ways in which it 
will operate, the nature of issues it engages and the types of strategies 
and tactics it will support. Supporting fully the idea of agency requires 
a relinquishing of power downwards to one’s partners – this includes 
the power to determine priorities and solutions, the power to represent 
and speak on behalf of constituents, and the power to create knowledge 
and set agendas. Relinquishing power demands a mode of philanthropic 
operation that in every way is committed to enabling partners not only 
to be heard but also to exercise their influence.
What does it mean in practice, to devolve power? Despite con-
cerns around limited funding cycles and uncertainty at the level of 
TrustAfrica’s funding decisions, this relinquishing of power has, for 
instance, been reflected in the institution’s approach of utilising con-
venings and knowledge building as the basis for developing collective 
agendas and funding priorities. This helps to ensure that resourcing de-
cisions are based on the reality of local issues and priorities. Abbas views 
this as putting the work in context, and we need to note her caution that 
while the idea behind such methods is to broaden the range of voices 
informing its work, there is a very real danger that it still excludes those 
who are not networked in – potentially leaving non-traditional voices 
out of the discussions. At the same time, other authors observe that con-
venings and grounded research have served as key avenues for enabling 
different types of discussions and supporting more collaborative agenda 
setting than would otherwise be the case.
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As Abbas points out, convenings alone are not enough to enable 
the priorities of those most affected to emerge: it also takes a concert-
ed effort to reach out to marginalised communities in order to provide 
resources and enabling mechanisms for their voices to be heard. The 
ongoing challenge for philanthropy, even when moving beyond the net-
worked, more visible organisations, is to constantly explore which are 
the non-institutionalised voices that need to be included. They are often 
not linked to the sector and lack information or networks. Indeed, often 
their plight has continued unabated because of their invisibility and lack 
of access. Sometimes, despite awareness of these voices, bureaucratic 
processes or difficulties in dealing with accessing disparate voices can 
result in the establishment of internal barriers within philanthropic in-
stitutions. When this happens, reaching these voices requires a different 
way of working, an opening to perspectives and voices that challenge 
our comfort zones. 
The chapters show that a key endeavor of TrustAfrica has been to 
deliberately open up the civil society space. Sipalla notes the importance 
of TrustAfrica’s reaching out to civil society beyond the ‘urban, sophis-
ticated African NGO so as to represent better the complex diversity of 
African societies’; Brown reflects on the deliberate inclusion of rural and 
marginalised constituencies; Mubaya discusses reaching out directly to 
farmers’ member-based associations (rather than elite NGOs who seek 
to speak on their behalf); and Abbas looks at the inclusion of younger 
women as shifting the locus of power from the older generation. Several 
authors, however, caution that more can be done in this regard and that 
room could be made for even more diverse engagement – for instance, 
engaging with unaffiliated community organisers or small community 
based organisations, or exploring how to include the voices and prior-
ities that are reflected in less institutionalised spaces of activism. It is 
also important to note that both Abbas and Brown suggest that gender 
has not been adequately incorporated into TrustAfrica’s programmatic 
work, and call for a more integrated and substantive approach to be 
adopted in this regard.
Linked to efforts to expand and include multiple voices is the issue of 
movement building, i.e. developing a cadre of African organisations and 
individuals that can speak with a shared voice, develop collaborative 
agendas and advance collective policy positions. Several chapters high-
light TrustAfrica’s contributions to movement building. Brown sees this 
playing out in collaborative efforts to advance constitutional reforms in 
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Zimbabwe and in the work on natural resources concessions in Liberia. 
Ngirande reflects on how a movement-building approach has greatly 
helped to advance a more contextualised reflection of the IFF challenge 
in Africa, and Sipalla talks about this in relation to enabling the issue of 
victims’ rights to take a much more central place in impunity work. Ab-
bas argues that women’s rights movements require quality resourcing, 
the kind that is possible only when funders apply a movement-building 
lens that is also African. Thus the funding itself needs to have a pan-Af-
rican ideological base and an intersectional focus.
TrustAfrica considers resourcing as one of several core elements re-
quired for movement building and change. It seeks to adopt a holistic 
approach that complements grant funds with networking, institutional 
strengthening (both substantively and technically), leadership develop-
ment, enabling knowledge generation and brokering between different 
and often unequal loci of power. Several of the chapters also reflect on 
how TrustAfrica’s strategic approach to collaboration – which Murisa 
refers to as stemming from its aim to see itself as a ‘landscape interpreter 
and an honest broker responsible for helping forge alliances’ – has a 
significant effect on its work in many areas. It uses donor collaboratives 
to unite and expand the reach of previously disparate and sometimes 
duplicative funding mechanisms, and it uses partner collaboratives to 
broaden and deepen the impact of the collective programmatic work, 
amplify voices and enhance their power to influence policy and practice. 
This type of support is significant given the fact that such a strategic 
approach is relatively rare among funders. A recent report on global hu-
man rights funding, for example, shows that coalition and collaboration 
building received just 5% of grant dollars, and grassroots organising 
only 2% of grant dollars (Koob et al., 2016). 
While several chapters make clear the value of TrustAfrica’ s collabo-
rative approach, they also convey some important lessons for all of those 
who seek to undertake this kind of work. Brown, for instance, highlights 
the need to pay specific attention to the processes required to maintain 
healthy collaborations. Abbas suggests that developing collaborative 
mechanisms needs to be undertaken in a way that ensures that they are 
embedded and can continue beyond the role of the funder. 
Another challenge for TrustAfrica and other philanthropies is to be-
come better at working through an intersectional lens (see Abbas). As 
Murisa points out, while viewing our work in silos enables us to make 
sense of an issue, it simultaneously fragments it. We must therefore find 
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ways to work more effectively together to advance social change across 
issues. Abbas also calls on us to support to an array of movement ac-
tors, recognising that limiting funding to institutionalised actors leads 
to fragmentation rather than movement building. This raises a larger 
question, also posed by Murisa: in a context where unorganised and 
distributed leadership movements are increasingly gaining and claiming 
space, what role is there for philanthropy? How best can philanthropy 
support them without trying to formalise them? What alternative ave-
nues exist to facilitate spaces for these voices to be heard? Can the rules 
of engagement with broader civil society be revised to do so? Ultimately, 
the question needs to be posed: how open is philanthropy to confront-
ing its own limitations in this regard?
A seat at the table
Gerry Salole, the founding chair of TrustAfrica’s board,9 has said 
that ‘TrustAfrica allows Africans to take their rightful seat at the ta-
ble among donors and others who influence development’ (Barya and 
Richardson, 2012). TrustAfrica’s aim has been to use this seat at the ta-
ble – through its ‘ways of working’– to advance two larger ends. First, 
to support the development of narratives, positions and priorities that 
reflect the lived realities of those suffering from injustice. Second, to 
support the use these narratives, positions and priorities to push for 
a more grounded understanding – at the seats of power – of the chal-
lenges being faced on the ground, and thus for more contextualised 
and locally defined solutions. 
The chapters in this book show that TrustAfrica’s support is en-
abling these ends in significant ways. Ngirande, for instance, reflects 
on how northern narratives on the issue of illicit financial flows had 
reinforced asymmetries of power. Because the existing narratives did 
not express or deal with the specificities of the African IFF problem, 
TrustAfrica and its partners undertook a movement building effort to 
reframe the debate on IFF. This, in turn, enabled a more holistic look 
at the structural weaknesses of the global ecosystem. Mubaya observes 
how TrustAfrica’s approach highlighted the traditional dichotomy be-
tween policy advocates and small farmers, and created spaces, for the 
first time, for farmers’ voices to be directly involved in the policy deci-
9  Salole was integral to TrustAfrica’s establishment in his role as the Ford Foun-
dation’s representative in South Africa. He now heads the European Foundation 
Centre.
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sions that affect their lives.
Advancing these ends is not easy in the larger scheme of how in-
stitutional philanthropy continues to play out, and the way in which 
an inequitably configured development system gives precedence to the 
experts and the educated elite. Progress requires implementing strate-
gies that offer a distancing from the conventional wisdom, knowledge 
and expertise, and challenge existing frameworks and priorities. It also 
demands that a concerted effort be made to ensure that space is claimed 
for these narratives, positions and priorities to develop and build mo-
mentum – and that these be interjected into fora where they are able to 
exert influence over decision making.
For institutions such as TrustAfrica, this calls for taking on positions 
that may not be popular or widely accepted, and challenging dominant 
power relations that have long sought to define not just who sits at the 
decision making table, but what issues are up for discussion at that ta-
ble. These locally informed narratives and positions seek to disrupt pre-
vailing orthodoxies, and so institutions such as TrustAfrica consistently 
need to reflect on how to both challenge the systems and yet still retain 
influence within them. Or, seek to develop alternative systems. Through 
the examples in the book, TrustAfrica has seen success in using the 
leverage it has to diffuse power rather than centralise it. In this way it is 
enabling a shift of the balance of power relations from elites to people 
on the ground. It is indeed, African agency at work.
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How To Make Societies Thrive: 
The role of African Philanthropy 
Bhekinkosi Moyo
Introduction
Historically, and in modern times, philanthropy, and in particular African 
philanthropy, has functioned as a glue that binds humanity, promoting 
solidarity and integration. It is the energy that animates collective action, 
unity, and self-reliance as well as the transformation of economic and 
social relations. It builds social cohesion through its emphasis on creat-
ing bonds and bridging difference. This has been consistently confirmed 
by communities and initiatives across Africa. For example, the liberation 
of many African countries was primarily based on philanthropic efforts, 
and testimony to this is found in the solidarity that was built from Al-
geria to South Africa, from Tanzania to Zimbabwe, and from Uganda to 
Mozambique, among others. In addition, communities bonded together 
and provided valuable support to liberation movements and the many 
other united fronts and self-reliance initiatives that were developed, 
for example by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in the 1960s 
through the 1990s. Today this imbedded interface between philanthro-
py and pan-Africanism continues in many of the initiatives and policies 
of the African Union (AU).1 
This chapter discusses the state of African philanthropy today and 
1 For a detailed discussion of the interface between pan-Africanism and African 
philanthropy, see Moyo and Ramsamy (2014).
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the role it plays in promoting and projecting local agency. It also dis-
cusses its role in speaking truth to power, levelling the playing field 
and sustaining development. Philanthropy has been adopted by many 
African institutions. TrustAfrica was one of the first in a series of African 
institutions to formally develop a portfolio on African philanthropy.2 
The chapter therefore reflects on African philanthropy in its many forms 
including the institutionalised version. This is done in an era character-
ised by massive growth and interest in the field as well as by acute social, 
economic and political challenges which require the kind of solidarity 
mechanisms that are the hallmarks of African philanthropy. 
Local agency and African philanthropy frame
In an article about TrustAfrica’s efforts in influencing policies at a 
pan-African level, I equated local agency with philanthropy:
As a foundation based in Africa, TrustAfrica is often in colli-
sion with political elites and others with vested interests. This is 
why we have adopted African agency or what we term African 
philanthropy. Africans should be at the centre of the response 
to their challenges and African philanthropy means resources 
– human, financial, social, intellectual – that can be tapped to 
address Africa’s problems (Moyo, 2010a: 45). 
Local agency is also defined in sociological terms as the capacity of 
individuals to act independently and make their own choices. To be 
sure, local agency is also determined by structural and systemic factors. 
It is therefore appropriate that any investigation of this nature should be 
interested in how philanthropy builds social cohesion and contributes 
to local capabilities and orientations as far as structures and systems 
are concerned. Many countries and societies in Africa in particular have 
local initiatives or practices that have historically provided the founda-
tions for social transformation and social cohesion. These have been 
institutionalised and, often, modernised to frame the economic, social 
and political transformations needed to sustain societies. A case in point 
are local initiatives in Rwanda known as ubudehe, Girinka Munyarwan-
da, and umuganda (Ndahiro et al., 2015). Rwanda’s celebrated success 
is firmly grounded in these practices in areas such as socio-economic 
transformation; good governance, justice, economic development and 
2  Its 2007 Philanthropy Research and Outreach Strategy set in motion such ini-
tiatives as the formation of the African Philanthropy Network (APN), research ini-
tiatives and collaborations as we have them today. 
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social welfare. Elsewhere in East Africa, particularly in Kenya, the same 
practices are found and perhaps best captured in the concept of haram-
bee. In Southern Africa, initiatives of this nature are underpinned by the 
concept of ubuntu. 
Philanthropy and African identity are therefore inseparable. Although 
philanthropy transcends race and geography, it nevertheless remains 
one of the key features of African identity. Philanthropy permeates and 
to a large measure shapes many aspects of individuals, communities 
and institutions. Philanthropy, in the African context, is many things: a 
spirit, energy, power and any other form that makes humanity lovable. 
It connects life with death and rebirth. 
The spirit of solidarity among African societies is what connects ev-
eryone and their aspirations. As I argued in 2011:
Though not a common or even user-friendly concept in Africa, 
philanthropy as a phenomenon perhaps is best captured by the 
notions of ‘solidarity and reciprocity’ among Africans and some 
of the features that accompany relational building. As a result, 
therefore, culture and relational building are central attributes 
in defining what philanthropy in the African context looks like. 
Philanthropy is intrinsically embedded in the lifecycle of birth, 
life and death of many, if not all Africans. At any one given 
time, one is either a philanthropist or a recipient of one kind or 
another of benevolence. (Moyo, 2011: 1)
Seen in this light, philanthropy is an instrument of trust, account-
ability and mutual cooperation. It is those activities (mostly private) 
performed with a goal of promoting well-being. It can take many forms: 
individuals giving to nonprofit organisations; diaspora communities 
funding relief and development projects in their home towns; foun-
dations and charities supporting community projects, social invest-
ments, and programme-related investments; corporations undertaking 
cause-related marketing campaigns as well as multi-million dollar dis-
ease treatment programs. It is members of religious organisations under-
taking short- and long-term missions to help in orphanages; individuals 
using technology such as SMS to transfer funds to disaster victims and 
donating to overseas projects through the internet; and the use of en-
tirely new financial tools, such as social stock exchanges, to promote 
well-being.
This is the prism through which any attempt to understand African 
philanthropy should be seen. It lays the basis for differentiation between 
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African philanthropy and typologies found elsewhere. It also makes 
clear that the establishment of institutions like TrustAfrica, the African 
Women Development Fund, and the Kenya Community Development 
Foundation among others, signalled the birth of a new defining era for 
African philanthropy. This era elevated the position of African philan-
thropy and begun unpacking the nuances and subaltern notions of what 
it means to be philanthropic in the African landscape and equally what 
it means to be African in the philanthropy landscape. With many of 
these institutions operating at national, regional, continental and global 
levels, there has been a resurgence of African pride and the belief in local 
agency. 
Further, there has been recognition and reaffirmation of African 
identity and approaches. Nowhere do we see this more, than around 
the formation of African philanthropy support organisations such as the 
African Philanthropy Network, the Africa Philanthropy Forum, the East 
Africa Association of Grant Makers and many others that have emerged 
across the continent (Mahomed, 2014). There has been a huge upsurge 
of intellectual engagement with the subject; in the last fifteen or so years, 
the literature on African philanthropy has increased enormously.3 
State of philanthropy in Africa and African philanthropy
The philanthropic landscape in Africa is generally characterised 
by both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Because the term 
‘philanthropy’ is not popular with the people in the continent, 
and neither is it useful in capturing what exists, the emerging 
body of literature on philanthropy in Africa prefers to define 
philanthropy as ‘help’ or ‘giving’. Philanthropy refers to giving 
by the poor to other poor individuals of the community. More of-
ten this manifests itself in cultural and linguistic underpinnings 
– hence it normally takes on indigenous expressions such as co-
operatives, rotation and savings clubs (normally called stokvels), 
communal collective efforts and burial societies. Philanthropy 
also takes forms such as private foundations, trusts, corporate 
foundations, family trusts, community chests and community 
foundations (Moyo, 2010b: 263). 
Today, across the continent, and for the first time in history, African 
philanthropy, in particular international private foundations and new-
3 An African Giving Knowledge Database compiled by TrustAfrica shows that 
there are more than 800 writings on African philanthropy. The database can be 
accessed here http://www.trustafrica.org/en/philanthropy-database
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found wealthy individuals, is beginning to take a central role in questions 
of development and sustainability and slowly informing policy process-
es at a national level. In 2009, for example, the government of Liberia 
established the Liberia Philanthropy Secretariat, a platform for linking 
national priorities with philanthropic resources primarily from foreign 
sources. In 2015, the AU launched the African Union Foundation to 
mobilise voluntary contributions in support of its Agenda 2063. Mean-
while, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is in the 
process of developing a framework for the inclusion of philanthropic 
activities in support of its regional integration agenda. In Rwanda, the 
government is currently developing a strategy to engage philanthropy in 
implementing Vision 2020, while in South Africa, the National Treasury 
and Department of Science and Technology are doing the same. 
Giving in Africa by Africans and international benefactors is on the 
increase. Recent research shows that US foundation funding for Africa 
increased from $288.8 million in 2002 to nearly $1.5 billion in 2014 
(Foundation Center, 2015). The number of US foundations giving to 
Africa rose from 135 in 2002 to 248 in 2012. The bulk of the funding 
is for health, agriculture, water and sanitation, women’s empowerment, 
youth employment and education. 
Interestingly, more than 75% of this funding is administered by inter-
mediary organisations headquartered outside Africa. In 2012, twelve of 
the top fifteen recipients of Africa-focused US foundation funding were 
headquartered outside of Africa. One of the arguments advanced for this 
is that local organisations do not have the capacity to absorb and manage 
large resources. This is not true. There has been a significant growth in 
institutionalised philanthropy in Africa. There are many African philan-
thropic institutions, most of which have been in existence for more than 
a decade. TrustAfrica for example, is celebrating ten years of existence in 
2016, during which time it has managed more than $20 million and not 
once has it been found wanting. The same applies to many other such 
groups as the African Women’s Development Fund, the Southern Africa 
Trust and the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund which were established 
precisely to ‘change perceptions about Africa and to begin to imagine 
an Africa capable of deciding her own destiny’ (Moyo, 2008: 40). Not 
only have they managed huge amounts of money, they have also been at 
the forefront of development initiatives and the setting of agendas. They 
have attempted to level the playing field between the traditional power-
ful Northern donors and beneficiaries in Africa, and have argued for the 
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movement of resources closer to where the challenges are and advocated 
for Africans to be the drivers of change. 
African giving is also on the increase, through corporations, fam-
ily foundations, trusts, individual giving, voluntarism and communi-
ty philanthropy. These include Aliko Dangote’s Dangote Foundation 
(manufacturing), Strive Masiyiwa’s Higher Life Foundation (telecom-
munications) and Tony Elumelu’s foundation (investment banking). 
These so called high net worth individuals (HNWIs) are giving back 
to their communities and becoming forces to contend with. They see 
philanthropy as part of the African identity.4 As the number of HNWIs 
grows, so too does the number of institutions, networks and organisa-
tions established by wealthy African individuals. 
The number of Africa’s HNWIs increased by 5.2% in 2014 to 0.15 
million, while their wealth increased by 7.0% to $1.44 trillion. Globally, 
14.65 million HNWIs have a total worth of $56.40 trillion. Africa has 
the fastest growing market of HNWIs in the world. It is further projected 
that Africans with assets more than $30 million will double by 2025, a 
growth of 59% over the next ten years compared to the global figure of 
34% (Capgemini, 2016). 
The number of philanthropists from the technology industry is 
growing globally; Facebook, Amazon and Uber, for instance, generate 
substantial wealth and giving. 
There is also a moderate increase in faith-aligned philanthropies 
from the Middle East and Africa. Arab philanthropy has focused on ei-
ther smaller familial networks or related issues, or has been tied to the 
spread of particular religious practices and beliefs.
The increased interest in the theory and practice on philanthropy 
has also led to the establishment of the Wits Business School Chair in 
African Philanthropy, a joint initiative with the Southern Africa Trust, 
and the first of its kind in Africa. The Chair will spearhead teaching and 
community engagement across the continent, produce internationally 
recognised research, foster innovation, and explore ways to strategise 
and support African-centric mechanisms of giving. 
One can only conclude that there has never been a greater time for 
African philanthropy than today. The momentum and interest around it 
have grown – at times surprisingly so, given that not so long ago philan-
thropy was accorded no role in formal and intergovernmental processes. 
Not many governments considered philanthropy in their policy process-
4  See Mahomed et al. (2014).
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es, and if they did, it was disparagingly or distrustfully. Today they have 
embraced philanthropy as an important resource for development. This 
is an opportunity to assert the role philanthropy plays in building social 
cohesion and local agency. 
Social cohesion and individual empowerment
African people have always recognised the value of bonds that keep 
them together, which is why their struggles were mostly interlinked 
at community, national and global levels. This uncorrupted love and 
compassion led to many movements that were underpinned by features 
of African philanthropy such as unity, self-reliance, solidarity and rec-
iprocity. All of this is framed by the philosophy of Ubuntu – ‘one is 
because of the other’. It is this interdependence that makes philanthropy 
a very powerful paradigm for building social cohesion, developing local 
capabilities and shaping a world where no one should be left behind. At 
his trial in 1960, Nelson Mandela said: ‘During my lifetime, I have dedi-
cated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against 
white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have 
cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons 
live together in harmony and with equal opportunities’. 
Philanthropy has the power to build societies in amazing ways. 
Nowhere is this truer than in African societies. This is perhaps most 
poignantly demonstrated in post-genocide Rwanda, which revisited its 
traditions and sought to rebuild using its own systems and knowledge. 
‘To many observers, Rwanda is an example of how traditional culture 
can be a source of inspiration in finding solutions to modern day chal-
lenges’ (Ndahiro et al., 2015: 312). The first instance of this is Itorero, 
a traditional leadership institution that taught values like nationalism, 
patriotism, hard work and honesty. This instilled in citizens the under-
standing and appreciation of their society and encouraged them to be 
ready to serve it. Itorero is open to all genders and the government has 
revived it and used it to train citizens about what it means to be Rwan-
dan as well as equipping them with leadership skills. The second is the 
Gacaca (‘justice amongst the grass’) courts that were adopted to deal 
with cases of more than 120,000 individuals arrested for the genocide. 
The third is the Agaciro (‘dignity’) Development Fund, established to 
mobilise voluntary contributions to Rwanda’s development. The fourth 
is Girinka Munyarwanda (‘one cow per poor family’), a new initiative 
that was adapted from a traditional practice of solidarity where commu-
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nity members gave each other a cow as a pact of friendship and support 
in situations of misfortune or need. As in most African cultures, a cow 
is a sign of wealth and breaking of poverty. The programme was initi-
ated specifically to deal with malnutrition and poverty. Today, Rwanda 
boasts that the programme has:
Helped curb malnutrition, break down social barriers, improve 
agricultural output, support reconciliation efforts and greatly 
improved the welfare of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans 
(ibid.: 223).
The fifth is the popular umuganda – ‘coming together in a common 
purpose’. Traditionally in Rwanda, community members would meet 
and jointly support one of their community members in constructing 
a house, for example, or farming or working on a community project. 
Nowadays, everyone comes together on the last Saturday of the month 
to participate in a five-hour community work programme. Sixth is the 
practice of ubudehe (mutual assistance), in which community members 
come together and identify the challenges confronting them and devise 
solutions by working together. Today, this practice is used by commu-
nities to identify the needy among them to benefit from programmes 
such as Girinka. 
What is common among these initiatives is that they are all based 
on solidarity. They have also become the foundation for accountable 
governance. When parents build schools, they are the first to make sure 
children go to school, and that the principal manages the infrastruc-
ture properly. And when citizens contribute to the national budget by 
building health centres, offices and roads, they are the ones to demand 
accountability for the use of resources. These home-grown initiatives are 
not peculiar to Rwanda; they are found in other African countries too:
Other forms of reciprocal giving include traditional systems of 
cooperation, mutuality and solidarity. These remain active to-
day across African societies, ‘primarily in rural areas as well in 
informal economic settings’. Among these are rotating savings 
and credit associations – popularly known as stokvels in South 
Africa but found everywhere across Africa. More often a group 
of people come together and pool their resources for a later re-
distribution. Beyond the savings and credit elements is the cen-
tral value of mutual assistance. Burial societies are another form 
of African solidarity which initially played the role of cultural 
and societal compliance with rituals associated with death, es-
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pecially for those who die far from their ancestral homes. Today 
these have incorporated a somewhat micro-insurance aspect to 
them; beyond the communal fundamentals of sending off the 
dead to the land of ancestors, burial societies now serve as finan-
cial backers for the bereaved. There are also other mechanisms 
for sharing labour-intensive ventures such as farming, house 
construction, harvesting or any other activity that might need 
mutual work-sharing. Known as ilima (coming together to help 
those without) among the Nguni-speaking people, this practice 
is widespread across Africa (Moyo, 2011: 7).
Civil society strengthening and movement building
Philanthropy has contributed to the growth and protection of civil soci-
ety in addition to strengthening social cohesion. In Africa, governments 
have traditionally viewed philanthropy, particularly from international 
foundations, as forming part of the western agenda to influence regime 
change. This has been fuelled in part by the fact that foundations have 
supported civil society organisations on issues such as governance, hu-
man rights, poverty eradication, economic development and elections. 
Governments in Africa have not taken kindly to this, as it has tended 
to encourage citizens to hold them to account. The result has been the 
targeting of civil society, including philanthropy, by governments across 
the continent.5 
Civil society’s main role is to defend democratic values, so it is not 
unusual for it to be constrained by governments. As the American aboli-
tionist, Frederick Douglass once said, ‘Power concedes nothing without 
a demand. It never did and it never will’. And African governments in 
particular know this. Most of them came to power through the mobili-
sation of citizens demanding concessions. Historically, especially during 
the anti-colonial struggles, political and civil society lines were blurred. 
It is only after African liberation movements came into power that the 
lines became clear. Civil society has continued to play its watchdog 
function ever since. One-party states – and ironically even modern Af-
rican democratically elected states – have all been wary of civil society. 
The more democratic the space has become, the more vibrant civil soci-
ety has also become, but this has made the state more agitated. In turn 
civil society has been further emboldened and determined to hold the 
state, and increasingly the market, to account. This is a theatre in which 
5  For more on civil society and the operating space, see Moyo (2010b).
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philanthropy is an active participant and not just a spectator. While 
most international foundations were initially geared towards supporting 
new nationalist governments, there was a shift in the late 1970s towards 
human rights and social justice. This is at the time when most African 
governments were adopting the one-party state system and pushing into 
hiding all dissenting or critical voices.6 The point here is that philanthro-
py cannot be viewed outside the confines of government-civil society 
relations. 
Philanthropy has however managed to forge a narrative that it is flex-
ible in its funding modalities, that it is a risk-taker and that it fosters in-
novation. This works well for civil society in all spaces, closed or open. 
For civil society to be able to perform its roles properly and effectively, 
it requires the kind of support that is provided in the main by philan-
thropy. 
Government and philanthropy nexus 
With the rise of these institutions and the growing interest in research-
ing and writing on African philanthropy has come the attention of pol-
icy makers. This has created both opportunities and challenges for Af-
rican philanthropy in the spaces normally reserved for the public and 
private sectors. Increasingly, philanthropy is forming part of the official 
development paradigm while continuing to strengthen communities 
and their formations. This is an exciting moment for philanthropy, but 
it is also one that could contribute towards the weakening of local agen-
cy. As noted elsewhere:
There are concerns that this new era of philanthropy will lead 
to a collusion between philanthropy and governments in pursu-
ing government agendas, which could be at the expense of civil 
society. No doubt, governments are clear about their need to 
engage philanthropy: they are engaging philanthropy in order to 
meet global and national targets; theirs is to align philanthropic 
interventions and resources with national priorities. Govern-
ments further recognise the value of risk taking, innovation 
and stakeholder engagements, which characterise philanthro-
py. These are not features to be found in any government, and 
yet increasingly citizens are pushing their governments hard on 
service delivery. It has become clear to some governments that 
they need philanthropy to provide these features (Moyo, 2016).
6  See Moyo (2005). 
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Clearly something significant is happening. Philanthropy is being 
stretched. This is due to its resources and what governments think they 
will get if they engage it. Most governments are facing the reality of de-
clining ODA flows. This has forced many to think of alternative sources 
of support. Philanthropy has become one of the sources, and it is being 
actively courted by governments. The evidence is clear in many coun-
tries. Globally, in the consultations leading to the Fourth High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness (held in Busan, South Korea in July 2012), 
African countries emphasised the need to shift from aid effectiveness 
to development effectiveness. The broad way in which the Busan Part-
nership for Effective Development Cooperation was crafted allowed for 
the accommodation of other forms of development resources, including 
philanthropy. This rethinking of development assistance has also been 
apparent in recent global processes. The International Conference on 
Financing for Development that took place in Addis Ababa in July 2015 
produced an outcome document that was endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly and which spoke of the role that ought to be played by philan-
thropy and foundations:
We welcome the rapid growth of philanthropic giving and the 
significant financial and non-financial contribution philanthro-
pists have made towards achieving our common goals. We rec-
ognize philanthropic donors’ flexibility and capacity for inno-
vation and taking risks and their ability to leverage additional 
funds through multi-stakeholder partnerships. We encourage 
others to join those who already contribute. We welcome ef-
forts to increase cooperation between philanthropic actors, 
Governments and other development stakeholders. We call for 
increased transparency and accountability in philanthropy. We 
encourage philanthropic donors to give due consideration to lo-
cal circumstances and align with national policies and priorities. 
We also encourage philanthropic donors to consider managing 
their endowments through impact investment, which considers 
both profit and non-financial impacts in its investment criteria.7
Governments and intergovernmental agencies clearly see a poten-
tial role for philanthropy and they have already made up their minds 
on how they seek to benefit from it. Most governments are interested 
in the resources. If philanthropy provided about $30 million towards 
the implementation of MDGs, and if, as Brad Smith argues in his blog, 
7  UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/69/13 adopted on 27 July 2015.
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foundations are projected to provide $364 billion of the $3.5 trillion 
required,8 then philanthropy is a potential source of additional funding 
for governments. 
This is an opportunity for philanthropy to reclaim local agency 
for civil society, reform restrictive laws and forge a partnership that 
builds on the contributions of each. For example, in designing govern-
ment-philanthropy collaborations, philanthropy can demand that cer-
tain principles and values be in place in return for resources. 
Wither African philanthropy?
In a context where African countries are turning increasingly inward 
for resources, the philanthropic sector is becoming more central, and 
African HNWIs are increasingly able to contribute to this development. 
What is critical is that philanthropic initiatives recognise the importance 
of an African understanding of community. 
Philanthropy should therefore engage governments strategically and 
robustly while maintaining a critical independence. Principles of en-
gagement ought to be collectively developed and agreed upon between 
governments and philanthropies. Philanthropy must insist on a seat at 
the policy making table in order to advance social justice and support 
democratic values. It also needs to continue supporting civil society and 
using its leverage with governments to push for appropriate reforms. 
There is no doubt that more governments will be developing philan-
thropy engagements. Indeed, they may have little choice given the de-
clining support from bilateral and multilateral institutions. At the same 
time philanthropy must address some of the criticism that has been 
levelled against it, otherwise governments will disparage it when it de-
mands reforms. When all is said and done, philanthropy is still a part of 
civil society, despite its current cordial relationship with governments. 
Civil society is organic and rooted in communities, while governments 
are transitory. Philanthropy can therefore help societies thrive and un-
lock their creative energies.
8  ‘Foundations will contibute $364 billion to SGDs’. Philanthropy News Digest, 
24 May 2016.
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3
African Agency 
in Contested Contexts: 
A reflection on TrustAfrica’s work in
international 
criminal justice
Humphrey Sipalla
‘The world supply of disinterested altruists and unconditional aid is 
very small indeed.’
Julius Nyerere1
Introduction
In 2016, TrustAfrica celebrates its first decade as an African foundation 
and leader in shaping African philanthropy on the continent. Its work is 
built on a commitment to African agency, the conviction that Africans 
are the rightful drivers of efforts aimed at the transformation of their 
condition. This notion of agency is complicated, however, in the case 
of TrustAfrica’s International Criminal Justice (ICJ) Fund. In this field, 
which seeks international justice for victims of crimes such as atrocity, 
1  Nyerere (1970).
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opinions are sharply divided over what it means for Africans to support 
Africa. This chapter discusses TrustAfrica’s work in this contested set-
ting, where a truly African theory and practice of philanthropy is emerg-
ing. 
The ICJ Fund is a multi-donor fund whose vision is an Africa with-
out impunity for perpetrators of international crimes.2 The fund seeks 
to strengthen the capacity of local African civil society organisations 
(CSOs) to combat impunity through supporting social movements, el-
evating the voices of victims, and concerted advocacy for domestic, re-
gional and international accountability mechanisms. The fund works 
to generate improved knowledge and understanding of international 
criminal justice and related issues. Its theory of change is that a well-in-
formed citizenry and concerted civil society advocacy will provide the 
impetus for African leaders to address the scourge of impunity.
The fund was created in 2012 as a response to the growing backlash 
in Africa against the International Criminal Court (ICC), depicting the 
ICC as a pro-Western, imperialist organisation that disproportionately 
targeted Africans. Such depictions had overshadowed the need to secure 
justice on the continent. Although originally established to bolster Afri-
can support for the ICC, the fund’s understanding of what it means to be 
an African grant maker supporting African agency in a polarised setting 
has evolved, become more nuanced. This chapter sets out to discuss this 
evolution.
A history of the notion of African agency
The colonial enterprise, which any reflection on Africa’s present and 
future can only ill-advisedly ignore, was built around denigrating the 
colonial subject (Fanon, 1963). Early assertions of African agency like 
the Negritude movement, which arose in the 1930s, relied on artistic ex-
pressions of cultural pride to reject the denigration of Africans and their 
descendants. It was not long, however, before Africans began to point 
2  In our present context, these are genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. The atrocities such crimes entail are considered so grievous as to ‘deeply 
shock the conscience of humanity’ and thus are of ‘concern to the international 
community as a whole’ especially as they ‘must not go unpunished’ with a view to 
‘end impunity and [thus] contribute to their prevention’. See Preamble of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. However, international crimes may, in 
a larger context, also refer to crimes that threaten international peace and security, 
such as the crime of aggression, or crimes that necessarily occur beyond the normal 
jurisdiction of one state, such as piracy.
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to the future of African agency, where spoken affirmations of cultural 
self-worth alone would not suffice. For instance, Wole Soyinka sharply 
criticised Negritude thus: ‘A tiger does not proclaim his tigritude, he 
pounces.’
In the 1950s, as Africans fought for political independence, so urgent 
and necessary a task was it to assert African agency that Kwame Nkru-
mah, in his ‘Motion of Destiny’ speech in 1953, argued for the right of 
Africans to make their own mistakes as all peoples do.
The establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) em-
bodied this conviction that official African action would be directed by 
Africans. However, while the elimination of oppression and discrimina-
tion had been a ‘major factor in the African drive to self-determination 
and independence, the initial post independence [human rights] record 
of African states was generally unsatisfactory’ (Jallow, 2012). It was sad-
ly not unusual for African states to focus on the evils of apartheid while 
ignoring the ‘massive and systemic violations, sometimes of a genocidal 
scale’, amongst OAU members.
With Africans exercising their right to make mistakes, people began 
to demand more from African agency than rebuttals of cultural inferior-
ity and recitals of lofty dreams. 
African agency as improving the lot of Africans
In the academy, Wole Soyinka was insisting that the tiger ought pounce 
more than roar. Among statesmen, Julius Nyerere was already in 1970 
showing dissatisfaction at the then prevailing trend of speaking in 
dreamy solidarity:
[I]t is no longer enough […] to meet and complain to each oth-
er and to the world. […] Simply to meet and repeat our goals 
and intentions is, therefore, meaningless. Worse, it would imply 
that we have doubts about ourselves, and our ability to continue 
along the path that we have chosen for ourselves.3 
Léopold Sédar Senghor, speaking in 1979, exemplified the decid-
edly introspective turn in assertions of African agency: ‘Unfortunately, 
independent Africa hardly teaches a thing or two on human rights. Let 
us admit our weakness. It is the best method of getting over it.’4 From 
Nkrumah fighting for a right to make mistakes, it was now time to own 
3  Nyerere  (1970).
4  At the opening the first meeting of the Drafting Committee for the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Dakar (Jallow, 2012: 62).
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up to those failures. 
On the official level, the most momentous change was that of replac-
ing the OAU with the African Union (AU) in 2001. This was far from a 
simple name change. The OAU had been focused on eliminating colo-
nialism and apartheid, and it considered state sovereignty as an abso-
lute. The AU, on the other hand, has been described as the product of a 
paradigm shift in African official thinking, from OAU’s policy of non-in-
terference to a policy of non-indifference. Institutionally, the AU envi-
sioned the creation of a court of justice to hold African states to account 
for international obligations, and a parliament that would progressively 
take over legislative powers from the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government. It envisioned a wider set of institutions to engage in poli-
cymaking, such as the AU Peace and Security Council. Significantly, it 
absorbed the institutional vision of the 1991 African Economic Com-
munity Treaty that aimed to revamp and integrate African economies. 
On the accountability front, fresh with the memory – and guilt – of the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda, the AU appropriated the bold legal right of 
the Union to intervene in any member state to stop the commission of 
international crimes – genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity 
– under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.5
Beyond responsibility: African agency as accountability
In the few years of the twenty-first century, the question of the true na-
ture of African agency has become nuanced, especially in the context 
of Senghorian candour about Africa’s human rights failings. Clearly, 
African agency must start with Africans being in charge of the de-
cisions that affect their lives, even if this may involve making mis-
takes. But does African agency include African accountability for any 
such mistakes? How does Africa assert pride in itself while being frank 
about its failings? Are the old ideas of absolute African state sovereign-
ty and non-interference valid? Who among the Africans, between per-
petrator and victim, governor and the governed, holds rights to speak 
on our behalf? How do well-meaning Africans confront state failure 
while working with the authorities? What is an authentic African re-
sponse to impunity for egregious human rights violations? And, are 
those who denigrate Africans necessarily non-African? These questions 
5  To be sure, in the past African states had, haphazardly and in national self-in-
terest, intervened in other countries, even militarily, as Tanzania did in 1979 to oust 
Idi Amin and ECOMOG, led by Nigeria, did in Liberia and Sierra Leone. But these 
were mostly exceptions to OAU policy.
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are central to any conception of African philanthropy.
African agency without African money?
The implicit North-South divide that characterised assertions of African 
agency from the earliest times seems to have a tenacious hold, especially 
as concerns the question of sources of finance. Benjamin Mkapa, speak-
ing on peace-building and transitional justice in Africa in 2014, offers 
this reflection:
African mediators constitute an essential part of the post Cold 
War pattern of local and regional actors seeking solutions to lo-
cal and regional problems. […] Although there has been signif-
icant movement in reducing the competition between African 
and international actors over management, organisation, and 
ownership of mediation, a lot more needs to be done to establish 
functional and fruitful collaborative governance in mediation. 
Resource imbalances between African and international mediators 
are not going to go away soon. And when some international 
actors deride the capacity of African mediators, hostilities be-
tween local and international mediators deepen. On the other 
hand, some African actors have the tendency to diminish the 
significance of international contributions particularly in the 
event of successful mediation outcomes (Mkapa, 2016 [empha-
sis added]). 
Issa Shivji (2005) captured the evolution of global political econo-
my and the challenges to African agency that it poses to African philan-
thropy. Shivji distinguishes between civil society actors and non-gov-
ernmental organisations,6 locating the African NGO at the ‘crossroads 
of the defeat of the national project and rehabilitation of the imperial 
project’,7 which recalls the century of evolving debate on African agen-
cy recounted above.
6  Civil society is traditionally defined as the space between the individual in 
private life and the state. Philanthropy necessarily acts within this space, which 
encompasses a wide variety of actors, from small community associations to trade 
unions and national and international networks. However, in twenty-first century 
Africa, this space, Shivji points out, has become dominated by the donor-funded 
NGO. He characterises NGO self-perception as a ‘non-governmental, non-political, 
non-partisan, non-ideological, non-academic, non-theoretical, not-for-profit asso-
ciation of well-intentioned individuals dedicated to changing the world to make it 
a better place for the poor, the marginalised and the downcast’.
7  See Shivji (2005) ‘By Way of a Preface’.
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Shivji’s is admittedly a ‘ruthless self critique’.8 He laments the ‘false 
bi-polarity or dichotomy between the state and civil society’ in Africa. 
In the context of resource imbalances, Shivji wonders whether the do-
nor-funded African NGO is conscious of the ideological undercurrents 
of social change activism or is an unwitting player in what he calls a 
new-age civilising mission.9
Concurrent to the North-South divide is the divide within African 
societies. The African NGO form dominates the civil society space. Yet, 
does this NGO form adequately express the concerns of the lowly Afri-
can, who in the context of international criminal justice, is the victim of 
atrocity crimes? To be sure, in the early years of African agency, it was 
assumed that any African spoke for all Africans. In twenty-first century 
Africa, this is not always the case. Are the views of local movements such 
as neighbourhood associations, victims’ groups or rural communities 
influential in setting agendas and forming policy? Is a bottom-up model 
possible if these local voices remain dependent on resources outside 
their communities? 
A prominent official African challenge to accountability advocacy is 
the peace versus justice debate that argues that conflict-weary commu-
nities prioritise an end to conflict. Seeing international criminal justice 
as a component of justice and reconciliation efforts, the African NGO is 
challenged to ‘pursue holistic approaches that ensure justice for victims 
of gross human rights violations’ (TrustAfrica and MacArthur Founda-
tion, 2011). To achieve this, the civil society space ought allow for other 
CSO actors beyond the urban, sophisticated African NGO, so as to rep-
resent better the complex diversity of African societies. 
An overview of the ICJ Fund
At the turn of the century, African NGOs and intelligentsia had viewed 
the AU’s policy shift to non-indifference, the establishment of the Afri-
8 Shivji centres his critique of the African NGO form around five points he 
calls ‘silences’: a self-definition that emphasises a non-state bi-polarity; priori-
tising activism before understanding the phenomena to be changed; accepting 
the present state as permanent; the depoliticisation of civil society action that 
disregards the complexity of social interests and social justice; and ambiguous 
change theory that separates African activism from African intellectualism.
9  In this battle for the African soul, Shivji’s arguments seem echoed by Gathii 
(2011), who posits that, insofar as neo-liberal trade agreements are concerned, de-
veloping countries are no longer hapless victims of Western imposition, but eager 
and willing adopters.
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can Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the strong official African 
support for the ICC, as heralding a new dawn for respect for human 
rights and fighting impunity. Yet, between 2005 and 2010, the sharp 
reversal in official support for existing accountability mechanisms raised 
concern among Africa’s human rights community.
In November 2011, a meeting was organised by TrustAfrica, the 
Centre for Citizen Participation in the African Union (CCPAU) and the 
MacArthur Foundation in Nairobi to reflect on this troubling trend. The 
58 participants were drawn from African NGOs, think tanks, donor 
institutions and African intellectuals, and sought to define an effective 
advocacy response to the ICC backlash. Participating donor institutions 
agreed to explore the possibility of joint funding in order to leverage the 
impact of individual donors and reach a more diverse group of African 
CSOs working on international criminal justice. The resulting fund, the 
TrustAfrica International Criminal Justice Fund, became operational in 
2012.
The fund sets out its strategy thus: to strengthen the capacity of hu-
man rights organisations to contribute to transitional justice policymak-
ing at the national level; and to develop informed and concerted advo-
cacy strategies to promote international criminal justice at the regional 
and international levels. This strategic choice envisioned the following 
outcomes: ‘Increased knowledge and understanding of the African inter-
national criminal justice landscape; Improved advocacy capacity of civil 
society organisations; Discernible improvements in responses to atrocity 
crimes’ (TrustAfrica, 2015: 13).
The fund engages in three classes of activities: technical assistance 
(commissioned research mapping out the ICJ landscape in Africa, na-
tionally, regionally and internationally); peer learning convenings; and 
grants, which constitute the principal activity of the fund.
A fiery baptism in 2012
The fund’s earliest strategy statement had an almost exclusively ICC fo-
cus. In 2012, the fund planned to make two main clusters of grants: 
for national campaigns on ratification, domestication and monitoring 
implementation of the Rome Statute; and for regional and internation-
al campaigns on developing cooperation policies with the AU organs, 
or urging the ICC Prosecutor and the UN Security Council to consid-
er cases from elsewhere in the world. The fund aimed to support the 
following activities: advocacy training and skills building; Rome Stat-
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ute ratification and domestication campaigns and media outreach; di-
alogues and partnerships between states and advocacy organisations; 
and networking and coalition building among advocacy organisations. 
In addition, the fund planned rigid funding caps for its two classes of 
grants: $50,000 for national projects and $100,000 for regional or in-
ternational projects.
A project was supported for civil society advocacy during the July 
2012 AU Summit in Malawi. The Summit did not materialise, because 
Malawi refused to invite Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. It was 
moved at the last minute to Addis Ababa, resulting in tensions that made 
for a particularly hostile ICC advocacy environment; the project was 
thus changed to support domestic public interest litigation, research 
and a conference on accountability for atrocity crimes in South Africa.
This very first project became emblematic of the politically charged 
and highly fluid nature of international criminal justice advocacy. If ever 
the fund had expected to apply its initial strategy rigidly, the circum-
stances of this project made it evident that a more nuanced approach 
was necessary. 
During the course of 2012, TrustAfrica took two important steps. 
First, it recruited dedicated staff for the ICJ Fund. Second, it commis-
sioned local experts to conduct eleven scoping studies on the interna-
tional criminal justice landscape in ten specific countries and the AU. 
These studies became the foundation of the fund’s model of knowledge 
management, which favours local expertise and promotes proximity to 
local concerns. The fund did not issue its second grant until October 
2013.
Scoping studies as knowledge from the periphery
The fund spent the period between late 2012 and mid-2013 conducting 
scoping studies in Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Egypt, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Uganda, Sudan and 
the AU. The studies depicted each country’s (and the AU’s) specific po-
litical and legal issues and made recommendations of potential areas of 
action and local partners. Some, such as the Egypt report, presciently 
foresaw a significant reversal of democratic gains following the 2011 
Arab Spring.
The studies affirmed the value of local expertise. Some also identified 
local actors who may not have been well known to international donors, 
but who stood to be potential partners and grantees. 
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In 2015 and 2016, the fund commissioned additional studies, on 
the implications of the unexpected arrest of former Lord’s Resistance 
Army commander Dominic Ongwen, the situation in Uganda, and the 
ICJ landscape in Cameroon and the Central African Republic.
Principles of a nuanced and evolving grants policy
Attention to local context
In contrast to the initial grants policy described earlier, the fund’s cur-
rent practice seems more contextually appropriate. In Nigeria, for in-
stance, given the high probability of pursuing Rome Statute domesti-
cation10 and the need for documentation of victims as identified in the 
scoping study, the fund supported the work of the Nigerian Coalition 
for the ICC (NCICC). In Uganda, the political climate allowed for a 
first-ever attempt to bring together war victims across several decades to 
a national platform. On the other hand, as opposed to the situation be-
fore 2011, with the election of two Kenyan indictees to the highest polit-
ical offices, Kenya replaced Sudan as the source and locus of a sustained 
state-driven campaign to delegitimise the ICC. Funding to Uganda and 
Kenya projects has reflected this, and has included a mix of regional and 
international advocacy by Kenyan and other African NGOs, engaging 
the national discourse on domestic prosecution (the proposed Interna-
tional Crimes Division of the High Court of Kenya), pro-active media 
engagement to balance the public narrative, and raising the profile of 
the victims who consistently get lost in the highly politicised Kenyan 
environment.
Victim centredness
The fund’s early documentation did not mention ‘victim’ even once, but 
it has since placed significant focus on victim-centred projects; indeed, 
the first two grants approved in 2013 were entirely victim-centred. All 
grants currently incorporate an element of victim promotion, such as 
coalition building that involves victims’ groups, litigation or advocacy 
that raises aspects of victims concerns, and research or documentation 
10  ‘Domestication’ is the process by which states convert international treaties 
they have ratified into locally enforceable laws. This is traditionally seen as a re-
quirement in countries that follow the English common law tradition which sees 
international law as separate from national law. Such legal systems are thus termed 
‘dualist’. Most other countries however follow a ‘monist’ system by which the ratifi-
cation of a treaty automatically makes it enforceable by local courts. Nigeria, being 
of dualist Common Law tradition, applies the ‘domestication’ requirement.
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work that similarly incorporates victim-centred approaches. It is safe to 
say the fund has made victim-centred project design central to its work. 
Fund documentation from 2016 makes the focus on victims a necessary 
theme rather than a simple sub-category.
Flexible funding limits
Current practice now regards the $50,000 and $100,000 as guidelines 
rather than rigid limits. The lower category of grants is issued to new 
grantee partners to allow the fund to either acquire first-hand experi-
ence of their organisational capacities or grow such capacities where 
pre-funding assessments have noted weaknesses. First-time partners 
may receive more than $50,000 on the strength of excellent reviews.11 
At present, grants range from $30,755 to $150,000. The highest grant 
amounts so far approved for first-time partners are $110,000, $103,000 
and $100,000. 
While it would have been easier to retain rigid funding caps, the fund 
attempts to instead make its evaluation on a case-by-case basis, priori-
tising the project needs and organisational capacity over fixed internal 
limits. This has allowed for more effective projects, such as AYINET’s 
2014 National War Victims Conference, which was the first time that 
local victims’ associations had been afforded a platform to share among 
themselves and directly voice their aspirations to state officials. 
Civil society movement building
Another benefit of this move away from rigid funding caps is seen in 
the fund’s focus on civil society movement building (including a media 
constituency), with sometimes small but bold grants.12 Such a focus is 
central to the idea of TrustAfrica supporting African agency. In fact, the 
proportion of total investment devoted to movement building was 42% 
between 2012 and 2015, and this could only have been achieved with 
flexible funding. The fund applies a progressive growth principle that 
facilitates its commitment to going off the beaten path to identify under-
11  Factors include recommendations by other donors who have worked with 
the organisation in question, previous handling of grants of a similar value, and 
evidence of sound financial and project management systems.
12  Grants to Coalition malienne des défenseurs des droits humains (COMADDH), 
Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), Kenya Chapter of the International Com-
mission of Jurists (ICJ-K), Association des femmes africaines pour le recherche et le 
développement (AFARD), Nigerian Coalition for the ICC (NCICC), African Youth 
Initiative Network (AYINET) and Journalists for Justice (JFJ) are notable examples.
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served constituencies and grow their capacities with incremental multi-
year grants. The fund thus serves as a facilitator, providing support and 
expertise in grant application and execution to small organisations and 
allowing them time and opportunities to grow. 
Movement building is approached from national and regional lev-
els. In Mali, for instance, grants have included support to strengthen 
a national network of human rights advocates, facilitating the national 
secretariat’s efforts to work with rural affiliates. By illustration, women’s 
groups from across the country engaged in research data collection that 
valorised their local knowledge but also strengthened their connections 
to the national network. In Uganda, support for follow-up activities 
from the war victims conference focused on cementing the incipient vic-
tims’ movement that had for decades been split into regional groupings. 
Peer learning
The fund applies a peer learning approach to the meetings and con-
ferences it supports. For instance, when supporting the 2014 AYINET 
conference, the fund ensured that grantee partners from other African 
countries attended, to see what best practices could be learnt from their 
Ugandan fellows. Uganda has one of the longest running conflicts in Af-
rica, and was the first country in the world to set up a truth commission, 
in 1974, as well as the first to refer cases to the ICC. 
This event made deep impressions on some of the fund’s grantee 
partners from Kenya, Ivory Coast and Mali; the relative youth of their 
conflicts means victims’ associations remain deeply divided along the 
same sectarian lines that fuelled the conflicts in the first place.
Similarly, the Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC) incorporated 
fund partners in its workshop to reflect on the status of international crim-
inal justice at the continental level and in national litigation. ICJ Kenya 
and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Afri-
ca (CODESRIA) have been supported to nurture other African NGOs by 
involving them in their advocacy missions at the AU and ICC Assembly 
of State Parties. Other peer learning activities include the annual interna-
tional criminal justice convening, which provides a platform for partners 
to share experiences. These activities enable the fund to build the capacity 
of its partners while itself learning from the participants.
The basket fund principle
As at end of 2015, the fund had seven primary donors: the John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Oak Foundation, the Open So-
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ciety Human Rights Initiative, the Open Society Foundation, Humanity 
United, the Sigrid Rausing Trust and an anonymous donor. These seven, 
together with TrustAfrica, pool their resources in a basket fund. In the 
case of the ICJ Fund, TrustAfrica is both grantee and equal partner. It 
does not simply serve as an outsourced administrator for the primary 
donors but as an active driver of policy and practice. A Steering Com-
mittee composed of these eight sets policy and manages the work of the 
fund.
Advantages of the basket fund approach
According to members of the Steering Committee, this resource pooling 
helps eliminate duplication when donors operate separately and allows 
for better trends analysis to avoid over-concentration in thematic or geo-
graphical areas. It also enhances the impact of overall interventions, and 
serves to build consensus on the best possible approaches to challenging 
impunity for atrocity crimes. This also helps prepare the fund for the 
long-term nature of international criminal justice advocacy. 
The diversity of donors enables the rich range of innovative ap-
proaches the fund is currently engaged in. While one donor may em-
phasise documentation, and another prioritise movement building, a 
third may focus on pro-ICC advocacy. Interventions range from a focus 
on international structures of criminal accountability, through promo-
tion of continental and national accountability structures, to support for 
victim concerns and overall transitional justice actions (documentation, 
truth telling, reconciliation, reparations). 
By working in concert within the fund, grant makers are challenged 
to consider supporting activities that would otherwise have fallen out-
side their purview. The AYINET conference, for instance, was supported 
by the fund despite it having been earlier rejected by one of the fund’s 
basket donors.
With small staff and large portfolios, grant makers are not always 
able to fund as many interventions as they would like. The diversity of 
local contexts, grant makers’ location far from said contexts and admin-
istrative bottlenecks mean their involvement in Africa has often been far 
from optimal. The fund allows them to expand their reach and support 
the type or depth of projects they may not have supported if working 
individually.
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Challenges of operating as a basket fund
No worthy endeavour is without its challenges. For the basket fund, 
these proceed from two key factors: first, the presence of several primary 
donors means that several distinct approaches have to be harmonised; 
second, the power dynamics within the Steering Committee require 
constant diplomacy from all concerned, and especially TrustAfrica, as 
both a grantee of and equal partner to its primary donors.
A key task for TrustAfrica in the basket fund is one of harmonising 
these diverse interests. But it also requires each donor to seek the com-
mon interest. This is not always easy. For instance, peer learning among 
grantee partners, which promotes the fund’s efficacy, also requires in-
creased expenditure on meetings, something that is not always popular 
among donors. Also, finding and supporting new CSO actors is time- 
and capital-intensive. 
The Steering Committee faces the challenge of continuous introspec-
tion of its role. Should it make overall policy or participate in specific 
decision making? Should a donor be allowed to veto an approach or 
place upon a meeting’s agenda, a review of an intervention that does 
not fit its preferred approach? Ought a donor be allowed to know what 
proportion of their investment in the basket goes into a particular proj-
ect? And how does a donor conduct oversight of its own grant making 
in such a basket fund effort?
TrustAfrica mitigates these challenges by maintaining stringent in-
ternal administrative controls, as it is a trustee of its primary donors’ 
funds. TrustAfrica must also maintain a constant diplomatic poise, using 
carefully crafted meetings to hear and respond to any queries from its 
donor partners. This is not always easy: a simple conference call from 
Dakar can be difficult to organise, given poor connectivity and varied 
time zones. Fund staff must also synthesise documentation from all the 
fund’s activities to be discussed at SC meetings. 
Certain attributes of the ICJ Fund
Close relationships with partners
The fund’s secretariat has developed working methods which funded 
partners have described as respectful, conducive to capacity-building 
and sensitive to local needs. It is this strength that affords the fund its 
ability to respond effectively to the dynamic and complex circumstances 
it works in. Staff of the fund take time to get to know their prospective 
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partners, to understand their weaknesses, and in some cases to help 
them draft their applications.
Such an approach is fraught with pitfalls. A grant maker must, by 
definition, sit in judgement over its partners, not only at the applica-
tion stage, but throughout the grant period. The fund needs to support 
weak prospective partners without compromising objectivity. This ap-
plies both substantively and administratively. Expanding grant making 
to underserved communities also adds critical administrative questions 
such as monitoring project costs, which can only poorly be assessed 
from outside their context.
Seeking out underserved communities and NGOs
The African landscape of human rights advocacy and, by extension, in-
ternational criminal justice, is largely dominated by the urban NGO, 
staffed by well-educated, soft-skilled13 Africans in mostly English-speak-
ing Africa. The donor community acting in African human rights advo-
cacy is dominated by players from the Anglo-Saxon world. By contrast, 
French, Portuguese and Arabic non-African donors are scarce. And the 
typical civil society actor, particularly in French-speaking Africa, is a 
national association of many grassroots associations, with a limited na-
tional secretariat. Their constituency and staffing is likely to lack the soft 
skills needed to penetrate the English-speaking philanthropy world.
The fund has focused on reversing this trend by seeking out small, 
poorly resourced NGOs with a strong grassroots constituency, and de-
ploying larger ones to support capacity building among them. The fund 
has taken affirmative action to facilitate the incorporation of poorly re-
sourced NGOs that do not fit the dominant characteristic of the urban 
sophisticated English-speaking NGO. 
The fund shuns the usual ‘call for proposals’ model, which tends 
to favour the well-resourced, experienced NGO, not least because they 
would be connected by internet to the virtual networks where such calls 
are distributed. Instead, the fund invites potential organisations to con-
versations aimed at synergising common aims.
Thanks to this approach, the fund’s partners include a number of 
non-urban associations from English-speaking Africa and even larger 
number of associations from French-speaking Africa that had hitherto 
13  By ‘soft skills’, we mean the intangible cultural understandings, demonstrated 
in language, etiquette and general diplomatic manner that would endear one, at a 
personal level, to interlocutors. Such skills better dispose a person to multicultural 
exchanges, which are necessary for inter-personal relations with Western donors. 
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been unable to attract significant funding. Coupled with a multi-year 
funding approach, a number of initially weak associations have grown 
in capacity and skills; they implement ever larger projects, and can ap-
ply their new skills to approach other donors with more stringent entry 
requirements. The fund thus becomes both benefactor and facilitator.
African identity versus African money
In international criminal justice advocacy, where the prevailing offi-
cial narrative is that international mechanisms seeking accountability 
for mass atrocities are neo-imperialist, the fund’s African identity bears 
great import. A number of the fund’s partners have indicated that simply 
being funded by an African donor makes advocacy before state authori-
ties more feasible. In their words, it ‘opens doors’ that would otherwise 
be locked. But as we have seen, TrustAfrica is itself funded by Western 
donors. This then begs the question of whether African identity neces-
sarily requires African money.
In its ‘Africanness’, the fund presents one viable response to the co-
nundrum of African philanthropy, given the very limited supply of dis-
interested altruists that Nyerere described, and the even more limited 
share of African philanthropists supporting human rights work, disin-
terested or otherwise. While Africa must progressively build its own 
‘bank’ of indigenous philanthropy to build African civil society, Nyere-
re’s call can also be seen as a challenge of substance. African money can 
be used to the detriment of Africa. Further, donor finance, regardless of 
its source, may cement top-down approaches, where the local and the 
periphery lose even the little say over their lives that they already have. 
If African philanthropy can apply models that empower the African pe-
riphery while utilising Western sources of finance, then the greater the 
benefit for Africans.
One answer may lie, if the fund’s practice is anything to go by, in 
the model that is applied by African states themselves. The true dis-
interested altruist is one who listens to and responds to the needs of 
the subaltern, rather than dictating terms because they hold the purse 
strings. African states themselves seek funding from beyond the conti-
nent. What makes their action Afrocentric is not therefore the source of 
funding but where the decision-making agency lies. The African state 
can claim a mandate to govern, but good governance demands, of the 
state, the philanthropist and the NGO, not simply to speak for the pe-
riphery, but to allow themselves to be changed by the priorities of these 
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peripheral communities.
Bridging NGO-academy, NGO-state dichotomies
The fund has made efforts to ensure that an intellectual understanding of 
the phenomena it seeks to act in favour of is at the core of and precedes 
its action. We have explored some examples above. In addition, the 
fund has sponsored projects seeking to bring African activism together, 
not only with the intelligentsia, but also with the state. It has been help-
ful that international criminal justice is itself ripe for such encounters. 
There is significant public discussion of the complexities of accountabil-
ity for atrocities in Africa across the intelligentsia, NGOs and states. In 
fact, a good number of the thought leaders in this regard can be seen as 
intellectuals who work with state (nationally or internationally) and/or 
civil society. CODESRIA, for example, is arguably the premier African 
centre for social sciences scholarship, and is an inter-governmental or-
ganisation as well. CODESRIA’s continental conference on International 
Criminal Justice, Reconciliation and Peace in Africa: the ICC and Be-
yond, held on 10-12 July 2014 in Dakar, brought together intellectuals, 
activists and state authorities to debate the complexities of international 
criminal justice in Africa.
Opportunities for the future
Official hostility to ICJ in Africa is far from universal
African diversity is also evident at the official level. African countries 
such as Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi have shown a willing-
ness to uphold their Rome Statute obligations. Further, African coun-
tries also practice a different foreign policy as individual countries as 
opposed to when acting within the AU. The Seychelles, Tunisia, Cape 
Verde and Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Rome Statute after 2010.14 Botswana 
ratified the amendment to Rome Statute Article 8 and the amendment 
on the crime of aggression in 2013.15 Gabon, Senegal and Uganda have 
ratified the Agreement of ICC Privileges and Immunities in 2010, 2009 
and 2014 respectively.16 These sovereign actions have occurred despite 
14 https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/african%20states/Pag-
es/african%20states.aspx; https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi Accessed 24 July 2016.
15 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-
VIII-10-a&chapter=18&lang=en Accessed 1 July 2015.
16 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-
VIII-13&chapter=18&lang=en Accessed 1 July 2015.
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repeated AU decisions resolving non-cooperation with the ICC. Atten-
tion to this diversity can help cultivate a healthier democratic space in 
continental affairs where divergent views are not necessarily seen as dis-
loyalty to Africa. The fund has for instance engaged the goodwill of the 
Senegalese state – given the election of Senegalese Justice Minister Sidiki 
Kaba to the ICC-ASP Presidency, and the trial of Hissène Habré – to-
wards greater African state support for accountability efforts.
Arguing against de-funding pro-ICC engagement
After a decade of persistent African official hostility to accountability for 
international crimes, and the collapse of the dockets relating to Sudan 
and Kenya in 2015 and 2016, there is currently little appetite in the 
donor and NGO communities for pro-ICC engagement, unlike in 2011. 
Rather than divest from ICC advocacy, the fund may well consider sus-
taining its initial limited pro-ICC support long enough for it to bear 
fruit, at least in those countries where incumbent high-ranking officials 
are not indictees, which essentially means the vast majority of African 
cases before the ICC. As Uganda’s experience demonstrates, by the close 
of 2013 a lack of movement in the LRA indictments had led the ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor to begin withdrawing active work in Uganda. 
This all turned around with the unexpected arrest of Dominic Ongwen, 
which reinvigorated interest in the ICC in Uganda, as well as rekindling 
concern for all the other victims of conflicts not covered by ICC action 
in Uganda.
Reversing the sidelining of the African human rights system
Accountability for mass atrocities can be seen to involve the two interre-
lated concerns of victim protection and redress, traditionally the prov-
ince of human rights law,17 and individual criminal responsibility. The 
history of recent international law shows that victims are more likely to 
be redressed in the flexible arms of international human rights law than 
the stringent walls of international criminal law.18
17  ‘The international protection of human rights should not be confused with 
criminal justice. […] The objective of international human rights law is not to pun-
ish those individuals who are guilty of violations, but rather to protect the victims 
and to provide for the reparation of damages resulting from the acts of the States 
responsible.’ (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 1988).
18  Charles Cherno Jalloh, in his presentation at the 2014 CODESRIA confer-
ence, laments the ‘unrealistic goals’ set for criminal tribunals, including UNSC Res 
1315(2000), which authorised the Special Court for Sierra Leone to call for ‘a cred-
ible court that will contribute to peace, justice and reconciliation’ (Wamae, 2014:7).
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At the time of the rise of international criminal law and its contro-
versies in the early 2000s, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights was gearing up for operationalisation. Its first bench was appoint-
ed in 2006. Equally, regional economic community (REC) courts were 
themselves coming to life. An amendment to the ECOWAS Treaty in 
2005 granted the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice a human rights 
jurisdiction. The Tribunal of the Southern African Development Com-
munity, established in 1992, was inaugurated in 2005. The East African 
Court of Justice, established in 1999, was inaugurated in 2001. These 
African courts occasionally issued bold pro-victim decisions. Coupled 
with the new focus on human rights and abhorrence of mass atrocity 
evident in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the 2000s held 
great promise for the concretisation of human rights protection and its 
victim-centred bias.
While the foregoing seeks not to challenge the currency of individual 
accountability for mass atrocity in the political economy of fighting im-
punity in Africa, as concerns victim-centredness, the sidelining of Afri-
ca’s human rights system at its critical expansion phase would not have 
been helpful.
One clear opportunity for the future is the task of constructing an 
African human rights system that can effectively redress victims and ad-
vance the cause of accountability, usual19 and manageable state resis-
tance considered. The fund’s origins and nomenclature, ‘International 
Criminal Justice Fund’, may have restricted its action to international 
criminal justice. Yet the central focus of this work – concern for the Afri-
can victim of mass atrocity – calls on the fund, and indeed civil society, 
to at the very least consider the bird in hand as well as the two in the 
bush. It is testament to the fund’s capacity to listen to its constituency 
and evolve, that in March 2016 it hosted a convening in Arusha, at the 
margins of the Ordinary Session of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights to precisely consider the role of human rights law in 
redressing victims of mass atrocities.
19  It is not unusual for states to resist and indeed defy international courts. The 
UK is currently (2016) defying the European Court of Human Rights demand for 
a repeal of a blanket ban on prisoner voting rights. The US defied the Internation-
al Court of Justice’s 1986 reparations demands for invading Nicaragua. Colombia 
withdrew from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction over its award of disputed islands 
to Nicaragua. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been defied by Trin-
idad and Tobago and Venezuela over the death penalty and judicial independence. 
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Conclusion
The fund has thus far succeeded in being nimble, risking to work out-
side the usual circuit of English-speaking African NGOs and promoting 
engagement in a wide array of aspects of atrocity accountability in Afri-
ca. It has also brought together the major grant makers to act in concert, 
and has provided a fresh and universally (among its donors and part-
ners) welcome approach to grant making, proving that close and inter-
ested working relationships with partners need not threaten objectivity 
but rather provide for more intelligent grant making.
While leveraging Western donor resources, it has built a reputation 
of harmonising diverse interests, as was the vision of its founding do-
nors. Its example demonstrates that donors having ‘an agenda’ does 
not necessarily mean that they act to the detriment of African agency. 
The fund’s constituency (donors, grantees and other partners) laud the 
fund’s value proposition and its contribution to the vision of a continent 
respectful of human rights and fighting impunity. Partners are universal 
in praising the fund’s preparedness, its knowledge of local contexts, its 
willingness to listen to grantee perspectives and its proactive participa-
tion in preparation of grant seeking documentation.
The fund is not the first or only African grant maker, nor is it the 
only collaborative basket fund. It is not the only actor in international 
criminal justice, and is not the only one to seek out underserved com-
munities in its field of work. In its first three years of operation, the fund 
has remained open to knowledge from the periphery, allowing its part-
ners to influence its interventions and broadening its scope from solely 
supporting one institution to a range that is sensitive to each situation’s 
peculiarities. The fund’s successes need be seen from the point of view 
of its own origins and aims. Its example, being young and fully seizing 
the African right to act, even at the risk of making mistakes, still has a 
long way to go. However, it has begun forcefully.
In seeking out the unbeaten path, the fund has started to build up 
movements, and within these has encouraged the growth of NGOs with 
weak capacities. Its next task lies in appropriately determining its exit 
strategy from specific communities. It must remain long enough to 
achieve its aims and allow its partners to develop, but it must, as with all 
grant makers, avoid debilitating dependence. 
So, what then is an authentic African response to the impunity for 
egregious human rights violations? African agency has always been mul-
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tifaceted, complex and operating from a position of reference to West-
ern resources. African philanthropy in the twenty-first century will be 
no different. Yet African agency has always evolved, its strength being 
not the right to make mistakes, but to learn from these mistakes and 
reanimate African faith in Africa rising. Atrocity accountability is among 
Africa’s most potent debates today. It is fitting therefore that African 
agency, so described, is active here, as well. 
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4
A Grounded Approach to Philanthropy:
Strengthening civil society in Liberia 
and Zimbabwe 
Alice L. Brown
Introduction
TrustAfrica was established as a pan-African foundation focused on im-
proving governance and development in Africa. While the organisation’s 
founders valued constructive and mutually beneficial international co-
operation, their underlying premise was that individuals and organi-
sations on the continent had the capability to create, foster and imple-
ment African solutions to African problems. They were committed to 
counteracting the negative perceptions of Africa as a hopeless continent 
without agency and in perpetual need of oversight and assistance from 
external sources, primarily from the global north. In this way, TrustAf-
rica embodied a philosophy of African agency in a theory of change that 
views civic movement building as a catalyst for lasting social change. 
Accordingly, TrustAfrica strives to help develop an influential body of 
informed, networked, and durable civil society organisations (CSOs) 
that possess the capacity to hold governments and other power holders 
accountable to their respective citizenries. 
This chapter focuses on TrustAfrica’s efforts to support and strength-
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en civil society’s work on democratic governance and accountability in 
two countries – Liberia and Zimbabwe – using the lenses of African 
agency and African philanthropy, reflecting on the extent to which the 
work enhanced African agency, asking if it has made a difference that it 
was led by an African-based philanthropy, and highlighting some key 
achievements and challenges in this regard.1 Both programmes, the Li-
berian Civil Society Initiative (LCSI) and the Zimbabwe Alliance, were 
grounded in TrustAfrica’s theory of change: they aimed to help build 
strong citizen movements of well-resourced and knowledgeable civil so-
ciety actors able to conduct research, generate knowledge and advocate 
effectively. Activities were to include grant-making, knowledge gener-
ation, capacity building and strategic meetings, known as convenings, 
which were to serve as opportunities for networking and collaborative 
action. In both cases, the donors were motivated by the historical mo-
ment. As the following sections relate, each country was facing an im-
portant political period where democratic governance was at stake. 
The Liberian Civil Society Initiative
With a population of approximately 4.4 million, Liberia is a country 
rich in natural resources, but it is one of the world’s least developed 
countries, with approximately 85% of the population living below the 
international poverty line. For 14 years, Liberia was in the throes of two 
brutal civil wars (1989 to 1997 and 1999 to 2003) that cost the lives of 
an estimated 500,000 and displaced approximately one million others. 
In addition to death, displacement and destruction, these wars devastat-
ed Liberia’s already feeble and struggling economy. To illustrate, before 
1990 the mining sector contributed more than 65% of the country’s 
export earnings and represented approximately 25% of GDP. During 
the war years, all major mines were closed and the sector’s contribution 
to the economy became inconsequential (EITI, 2016).
In 2005, Liberia held its first post-conflict democratic election; Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf became the country’s first female president and the first 
woman to head an African state in modern times; she was re-elected in 
2011. Since 2005, the Liberian government has made a number of ad-
vances with regard to good governance and transparency. These include 
efforts to strengthen or establish accountability institutions such as the 
1  These issues have been interrogated through an examination of internal programme 
documents, external sources and the reflections and observations of TrustAfrica pro-
gramme staff, funded partners and donor collaborators interviewed by the author.
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Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission and the Public Procurement and 
Concessions Commissions. In addition, in 2009 Liberia obtained cer-
tification as Africa’s first Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI)-compliant state. The Sirleaf administration has been generally 
supportive and protective of civil liberties such as freedom of speech 
and expression and access to information, establishing, for example, an 
Information Commission to handle information requests from the pub-
lic. At the same time, the government has achieved a sizable increase 
in foreign direct investment. Government revenue from the extractive 
sector rose by more than 68% to US$186 million in fiscal year 2012/13, 
with the value of total commodity exports growing by 126% to $352 
million (EITI, 2016). 
These are all noteworthy accomplishments. Yet, the administration 
has faced numerous critical challenges, primary among these being en-
suring stability in the country, stimulating broad economic growth and 
reviving democratic governance. Unemployment and illiteracy are en-
demic and corruption is rife, despite the presence of key accountability 
institutions. Public service reforms remain incomplete, with widespread 
allegations of nepotism and patronage, and although many public of-
ficials have been suspended or forced to resign due to allegations of 
corruption, there have been few prosecutions. Despite the various social 
responsibility portfolios of the leading concession companies, citizens 
lament the fact that resource extraction agreements rarely benefit their 
communities. All of these challenges were exacerbated by the Ebola out-
break that plagued the country from March 2014 until May 2015, se-
verely affecting normal life and further weakening the economy (EITI, 
2016). 
In 2008, TrustAfrica and Humanity United joined in a partnership to 
strengthen civil society, recognising that intensified support for the sec-
tor could bolster Liberia’s chances to move away from its recent brutal 
past. Over time, the effort was supplemented by an anonymous donor 
as well as from TrustAfrica’s own core flexible funds. It must be noted 
here that the Liberian peace process had been helped in great part by the 
intervention of civil society actors who were a part of peace efforts. After 
the war, several factors combined to suggest a continuing and greater 
role for civil society. These included the fragility of the new peace proj-
ect, the scale of efforts required to help take Liberia forward, and the 
importance of having independent voices holding the state accountable. 
At the same time, the sector had suffered greatly under the war and 
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required significant institutional strengthening, sometimes at extremely 
basic levels. The peacetime project also required new skills, particular-
ly around engaging at the policy level. Collaboration between Liberian 
civil society actors and the concentration of activities in the capital at 
the expense of rural communities were flagged as challenges to address.
Accordingly, the overarching goal of the LCSI was to encourage more 
accountable governance in the country by advancing and supporting 
policies to improve the circumstances of poor and vulnerable people. 
The objectives included: (i) bolstering the capacity of civil society to 
monitor national government and engage in advocacy; and (ii) empow-
ering citizens to engage constructively with local authorities to develop 
their communities in a way that advanced inclusive governance. In addi-
tion, the LCSI sought to promote professional media practice focused on 
investigative journalism targeting critical areas of governance. Between 
2008 and 2015, the LCSI supported 35 institutions via 81 grants, dis-
bursing more than $4.7 million. The approach of the LCSI has been to 
support the substantive and technical capacity of its partners, funding 
thematic interventions and enabling a combination of tailored trainings 
and convenings on institutional strengthening, policy, advocacy and re-
search. Following the first phase of the LCSI, it was recognised that more 
tailored capacity building and institutional support was needed, and 
TrustAfrica adapted its training interventions accordingly.2 The LCSI is 
currently in its third phase, which has seen further consolidation, as 
well as a recognition that while overall gains are being made, resources 
are too limited and diversely spread to have a concentrated impact on 
any particular one area. Hence the LCSI is now focusing on helping 
CSOs in their efforts to monitor the extractives industry in Liberia, and 
to raise their collective voices.
It can be difficult to isolate impact and attribute it to a specific in-
tervention such as LCSI. Yet, observations by staff and partners indicate 
some broad gains. First, institutions that have been repeat grantees have 
become more adept at conceptualising and implementing quality re-
search. Second, several partners have honed community mobilisation 
skills. Third, a critical mass of TrustAfrica-funded CSOs are now linking 
local community empowerment initiatives to larger challenges within 
Liberian policy environment. Fourth, thematic area specialisation, in-
cluding research, is becoming entrenched at several TrustAfrica-funded 
2  An in-depth and tailored capacity-building intervention was designed in partner-
ship with West African Civil Society Institute.
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groups. Finally, LCSI thematic area or project collaborations have en-
hanced other CSO networks. 
Other notable accomplishments cited in partner interviews and re-
ports include the contribution of LCSI partners to the development of 
Liberia’s first Media Assistance Strategy and a Media Quality Barometer, 
which defines areas for media development and assesses the performance 
of leading media establishments on a regular basis.3 The Initiative’s sup-
port for the advocacy of the Press Union of Liberia and other media 
organisations led to the passage of the Freedom of Information Act of 
2010, an important advance for press freedom and public accountabil-
ity. Support also enabled Actions for Genuine Democratic Alternatives 
(Agenda), an LCSI partner working with Civicus, to develop Liberia’s 
first Civil Society Index, which looks at capacity constraints and local 
perceptions of civil society. It is worth noting that Agenda, a nascent 
institution at the time, has emerged as one of the leading CSOs on re-
search and policy in Liberia. Other support enabled youth to participate 
in governance processes within three counties and helped strengthen 
conflict resolution initiatives in Liberia’s most ethnically diverse county. 
Policy-related achievements included convenings with high-level poli-
cymakers to enable civil society input and activities to establish mecha-
nisms to monitor and prevent election-related violence.
More recently, the LCSI established the Concessions Working Group 
(CWG), a diverse coalition that serves as a clearing house for on-going 
discussions and advocacy on natural resource governance within Libe-
ria. The CWG launched various advocacy campaigns to bring attention 
to human rights violations against citizens in concession areas, including 
forced evictions, unlawful land-grabs and death threats. The group pro-
vided vital reporting to the Independent National Human Rights Com-
mission of Liberia on gross rights violations in the extractives sector. 
In the policy arena, the LCSI has enabled critical feedback to the Land 
Commission on Liberia’s new land law, emphasising a community hu-
man rights perspective for land tenure. The CWG has also put forward 
civil society’s positions on current concessions agreements in strategic 
meetings with the chair of the House of Senate Standing Committee 
on Concessions at the Liberia legislature. The Initiative has created and 
3  During the launch of the second quarterly barometer, Liberian Vice President 
Joseph Boakai expressed gratitude to the Liberia Media Center, an LCSI partner, and 
TrustAfrica for what he termed a ‘great step towards the professionalism and critical 
introspection within the Liberian media’.
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maintained productive relationships with various departments within 
the Liberian government, in particular with the National Investment 
Commission, the National Bureau of Concessions and the Forestry De-
partment, contributing in part to enabling more inclusive, transparent 
and accountable governance processes. Finally, the work of the LCSI 
has been amplified through strategic partnerships with other influential 
civil society groups, including the Liberia Extractives Industries Trans-
parency Initiative, Publish What You Pay Liberia and the Liberia Peace 
Building Office.
The Zimbabwe Alliance
After decades of colonial subjugation and a 15-year civil war, the Repub-
lic of Zimbabwe was established in 1980, having gained independence 
from white minority rule. Today, this Southern African country has a 
population of approximately 14 million people. Robert Mugabe, libera-
tion leader and head of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU, 
later ZANU-PF), was first elected prime minister in 1980 and then, in 
1987 with an amendment to the constitution, he consolidated power as 
executive president. In office for the last 36 years, President Mugabe is 
one of the longest-serving African heads of state and the world’s oldest. 
Initially, during the 1980s and much of the 1990s, the newly inde-
pendent nation prospered and various indices associated with its Human 
Development Index improved. Amongst other improvements, there was 
positive economic growth, agricultural production in abundance, im-
pressive increases in the rates of adult literacy and one of the most ro-
bust health systems in the region (Murisa and Chikweche, 2015). Cir-
cumstances began to change, however, in the mid to late 1990s as one 
of Africa’s most promising economies began to spiral into an economic 
meltdown that lasted almost a decade. The contributing factors were 
multifaceted, complex and contentious. Amongst others, Zimbabwe was 
hard hit by the HIV pandemic which, by 1999, was claiming the lives of 
approximately 1,500 Zimbabweans a week (ibid.). Agricultural produc-
tion was adversely affected by severe droughts and, in 2000, the contro-
versial Fast Track Land Reform Programme, which involved the seizure 
and redistribution of white-owned commercial farms, was promulgated. 
Accompanying all of this was widespread and devastating hardship: un-
employment and poverty increased, agricultural production and exports 
fell into sharp decline, food shortages kicked in, social unrest in the 
form of protests and strikes became common place, outward migration 
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rose, and political strife and repression grew. The economy began to fall 
in 2000, reaching an astronomical hyperinflation rate of 11,200,000% 
by 2008. In a nutshell, Zimbabwe was in crisis.
As keenly observed by Murisa and Chikweche (2015: xiii), ‘Whilst 
the causes of the crisis remains a topic of debate, its negative impact on 
… politics, the economy and the general social fabric (inclusive of wel-
fare and social services delivery) cannot be disputed.’ Indeed, accord-
ing to the World Bank (2016), ‘the political and economic crises that 
characterized the economy between 2000 and 2008 contributed to the 
nearly halving of its GDP … and raising poverty rates of more than 72%, 
with over a fifth of the population in extreme poverty. Health, education 
and other basic services, once regional models, largely collapsed and 
Zimbabwe’s Human Development Index (HDI) in 2011 stood at 173 
out of 187 countries’. 
During this same period, President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF ruling 
party were accused of becoming increasingly authoritarian, corrupt and 
disdainful of the rights of citizens. Many Zimbabweans began to question 
and challenge policies, the lack of leadership change and the entrench-
ment of a de facto one-party state. In 1999, the opposition Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) was formed and, along with various CSOs, 
confronted the hegemony of ZANU-PF. The state responded with in-
timidation, a crack-down on civil liberties and force. Parliamentary and 
presidential elections held from the late 1990s to 2008 were marred by 
state-sponsored violence, and were seriously flawed and widely viewed 
as having been manipulated by the ruling party.
In September 2008, ZANU-PF and the MDC agreed to form an in-
clusive government based on a negotiated Global Political Agreement 
(GPA). The parties agreed to share power and jointly undertake a con-
stitutional reform process geared to creating the conditions for free and 
fair elections. This political settlement, combined with the adoption of a 
multi-currency regime (that is, the dollarising of the economy) in 2009, 
allowed Zimbabwe to embark on a period of stabilisation and avert an 
imminent collapse of the state. According to TrustAfrica staff, howev-
er, within a year the political situation had been replaced by ‘increased 
political polarisation, escalating cases of political violence and political 
arrests, a near collapse of the constitutional reform process, and virtual 
collapse of the GPA’. Fragmented, under threat and in an environment of 
limited resources and shrinking civic and political space, civil society’s 
role was in urgent need of additional support, financial and otherwise. 
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TrustAfrica began to engage in efforts to respond to the crisis in 
Zimbabwe in 2007. Two years later, in light of the brutalisation of civil 
society and abuses to democratic processes, it joined with like-mind-
ed donors to create the Zimbabwe Alliance. The Alliance included 
TrustAfrica, the Wallace Global Fund, the Schooner Foundation and 
the International Development Exchange (IDEX).4 With a secretariat 
staffed by TrustAfrica, decision-making is taken jointly. The mandate of 
the Alliance is to strengthen civil society and promote human rights and 
democracy in Zimbabwe.5 In the context of the fluid political dynam-
ics and the constitutional reform process and elections required by its 
terms, these donors saw a unique opportunity to support Zimbabwe’s 
transition to democracy by helping to strengthen the country’s civil so-
ciety and civic participation. Constitutional reform and the promotion 
of free and fair elections thus emerged as key goals in the immediate 
term, with medium to longer-term goals revolving around strengthening 
civil society and social movements to promote informed and effective 
citizen participation and to secure democratic rights and civil liberties. 
Included in this was the aim of ensuring that marginalised groups, par-
ticularly women, were not left behind. Participants recognised that civil 
society would need to be rebuilt if it were to contribute effectively to 
Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political transformation. Against this 
backdrop, the Zimbabwe Alliance initially focused on the three strate-
gic priorities: (i) strengthening the community and constituency base of 
civil society; (ii) strengthening the intellectual and knowledge base of 
civil society; and (iii) strengthening national coordination and advocacy. 
The Zimbabwe Alliance organised consultative meetings with civil 
society partners and other key actors on the situation in the country 
with a particular focus on civil society responses.6 During the constitu-
tional reform process, its work contributed to greater civil society co-
ordination and increased public participation. It also ensured that the 
focus of reforms went beyond civil liberties to include social and eco-
nomic rights. Significantly, this work directly informed the content of 
4  Prior to this a loose collaboration had existed in a different and more limited form. 
In 2009 an expanded funding and management configuration emerged, now involving 
TrustAfrica and others. This discussion deals only with activities in the post-2009 period.
5  Since its inception the Zimbabwe Alliance has also received support from other 
sources, including the Mize Family Trust, the Lester Fund, the American Jewish World 
Service and individual contributors.
6  Participants included the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, ZimRights, Bulawayo Pro-
gressive Residents Association, Amandla Center, and the Magamba Network.
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the new constitution through a technical team that the Alliance funded 
to support the drafting process. The result included provisions related to 
greater accountability, political rights and civil liberties. In March 2013, 
the proposed constitution was endorsed by 95% of voters in a national 
referendum. 
Despite the best efforts of the Zimbabwe Alliance and other like-mind-
ed groups and individuals, the country did not realise an undisputed 
free and fair election in 2013. It did, however, contribute to a stronger, 
more skilled and more viligant civil society, capacitated with the skills 
and knowledge to monitor and report on the activities of government. 
Specifically, the Elections Watch project that Zimbabwe Alliance co-cre-
ated in partnership with Hivos-IMS and several CSOs was one of the 
most extensive collaborative elections monitoring projects ever estab-
lished in the country. The project itself was unprecedented in terms of 
utilising new ICTs and mobile phone technology through Ushahidi, a 
platform that interconnected a nationwide network of election monitors 
and enabled real-time reporting of election-related incidents and viola-
tions via a special website that Zimbabwe Alliance developed. Using this 
platform, election monitors were alerted to incidents and able to organ-
ise timely interventions. The expectation was that this would help create 
an environment more conducive to free and fair elections.
The Zimbabwe Alliance has made 36 grants to 19 institutions work-
ing on strengthening civil society and promoting democracy. These in-
clude assisting civil society participation in crucial political processes, 
such as constitutional reform and elections, while simultaneously en-
hancing the capacity of key CSOs, activists and policymakers to par-
ticipate in those processes. It also helped amplify voices of traditionally 
marginalised groups, especially artists, women and community based 
organisations (CBOs) and created platforms for civil society to engage 
in dialogue and to coordinate strategies. Importantly, the Alliance pro-
vided urgent support and protection to human rights defenders facing 
dangerous circumstances and mobilised regional and international sol-
idarity in support of constitutional reform and democratic processes, 
extending its work to Zimbabwe’s diaspora and facilitating their partic-
ipation in shaping the future of the country. Finally, the Zimbabwe Al-
liance facilitated peer learning and coordination among donors working 
in Zimbabwe.
More recently, as part of its contribution to thought leadership on 
social and political transformation, the Zimbabwe Alliance facilitated 
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the establishment of a research group comprising civil society actors 
and university-based activist academics who produced papers to inform 
discussion and action on various aspects of Zimbabwe’s social, econom-
ic and political transformation. Some of these papers became chapters 
in Beyond the Crises: Zimbabwe’s Prospects for Transformation, a book 
published by Weaver Press and TrustAfrica in 2015. The Alliance also 
convened several discussions to catalyse youth to promote democracy 
and social change in Zimbabwe, offered skills training and workshops 
regarding use of ICTs in monitoring service delivery and the political 
environment, and invested in efforts to strengthen CBOs through resi-
dent’s forums.
Process is critical to impact: The value add of the Liberian 
Civil Society Initiative and the Zimbabwe Alliance
TrustAfrica’s theory of change centres on supporting a critical mass of 
networked and resilient civil society organisations as a key strategy for 
enabling public and private accountability, and thus a reduction in in-
justices. In Liberia and Zimbabwe, TrustAfrica’s support enabled signifi-
cant gains. This next section takes a closer look at  the process of provid-
ing support and the extent to which the nature of TrustAfrica’s support 
enabled agency for movement building. Were marginalised voices in-
cluded in its programming? What did groups find valuable about the 
nature of the support given? Did it make a difference that TrustAfrica 
was an Africa-based donor led by Africans? 
This reflection finds that in both Liberia and Zimbabwe, TrustAfrica 
has (i) enhanced the capacity of key CSOs, activists and policymakers, 
and amplified the voices of traditionally marginalised groups; (ii) cre-
ated platforms for civil society to engage in dialogue and to coordinate 
strategies; and (iii) facilitated peer learning and coordination among 
donors. To ensure that solutions were indeed informed and driven by 
those most affected, TrustAfrica facilitated collaborative fora and helped 
build the administrative, technical and substantive capacity of CSOs. 
The way in which TrustAfrica engaged with its partners was universally 
acknowledged and valued by funded partners and donor partners, who 
highlighted several critical factors about TrustAfrica’s approach.
A grounded partner: The fact that TrustAfrica is an African institu-
tion with local staff who have deep understanding of the contexts and 
changing dynamics was seen as a critical factor in how the organisa-
tion operates. One partner observed that far too many donors, espe-
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cially large bilateral and multilateral funders, make decisions at a dis-
tance through remote requests for proposals processes. As a result, these 
funders are often disengaged from groups and activities ‘on the ground’. 
TrustAfrica’s local presence and rootedness was seen as a key factor 
enabling active engagement with partners including discussing ideas, 
sharing perspectives and providing feedback through concept notes and 
proposal drafting steps, all grounded in a process of ‘agreement around 
ideas’. Another representative cited this approach to grant making as 
the ‘singular difference’ between TrustAfrica and other donors. Indeed, 
TrustAfrica, with its fulltime presence in Liberia and Zimbabwe, has 
been able to keep abreast of developments, build intimate relationships 
with like-minded entities and respond quickly to opportunities as they 
arise. Its position on the frontlines allows it to be an integral part of the 
strategising and co-creation of solutions alongside civil society and other 
democratic actors. The role of TrustAfrica goes beyond funding, to an 
active involvement in strengthening democracy in Liberia and Zimba-
bwe.
Beyond grant making: TrustAfrica combined grants and technical 
assistance in a way that enabled groups to both increase effectiveness 
and attract additional resources. To one partner, it was a ‘great mix’ 
because it helped build the internal capacity of local groups. TrustAfrica 
often commissioned consultants and other service providers to assist 
emerging or nascent CSOs to strengthen their organisational capacity. 
In other words, TrustAfrica helped fill gaps with regard to strategic plan-
ning, institutional development and financial management. Then, direct 
grant assistance followed. Over the course of two to three years, the 
twinning of technical assistance and grant support ‘really helped’ this 
organisation. In fact, it gave it the ability to attract additional resources 
from elsewhere and to decrease its financial dependence on TrustAfrica. 
The CEO spoke highly of this ‘unique aspect of the interaction with 
TrustAfrica’ and suggested that this ‘should be copied by other donors’.
A holistic approach to institutional strengthening: For too long, 
initiatives aimed at organisational development have focused solely on 
administrative elements – building sound boards, good governance, 
fundraising, financial management and the like. While these are criti-
cal to building strong institutions, they create an architecture that sup-
ports competence without focusing on programmatic impact. The val-
ue of TrustAfrica’s approach is that over and above the administrative 
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and technical support, it has also focused on the substantive elements 
through broad-based convenings that enable interrogation of ideas and 
strategies; through workshops on critical skills such as policy advocacy 
and research; and by catalysing the generation of new knowledge to 
enable appropriate interventions. In Liberia, for instance, one partner 
explained that through its partnership with TrustAfrica, it ‘internalised’ 
an understanding of taxation, transfer pricing, tax resourcing and com-
pliance that it had not had previously. At the time of research, the organ-
isation was about to enter into a memorandum of understanding to as-
sist the Liberian Revenue Authority with developing tax policies related 
to natural resources management in the country, thus ensuring that civil 
society voices and perspectives would be represented as this essential 
department goes about its work. Hence, the skills acquisition not only 
strengthened this CSO but also enabled the organisation to contribute 
tangibly to enhanced government performance and accountability. This 
partner representative explained that this is a tremendous development 
for the organisation and credits TrustAfrica with having the insight to 
support such technical and substantive capacity building. 
Supporting new and diverse voices: TrustAfrica’s programme 
strategy documents reflect a dedication to amplifying marginalised voic-
es. For instance, the Liberia strategy statement for 2008-2010 explicitly 
stated that it would consider only programmes that cover at least two 
counties or that are community centered in the sense that they seek 
to empower rural or remote communities. It also required that part-
ners work with local groups, whether formal or informal, as long as 
the said groups have constituencies of their own. Feedback reflects that 
TrustAfrica progressed well on its mandate to include marginalised voic-
es: a common observation amongst partners in both locations was that 
TrustAfrica has helped new, fledgling organisations start, develop and 
evolve into important actors on the civil society scene. Partners spoke 
highly of the ability and willingness of TrustAfrica to provide seed fund-
ing for new ideas and projects and to help them attract additional sup-
port from diverse sources as they developed. The implications of this 
can be seen in the role that these additional voices from the margins 
have played in both countries.
TrustAfrica’s collaborative approach in particular was instrumental 
in identifying promising groups that brought new voices to the fore. For 
example, the Zimbabwe Alliance helped to amplify historically margin-
alised groups through support for youth collectives such as the Mag-
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amba Cultural Activist Network, a prominent collective promoting the 
vision of a free and just Zimbabwe through creative youth activism, new 
media, popular cultural events and citizen journalism. By supporting 
Magamba in its initial stages, the Zimbabwe Alliance helped it to build 
its name and reputation such that it has become ‘one of the leading cre-
ative organisations in the country’ able to attract further support from 
other sponsors. Further, TrustAfrica adopts an inclusive approach that 
not only funds the participation of its partners but also supports the 
involvement of organisations that are not financially supported by it. 
This is seen as extremely valuable in bringing different perspectives to 
the table. 
The value of collaborative fora: TrustAfrica’s enabling of collabora-
tive fora was highlighted as an important strategy and contribution. In 
both countries, partners worked together through collective platforms 
such as networks and coalitions, efforts that not only enhanced coordi-
nation, but strengthened the collective voice of civil society. Partners ap-
preciated TrustAfrica’s ability to fund the infrastructure needed to create 
these platforms for civil society engagement and specifically noted the 
importance of connecting local NGOs and CBOs in collaborations and 
partnerships. In Liberia, for example, such efforts included the support 
of LCSI for the collective activities of the Concessions Working Group. 
TrustAfrica’s ongoing support has enabled monthly meetings where or-
ganisations have been able to discuss key issues, share knowledge and 
information, plan advocacy campaigns and forge partnerships. The 
funding and facilitation provided by TrustAfrica have been critical to 
the success and continued existence of this group. In another example, 
the Zimbabwe Alliance convened several major players in Zimbabwean 
civil society to establish an extensive network to monitor elections and 
respond to violations. Immediately after the 2013 elections, the Alliance 
also partnered with the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSI-
SA) and Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS) to convene the first major national 
conference for civil society to reflect on the agenda for social, economic 
and political transformation in Zimbabwe and to strategise for the fu-
ture. TrustAfrica has continued the partnership with OSISA and HBS 
through the Zimbabwe Donors Convening that facilitates peer learning 
and promotes collaboration amongst donors working in Zimbabwe.
As pointed out in the interviews for this chapter, many collective 
activities and partnerships begin but fail to last because there is no secre-
tariat or facilitator to follow up on decisions, organise meetings and gen-
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erally keep matters on track. The fact that this work was able to continue 
in both countries was seen as a result of the unique role that TrustAfrica 
plays as an African philanthropy with close ties to the local context. It is 
noteworthy that TrustAfrica recognised this need and has been willing 
to invest in such support, in contrast to many funders that do not. This 
is in part because many donors focus primarily on quantifiable outputs 
as opposed to processes, such as building and strengthening agency, 
autonomy, independence and self-reliance.
Moreover, funders as well as partners gained value in collaborating. 
TrustAfrica’s efforts to facilitate peer learning and coordination among 
donors were enhanced by the fact that although it is rooted on the con-
tinent it has the ability to act as an interlocutor with institutions in the 
global north. In speaking of the formal and informal ways in which the 
Zimbabwe Alliance facilitated ideas and actions amongst funders, for in-
stance, one donor partner said that the ‘convening power of TrustAfrica 
needs to be celebrated’ while another spoke of its ‘great intellectual part-
nership’ with TrustAfrica. One partner commended the donor collab-
orative for being ‘open to different ideas and proposals’ and for being 
flexible and allowing objectives and aims to change over time. Ideas 
would be considered for funding if they fit within the overall goals, and 
this was a welcome contrast to ‘other, more traditional funders’. In both 
Zimbabwe and Liberia, donors reported that working in concert ulti-
mately resulted in better funding strategies, and enabled them to en-
hance efficiency and impact by avoiding duplication and fragmentation.
While collaboration poses its own challenges (as will be seen in the 
following section) both funders and partners acknowledged that work-
ing together made it possible to leverage limited resources and achieve 
collectively what would not have been possible through individual ef-
forts. 
Critical challenges and recommendations
The challenge of maintaining healthy collaboratives
The collaborations discussed in this chapter have yielded significant and 
substantial impacts. The processes of collaboration, however, are not 
always smooth. Several drawbacks and limitations bear reflection and 
yield important lessons not just for TrustAfrica but for donor collabora-
tives and partnerships in general. 
Attention to the process: It can difficult and time-consuming to 
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take decisions as a group, particularly if participants are located in dif-
ferent regions or countries. Moreover, collaborative arrangements, and 
the institutions that comprise them, are not static. Thus partners should 
periodically re-examine their goals, mission and principles for participa-
tion to evaluate whether they remain as defined at the onset or need to be 
revisited. This focus on process may seem counter-intuitive – requiring 
even more time – but it can provide important stability. Seeking clarity 
on goals, especially where contexts are fluid, can prevent misalignments 
and misunderstandings amongst and between the partners. As one do-
nor partner observed, the substantive grant making of a collaborative 
can be on target, but if the processes and procedures essential to nur-
turing the collaboration itself are neglected, it can result in a loss of 
vitality, and atrophy. Periodic deliberation and review of processes and 
procedures is essential to the health and productivity of a partnership. 
Good communication between partners: It is not uncommon for 
conflicts or tensions to arise around issues of control, especially if part-
ners bring unequal resources to the table. Resentment can become an 
issue if one or two of the partners end up taking on the majority of the 
work. Differences due to individual or institutional egos, if not acknowl-
edged or tended to, can become destructive and drain members’ time 
and energy away from substantive issues such as programme strategy. 
Relationships within collaborations and partnerships should be sup-
ported and administered but also be actively prioritised and maintained.
Reconciling different cultural or institutional approaches: Mem-
bers of collaboratives, whether of donors or funded partners, tend to 
have diverse backgrounds. This is especially true for those seeking to 
bring new voices to the fore, as was the case in both Liberia and Zimba-
bwe. As Briggs Bomba (2014) has observed, such diversity can result in 
‘a cultural or systems clash’: ‘This is revealed in many ways: for instance, 
a more deliberative approach to an issue in contrast to an expeditious 
one, inevitably creating a sense of one party feeling rushed and another 
feeling slowed down.’ Donors differ in the size of the grants they want 
to make, or they may have a different approach to working with funded 
partners. TrustAfrica staff and others have found that good facilitation is 
one way to reconcile these differences. 
Recognising the life cycle of the partnership: Whilst main-
taining momentum and preserving the raison d’être is crucial for effec-
tiveness, it is also critical to recognise when it makes sense to bring a 
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collaboration to an end. This natural life cycle can be affected by exter-
nal factors, such as change of legal regime or the onset of hostilities, and 
can even lead to premature mortality. Time-bound events, such as the 
post-2005 election situation in Liberia or the 2011 referendum on the 
new constitution in Zimbabwe, can provide a powerful rationale for a 
joint effort. But donors and partners should also closely consider what 
happens in the aftermath of that galvanising event or circumstance. The 
stimulus, energy and momentum created in response to these excep-
tional circumstances may dissipate in their aftermath. Other factors may 
include ‘donor fatigue’, or a change in priorities on the part of one or 
more partners. It makes sense therefore to pay attention to the appro-
priate lifespan of certain collaborations or partnerships and whether the 
strategic imperative of the work continues to be relevant in a chang-
ing context. It may be unrealistic and impractical to expect some joint 
efforts to survive much beyond the particular event or campaign that 
brought them into existence.
Addressing the sustainability issue: For a foundation such as 
TrustAfrica, which aims to sustain civil society in the long term, it is im-
portant to recognise that when a collaborative ends, so does the support 
to the funded partners. Their advocacy activities may therefore cease. 
Indeed, one staff member observed that ‘good partners and initiatives 
can die off at the expiration of the project period because there is no 
investment in the sustainability of institutions.’ Over time staff learnt to 
use the few resources they had ‘to invest in partners’ own operational 
and survival needs’. It will be important for TrustAfrica and others who 
fund civil society to ensure that capacity building work is undertaken 
with an eye towards strengthening  the ability of organisations to in-
crease their skills and influence during the grant period, and ultimately, 
to sustain their work beyond that period. 
Ensuring a strong, equal voice for partners: From the perspective 
of civil society organisations, it may be important to engage in a more 
critical review of donor-inspired collaborations and partnerships. While 
collaboration at this level may enhance efficiency, strengthen strategies 
and avoid duplication of efforts, the manner in which a donor intro-
duces a collaborative model to a collective of funded partners can also 
be problematic and even non-productive. Donor-dictated collaborations 
between partners may undermine institutional autonomy and thwart 
the growth of African agency. A process that has not been sufficiently 
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inclusive can result in unintended consequences, including the suppres-
sion of marginalised or vulnerable voices, such as those of women and 
youth, within the collective. Donors and potential partners might ask: 
Has a partnership been created organically, out of genuine consultative 
processes, or is it a forced marriage between reluctant parties? 
The challenge of representation and women’s leadership 
The LCSI and the Zimbabwe Alliance are committed to promoting the 
agency of African voices, especially the least empowered and most mar-
ginalised such as women and youth. Yet in both initiatives there is an 
overwhelming presence of the male voice in leadership positions. This, 
despite the best intentions of TrustAfrica, which promotes women’s 
rights and gender equality and funds women-led and women-focused 
CSOs as well as capacity building for women. Still, it appears that these 
voices have not been absorbed into the leadership of the governance 
and democracy programming in Liberia and Zimbabwe. Why is this so, 
especially given the commitment of TrustAfrica to agency, equality and 
empowerment? In partial response to this inquiry, one TrustAfrica staff 
observed that although TrustAfrica aims to lift up marginalised voices, 
and has done so in some instances in the context of youth, ‘no specif-
ic gender lens has been developed to guide this type of intervention’. 
Another staff member reflects that ‘Though we’ve managed to fund a 
few women-focused outfits in Liberia, the programmatic lens has not 
necessarily been about women’s issues and I think this is something we 
should be doing considering our mantra on African agency.’
This critique considers that TrustAfrica’s programming in Liberia 
and Zimbabwe may be undertaken in a manner that does not easily lend 
itself to including women’s representation and diversity issues. If, for 
instance, the thematic lens of a programme is on democracy and gover-
nance-related issues, then the focus would concentrate on elections and 
related processes. This narrow focus, concedes one staff member, might 
not necessarily include ‘women’s rights per se’ and may have resulted in 
missed opportunities. What’s more, this sometimes constricting defini-
tion of programmatic areas ‘is an issue across the institution’. 
This dynamic played out, staff observed, in an agenda concentrated 
too narrowly on elections, a focus that may well have prevented the 
integration of women and diversity issues into the programme. Further, 
there may have been insufficient questions and conversations within the 
programme with regard to pushing a gender analysis. By way of illustra-
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tion, TrustAfrica requires all funded partners to include their diversity 
profiles as part of the application process, but this may have become a 
perfunctory exercise rather than a meaningful exploration of the power 
and gender dynamics within a particular organisation and the need to 
challenge these dynamics. This diversity inquiry needs to be ‘deepened’. 
This could indicate the TrustAfrica may need to pause and reflect 
on what aspects of its programmatic approach need to change in order 
to take on a more substantive gender character to its work. Without 
question, the political commitment is there, but with respect to the op-
erationalisation of promoting the representation of women and gender 
parity, the programmatic interventions may not have been sufficient. 
In terms of lessons learned from the first ten years of practice, perhaps 
this discussion demonstrates the need for TrustAfrica to place a greater 
emphasis on mainstreaming gender and diversity issues into all its pro-
grammes. 
It must be stressed, however, that mainstreaming is not an end in 
itself but a strategy, a means, to achieve a goal. In this instance, the goal 
would centre on promoting and advancing gender equity and the agen-
cy of women. Specifically, mainstreaming here would involve ensuring 
that women’s participation, perspective and voice find a more promi-
nent place amongst CSOs and movements focused on democracy and 
governance. Mainstreaming should not usurp or diminish the need for 
targeted interventions aimed at supporting women-led and women-fo-
cused initiatives. Indeed, the two are not mutually exclusive: TrustAfrica 
may want to consider a more assertive approach to mainstreaming the 
representation of women in these CSOs while continuing to maintain, 
expand and enhance its targeted interventions aimed at strengthening 
women-led and women-focused groups. This Achilles heel is not exclu-
sive to TrustAfrica. Democracy and governance funders, as well as civil 
society itself, needs to take special measures to ensure the promotion 
of women’s leadership and voice within traditionally male-dominated 
CSOs. 
It needs to be emphasised that the best intentions of social justice 
donors often come face to face with the stark reality of societal norms 
and culture that perpetuate patriarchy and male dominance. To be sure, 
the progressive ideals of some donors and CSOs clash with pre-existing 
prejudices, biases, apathy, reluctance or resistance. Thus it may take 
longer to measure the impact and progress of efforts to promote wom-
en’s leadership. It may take longer than progressive-minded donors an-
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ticipate to see the presence of women in leadership positions in CSOs 
focused on governance and democracy. Donor attempts to tip the scales 
in favour of equity and alter the balance of power are essential, but it 
must be understood that these processes and transformations require 
continuous, constant, evolving and long-term interventions.
The challenge of being a philanthropy that both gives funds 
and receives funds 
TrustAfrica is an institution that both makes and receives grants. How 
does this dual identity influence the agency of TrustAfrica itself? The 
challenges and tensions dictate some constraints on its ability to make 
unilateral decisions on such issues as the focus of its grant making, what 
and whom to fund, the longevity of grants and strategies, the periods of 
time over which to fund certain campaigns or interventions and whether 
and how to assist its partners in addressing issues of sustainability.
For instance, TrustAfrica may desire to set up a rapid response fund 
or a dedicated endowed fund to strengthen the sustainability and lon-
gevity of CSOs in Liberia and Zimbabwe. Yet, as a recipient of donor 
funds, TrustAfrica is bound by the grant agreements with its own donors 
that may not allow for these types of funding vehicles. Just as its partners 
must comply with the mandates of TrustAfrica, so too must TrustAfrica 
abide by the requirements of its grantors. As such, when partners in 
the two programmes lament the fact that TrustAfrica (along with other 
donors) tends to provide project-based and short-term funding,7 one 
wonders how this could be different given the reality of TrustAfrica’s 
own funding constraints. As one staff member noted, ‘Funding streams 
for organisations such as TrustAfrica are not unrestricted.’ As a result, 
TrustAfrica may be restricted in its ability to establish certain funding 
structures that it deems optimal. Although it certainly has some inde-
pendent agency, TrustAfrica does not have complete or sole authority to 
7  A number of Liberian and Zimbabwean funded partners expressed that TrustAfrica, 
along with other donors, tends to provide project-based and short-term funding. These 
representatives spoke of the ways in which such a funding approach constrains progress, 
momentum and continuity. One representative pointed out that because TrustAfrica 
funds its activities and programmes on a project-basis for a period of one year, or per-
haps two, at a time, the NGO finds it difficult to recruit and retain qualified, motivated 
staff as employee contracts must reflect the funding limits. Due to this insecurity, when 
longer term, more stable and secure employment opportunities are offered, many staff 
members accept them, resulting in a loss of momentum and institutional memory for 
the NGO or CBO on the ground and adversely impacting the progress of the interven-
tion and general staff morale. 
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disperse funds as it may desire.
Nevertheless, the dual identity of TrustAfrica holds some advantag-
es. As an African-based philanthropy established, in its initial stages, 
with monies from northern donors, TrustAfrica has had continued ac-
cess not only to financial resources but also to technical assistance and 
professional guidance from those sources. Likewise, these funders have 
also benefitted from their relationship with TrustAfrica, which serves 
as an intellectual resource helping them to better understand the vari-
ous African contexts. This has enabled northern donors to make more 
informed decisions with regard to their philanthropy. TrustAfrica has 
advised them on critical gaps and helped them facilitate different types 
of relationships with NGOs and CBOs on the ground. Hence, the dual 
identity of TrustAfrica allows for mutually beneficial and supportive re-
lationships between it and external donors.
Looking outward, TrustAfrica, both as grantee and grantor, has 
earned the trust and respect of funders originating in the global north 
as demonstrated by the support received and the multiple partnerships 
and collaborations forged. Looking inward, as an African-based philan-
thropy, TrustAfrica has extensive connections to CSOs in various parts 
of the continent and, as a consequence, it has its institutional finger on 
the pulse of pressing and current issues facing the citizens of various 
African nations. TrustAfrica is indeed well placed to discuss these is-
sues and circumstances with donors and other interested parties, from 
both the global north and the global south. Moreover, it acts as an in-
termediary between larger donors and small to medium size CSOs on 
the continent that may have difficulty accessing funds from global and 
international sources. Likewise, it performs an important role for larger 
donors who are restricted and limited in their ability to directly reach 
and support these locally-based institutions. 
TrustAfrica’s dual identity has at times inhibited its ability to help 
build a critical mass of informed, networked, and resilient CSOs capa-
ble of holding governments accountable. Yet it has found other ways 
to advance this aim, for instance by acting as an advocate and a facili-
tator, forging relationships and providing support that goes beyond its 
role as grantee and grantor. One example is the case of the Institute for 
Young Women Development (IYWD), a self-described ‘young feminist 
organisation.’8 Although the Zimbabwe Alliance was not in a position to 
8  ‘IYWD is committed to mobilising and strengthening the voice and power of 
young women in marginalised communities to transform the status quo through 
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fund IYWD, staff introduced this dynamic group to IDEX which provid-
ed IYWD with support and is now developing a long-term relationship 
with the group. 
This is just one example of a way in which Zimbabwe Alliance, and 
by extension, TrustAfrica, acts as a connector9 and fills an important 
role in the context of helping to (i) build organisations and movements 
that are the catalysts for lasting social change and (ii) promote diversi-
ty and transformation within civil society in Zimbabwe. Similarly, one 
Liberia-based partner described TrustAfrica as ‘more than a donor, it is 
an enabler’. 
Wearing both these hats, TrustAfrica has, in the context of the LCSI 
and the Zimbabwe Alliance, played a number of roles and served a variety 
of functions that have contributed to the success of these collaborations. 
In both countries the work has advanced civil society’s ability to influence 
policy, with specific achievements. Moving forward, TrustAfrica should 
look to maximise and capitalise on these. Given its dual identity and 
its track record since its establishment in 2006, TrustAfrica is ideal-
ly placed to help carve out space for experimenting with new ways to 
address CSO sustainability in Africa. Indeed, the need to invest in the 
sustainability of institutions and initiatives is an important lesson that 
TrustAfrica staff have come to learn and appreciate. 
As it continues to strive to fulfil its mission and mandate of advancing 
African agency, TrustAfrica and other such donors face a dilemma: how 
to sustain support for civil society in a meaningful way when funding for 
such work is irregular? There is a need for more exploration of ways to 
use limited resources so that their benefits outlast the project time-frame. 
How can short-term capacity building be directed in a way that leaves the 
civil society organisation or network stronger in the long term? 
TrustAfrica might also do more to create new streams of funding for 
this work. One avenue would be to dedicate attention and resources to 
various programmes that engage communities, institutions and the young women 
themselves so that issues that marginalise and oppress them are eliminated.’ From 
https://iywd.wordpress.com/what-we-do/. 
9  Gladwell defined a connector as a person ‘…with a special gift for bringing the 
world together’ (Gladwell, 2000: 38). Yet, ‘Connectors are important for more than 
simply the number of people they know. Their importance is also a function of the 
kinds of people they know’ (ibid.: 46). Although Gladwell wrote about individuals, 
the description could easily apply to an organisation such as TrustAfrica, which 
knows the global and international donor world and the African civil society sector 
and has displayed a gift for bringing them together.
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attracting support and contributions from within the continent – ap-
pealing to the growing number of high net-worth individuals and other 
philanthropic endeavours indigenous to the African continent and the 
global south. Indeed, a major component of TrustAfrica’s mandate, but 
one that has not received the attention required, is to leverage African 
philanthropic resources to minimise reliance on external donors. 
Concluding remarks
The work of TrustAfrica, through the Liberia Civil Society Initiative and 
the Zimbabwe Alliance, has been an important contributor to the ad-
vancement of African agency. It has enabled institutions and individuals 
to conceptualise and implement what they have seen as the solutions to 
their challenges. While these initiatives have produced some construc-
tive results – including several policy wins – in the short and medium 
term, it is too early to speak of long-term implications. Nonetheless, 
through the reflections and observations of TrustAfrica staff, partners 
and donors, and an emerging body of evidence, the work in Zimbabwe 
and Liberia illustrates at least in part TrustAfrica’s theory of change: that 
a critical mass of informed, networked, and resilient CSOs can hold gov-
ernments to account. TrustAfrica has indeed influenced and contributed 
to advancing critical social justice issues in Zimbabwe and Liberia, and 
it continues to do so. 
Moreover, TrustAfrica has done this work with a vision and man-
date that value and promote African agency and empowerment. The 
comments and insights of those consulted for this chapter affirm this, 
even as they offered a critical review of the work of TrustAfrica, bringing 
challenges and missed opportunities into the foreground. The fact that 
TrustAfrica grapples with these knotty, perplexing, unpredictable and 
often seemingly intractable issues within complicated and fluid contexts 
is an indication that it is fully engaged with the realities of the practice of 
social justice philanthropy on the African continent, and is committed 
to the promotion of agency, self-sufficiency, equality and democratic 
development.
Despite all of its progress, TrustAfrica – and other philanthropies 
seeking to promote social justice and democratic, accountable gover-
nance – must navigate political, economic and social terrains that can be 
volatile and unpredictable. They must deal with unequal power dynam-
ics on a number of fronts, with their donors and in the contexts in which 
they work. They must negotiate cultural sensitivities and differences and 
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address issues of sustainability for their funded partners while, in many 
cases, themselves being vulnerable to funding flows and the constraints 
that these place on them. 
It is therefore vital to have a critical interrogation of the expectations 
that are placed on such institutions, particularly if they are being seen as 
nodes for enabling agency through philanthropy. Any long-term success 
in advancing African agency must be considered within the context of 
how to enable an independent civil society that can withstand political 
and other pressures, but also be financially independent. While raising 
African philanthropic resources is certainly one option, more needs to 
be understood about how to enable civil society and philanthropic inde-
pendence, particularly where civil society voices are threatened. These 
tasks may be huge, but they must be addressed. 
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5
Movement Building to Promote African 
Voices: TrustAfrica’s 
support to stop illicit financial flows from 
Africa 
Fambai Ngirande
Introduction
The topic of illicit financial flows (IFFs) may appear to be a specialised 
matter of concern only to technical experts, but TrustAfrica’s project 
to curb IFFs from Africa demonstrates that it can be made the people’s 
business. Over the past three years TrustAfrica and its partners have 
helped popularise the debate and build mass pressure to effect policy 
changes on what is now emerging as a critical development matter for 
the continent. This chapter unpacks the issue of IFFs and looks at the 
state of advocacy when TrustAfrica joined the space, the strategies em-
ployed, and the impact of the project’s interventions.1
A conceptual look at illicit financial flows
The term ‘illicit financial flows’ has gained currency as a catch-all phrase 
that defines the leakage of resources across borders through a variety 
of hidden means. Global Financial Integrity (GFI) (2013) defines IFFs 
as ‘all unrecorded private financial outflows involving capital that is il-
1  This chapter is based on a combination of documentary research and interviews 
with current and former TrustAfrica staff and funded partners of the IFF project.
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legally earned, transferred, or utilised, generally used by residents to 
accumulate foreign assets in contravention of applicable capital controls 
and regulatory frameworks’. Thus, even if the funds are legitimate, such 
as the profits of a business, their transfer abroad in violation of exchange 
control regulations or corporate tax laws would render the capital illicit. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2012), 
refers to IFFs as ‘methods, practices and crimes aiming to transfer finan-
cial capital out of a country in contravention of national and internation-
al laws’. According to the United Nations Development Program (2011), 
IFFs ‘include but are not limited to tax evasion, corruption, trade in 
contraband goods, and criminal activities such as drug trafficking and 
counterfeiting’. Varied as the definitions of IFFs are, implicit in all of 
them is the idea of concealing income or wealth from the relevant tax 
authorities. 
The sources of IFFs fall into three broad categories: corporate, crim-
inal and corrupt. The latter arise from activities such as the bribery of 
state officials and theft of state assets. Criminal sources are generated 
from money laundering, drug trafficking and human trafficking. Cor-
porate sources derive from commercial activities of mostly private mul-
tinational companies and are estimated to account for 65% of all illicit 
outflows. As sensationalised as corruption is in narratives of the conti-
nent, the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa (2013) 
estimated that corruption accounts for 5% of IFFs, with the remaining 
30% coming from proceeds of crime. 
Given its huge contribution to the overall volume of IFFs, the com-
mercial component deserves particular attention. Companies employ 
a wide range of mechanisms to evade taxes and illicitly transfer funds 
from African countries, including transfer pricing, and misinvoicing 
trade and services. Multinational companies can engage in intra-group 
trade to move profits from high- to low-tax jurisdictions, and can also 
understate the quantity, price and quality of their exports, particularly 
in the extractive sector, resulting in losses in potential revenue for the 
exporting countries. As well, they may over-invoice imports in order to 
illegally export foreign currency, and invoice for fictitious agency fees, 
brand fees, and management fees. 
Although the commercial sector is the biggest source of illicit finan-
cial flows from Africa, its role in undermining development on the con-
tinent is often overlooked. In fact, multinational companies are gen-
erally regarded as development saviours on the continent and foreign 
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direct investment (FDI) is uncritically accepted as a panacea for the its 
development challenges. Development problems on the continent are 
usually attributed to the all-too-familiar problems of state corruption 
and bad governance. However, growing insights on IFFs demonstrates 
that the corporate sector, if not held accountable, can be an equally 
destructive force through IFFs, exacerbating the sector’s culpability in 
Africa’s underdevelopment. Indeed, corruption by state bureaucrats and 
IFFs perpetrated by corporate elites cannot be looked at in isolation. Of-
ten, there is collusion between the two, withering the capacities of Afri-
can governments, corroding democratic institutions and compromising 
public officials. This in turn limits the state’s capacity to dismantle the 
vicious cycle of exploitative conditions and unjust economic relations 
under which IFFs thrive. Even more worrisome for a war-weary conti-
nent is the fact that IFFs ‘not only thrive in conflict and insecurity but 
exacerbate both by undermining the financial and political prospects for 
states to deliver and support development progress’ (Cobham 2016). 
The lack of transparency in the global financial architecture encour-
ages IFFs. Tax havens and offshore jurisdictions facilitate layers of fi-
nancial opacity and dubious accounting practices that create a shadow 
finance system in which IFFs thrive. In spite of its global spread, the 
most devastating effects of IFFs are felt in the developing world, Africa 
in particular; they constitute a major source of resource leakage from the 
continent, draining scarce foreign exchange reserves, reducing tax col-
lection, counteracting investment inflows and ultimately contributing to 
worsening poverty and inequality. Reed and Fontana (2011) estimate 
that $1.3 trillion was illicitly siphoned out of the continent between 
1980 and 2009. The report of the High Level Panel on IFFs from Africa 
estimates the annual leakages from the continent at up to $60 billion. 
The latest OECD estimates (2016) go as high as $150 billion per annum. 
Worse still, an influential GFI (2011) study estimated that illicit finan-
cial flows from Africa were increasing at an annual average of 23%.
Clearly, IFFs are a problem too big to ignore, not least by African 
countries whose development prospects depend on their ability to lever-
age their resources for development. In its groundbreaking advocacy 
campaign, ‘Stop the Bleeding’, TrustAfrica deliberately describes this 
leakage of Africa’s wealth as a loss of blood, a metaphor that speaks to 
the life-threatening loss of domestic resources which could otherwise 
have been life-sustaining – if used to address healthcare, education, in-
frastructure, and other vital development priorities. This loss of resourc-
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es not only retards development across the African continent but has 
corrosive impacts on governance and the enjoyment of human rights, 
the stability and security of societies, and the rule of law, democracy 
and justice. 
Research carried out by the Mali-based Institute for Research and Pol-
icy Alternatives in Development (IRPAD) with support from TrustAfrica 
demonstrates that IFFs capitalise upon existing structural weaknesses 
in African countries (Goïta et al., 2015). These include inadequate legal 
frameworks; lack of enforcement of existing laws; poor contract nego-
tiation and award processes; limited knowledge and awareness about 
IFFs and their manifestations; poor inter-country collaboration; lack of 
beneficiary ownership and disclosure, and poor coordination amongst 
stakeholders. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(2014) echoes these findings by noting that ‘loop-holes in national legal 
systems, contradictions between them, and the capabilities gaps of de-
veloping countries to enforce them and international agreements, enable 
economic players and individuals to transfer financial resources interna-
tionally in a targeted way on a large scale’. 
Exposing the rot: the emergence of a movement
Illicit financial flows are not a new phenomenon. In fact, the various 
schemes that add up to what is now conceptually defined as IFFs began 
with global capitalism. Yet for a long time, IFFs were largely perpetrated 
under the radar, with little literature and discussion on the subject. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, structural adjustment programs and the associat-
ed financial deregulation regimes that were introduced made possible 
the unhindered global mobility of capital, resulting in a massive increase 
in IFFs. It was not until recently, however, that IFFs aroused public 
attention. Baker (2005) provided empirical estimates on the extent of 
the problem at a global level, and Ndikumana and Boyce (2011) was 
amongst the pioneering works to provide Africa-specific context and 
estimates. 
When TrustAfrica began work on IFFs in 2013, a number of inter-
national and African organisations were already working on the subject 
and related matters, including groups such as the UK-based Tax Jus-
tice Network (TJN), Oxfam, Action Aid and Tax Justice Network-Africa 
(TJN-A). Credit is due to all these groups, and in particular the efforts 
of African civil society, for putting issue at the forefront of development 
discussions on the continent. 
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TrustAfrica’s decision to work on IFFs evolved from earlier initia-
tives supported with funds from the Ford Foundation. In the initial 
years after its founding in 2006, TrustAfrica utilised funding from the 
Ford Foundation and others for three broad programme areas: dem-
ocratic governance, African philanthropy and equitable development. 
A few years ago, however, discussions between the Ford Foundation 
and TrustAfrica gravitated towards a narrower thematic focus, and 
IFFs emerged as the core issue supported with Ford Foundation funds. 
Commenting on this shift in focus, a then TrustAfrica programme staff 
member noted that the focus ‘enabled us to connect themes in econom-
ic governance with elements of a much-needed developmental agenda 
centred on enhancing the African state’s capacity to meet the needs of its 
people’. Around the same time there was also a growing interest across 
the continent in exploring domestic resource mobilisation as an alterna-
tive to external sources of finance that were proving to be inconsistent 
and unsustainable. 
From the broad agreement to focus the funding on illicit financial 
flows, TrustAfrica proceeded to set its own goals, to outline strategies 
and to build a network of partners. When TrustAfrica entered the space, 
the conversation was dominated by voices in London, Brussels and 
Washington. The OECD analysis in particular dominated the discourse 
and shaped the thinking on policy responses. While this helped to bring 
to the fore the global aspects of IFFs, it did little to express or address 
the African specificities of the problem. 
Given this context, TrustAfrica set its broad goal to support a move-
ment promoting African voices in processes and initiatives that stop the 
flow of IFFs from the continent. It specifically outlined the following 
objectives: 
1. Build and strengthen a wider movement of advocates rooted in 
Africa to combat illicit financial flows through the provision 
of platforms for dialogue, knowledge and experience sharing 
among advocacy, knowledge generation and policy formulation 
communities.
2. Expand and enhance access to needs-driven up-to-date research, 
data and analysis on the state, dynamics of economic governance 
and IFFs in Africa.
3. Communicate more effectively about illicit financial flows and en-
sure that there is a growing set of actors (experts and non-ex-
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perts) in the debates and advocacy against illicit financial flows.
4. Foster networking, coordination and collaboration among insti-
tutions (including those in the global north) working on illicit 
financial outflows. 
Underlying these objectives was TrustAfrica’s overarching aim to fa-
cilitate the emergence of a critical mass of informed, networked, and 
resilient African civil society organisations capable of holding govern-
ments accountable to pro-poor policies. As TrustAfrica’s IFF programme 
officer noted, ‘we see our role as contributing to shifting the balance of 
power between self-interested elites and the people’. From TrustAfri-
ca’s perspective, work to put in place policies that stop IFFs is in many 
ways a political process that seeks changes in the distribution of wealth 
and power; getting to the tipping point requires the mobilisation of a 
robust movement to challenge entrenched interests and force reforms 
to the structures underpinning the global financial governance process-
es. To this end TrustAfrica’s interventions have evolved into a cohesive 
programme of action whose main pillars go beyond grant-making to 
include research and knowledge management, capacity building and 
technical assistance, convening and campaigning. 
Strengthening the African knowledge base
In order to feed the initiative’s popular messaging and policy proposals, 
TrustAfrica and its partners invested in research on various aspects of 
IFFs. These efforts constitute a major part of TrustAfrica’s goal to build 
a truly African advocacy movement to advance the issue. Research into 
IFFs is dominated by western institutions, in part because groups such 
as GFI and TJN have a much longer history of working on the issue 
and, more importantly, have access to the kind of resources needed to 
conduct in-depth research. Moreover, funding for such research is not 
easily available on the continent. As a result, African civil society actors 
have found themselves compelled to quote data and cite references from 
the West, which were not as helpful when it came to mobilising for local 
action. 
Beyond the need for data, however, the larger perspective was at 
issue. As TrustAfrica’s programme officer explained, ‘we were acutely 
aware that we were joining a conversation that had been framed from 
an outside perspective and dominated by global north voices’. Thus the 
goal was not just to generate relevant research, but to propose solutions 
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that would apply to the conditions on the continent. TrustAfrica’s col-
laboration with the Accra-based Third World Network-Africa (TWN-A), 
which set out to unpack the conceptual and systemic aspects of the 
issue in Africa and put forward policy recommendations relevant to the 
‘African specificities’, was a critical intervention in this regard. This ‘con-
ceptual clarification’ identified the structural aspects of the challenge of 
IFFs to African economies. TrustAfrica then facilitated wider knowledge 
sharing to help strengthen the capacity of African civil society in general. 
As part of an overall commitment to building a pan-African knowl-
edge base, TrustAfrica has actively supported the strengthening of the 
capacities of African researchers on IFFs. It has afforded pan-African 
researchers the space and resources to tackle complex themes from an 
African perspective and, significantly, to contextualise some of the or-
thodox analysis that had in many cases inadequately captured the inter-
ests of African people. Over the last three years, TrustAfrica has brought 
together leading African scholars and researchers to explore ways of 
strengthening methodologies of studying IFFs. In addition, it has estab-
lished an IFF Research Grants Initiative whose objective is to provide re-
sponsive and accessible technical and financial support for researchers. 
To date, research fellows from twelve African countries have accessed 
support from this facility and are contributing to the emergence of a 
cohesive body of knowledge influencing policy discussions and stimu-
lating debate on IFFs.
This knowledge-building work has included studies on IFFs and the 
mining sector in five West African countries, namely Mauritania, Guin-
ea, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. It also has included in-depth stud-
ies on the extent of IFFs in key economic sectors in Southern Africa, 
specifically focused on mining, agriculture, and wildlife and tourism. 
TrustAfrica has also been working with the Southern Africa Trust to 
build knowledge on the links between African philanthropy and illicit 
financial flows. From initial studies that looked at philanthropy’s links 
to IFFs, natural resource governance and taxation, the Southern Africa 
Trust has brought the work to a regional level, with the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) secretariat now exploring the devel-
opment of a regional framework for sustainable financing for develop-
ment which would have a major focus on curbing illicit financial flows. 
TrustAfrica has also collaborated with partners such as TJN-A to build 
knowledge on the issue of transfer pricing from an African perspective. 
The resulting policy recommendations on issues such as legislative re-
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forms and regional approaches to taxation have strongly influenced po-
sitions advanced at regional and continental decision-making platforms. 
Significantly, research by TrustAfrica and partners found that plug-
ging IFF leakages and enhancing the extractive sector’s contribution to 
public revenues and social development would have a greater devel-
opmental dividend across all five West African countries than FDI and 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) combined. While there is still 
a long way to go before African institutions can stand toe to toe with 
their Western counterparts in terms of research capacity and knowledge 
production, efforts by TrustAfrica and its partners show, at the very 
minimum, the importance of investing in local knowledge production 
to fuel the case for policy action. 
In addition to commissioning original research, a signature TrustAfrica 
contribution has been the establishment of a free online database that 
serves as a ‘knowledge hub’ for IFFs from Africa. Established in part-
nership with the Southern Africa Research and Documentation Centre 
(SARDC), this database contains over 600 research papers, reports and 
other documents and keeps the community of researchers, civil society 
and policymakers updated on new resources via a system of alerts. Ad-
vocates view the growth of a database of credible data reflective of Afri-
can perspectives as central to their ability to set the agenda and spear-
head their own initiatives to combat IFFs.
Challenging dominant narratives
After entering the field at a time when the narrative on IFFs was largely 
dominated by organisations and platforms in the north, TrustAfrica has 
made a notable contribution by helping to amplify African voices on the 
issues. It has also helped build the capacity of African organisations to 
engage in policy conversations. Central to this has been TrustAfrica’s 
investment in the reframing the debate to reflect African priorities and 
specificities. This new frame is expressed in ‘The African CSOs IFF Dec-
laration and Call to Action’ developed by TrustAfrica and partners as 
part of the ‘Stop the Bleeding’ campaign. 
One key area where TrustAfrica has differed with the international 
community has been the orthodox framing of IFFs. The dominant fram-
ing has been based on a minimalist focus on ‘illegal’ activities such as 
crime and corruption; it approaches the issue of IFFs in isolation and re-
gards it as a new-found silver bullet to solve Africa’s development prob-
lems. Challenging this framing, TrustAfrica has contributed to bringing 
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attention to the structural weaknesses of the global economic gover-
nance system as the root cause of IFFs. It has further focused attention 
beyond ‘illegal’ activities to include ‘legal’ leakages of African resources 
that are taking place through, for instance, unregulated capital flight and 
tax holidays granted by African governments to multinational corpora-
tions. The new focus favoured by TrustAfrica has also helped strengthen 
the response of civil society in a way that reaches beyond the fixation 
on transparency and corruption that had come to define the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) responses. The EITI and even to 
an extent the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) based approach tends to 
let commercial companies off the hook and assumes that the problem is 
simply with African governments stealing monies paid by companies as 
tax revenues. TrustAfrica’s contribution has therefore been to work with 
its partners to expand the spotlight and to also question whether com-
panies are paying their fair share of taxation in the first place. The focus 
on corporate activities is sensible given the fact that the corporate sector 
is responsible for the bulk of IFFs. That this occurs as part of normal 
business practice is not as surprising as the fact that financial regulatory 
frameworks in African countries are largely unable to stem the resource 
leakages. This is compounded by the fact that the tepid global regulatory 
frameworks are rendered ineffectual by the lack of cooperation across 
borders. 
Reflecting on Third World Network’s (TWN) cooperation with 
TrustAfrica to expand the definition of IFFs to focus more on the root 
and structural causes, Yao Graham, TWN’s coordinator, contends that 
‘anti-IFF interventions that carry the blessing of international financial 
institutions and major donors tend to focus around corruption, bribery 
and money laundering.’ For example, the World Bank frequently refers 
to IFFs as comprising those flows and activities that have a clear con-
nection with illegality. However, as research by TrustAfrica’s partners 
consistently elaborates, the major source of resource leakages from Afri-
ca is not from the isolated behaviour of corrupt individuals in corporate 
entities but stems from unjust economic power relations between Afri-
ca and the developed world. IFFs have become a fundamental element 
of a business model favoured by transnational companies and enabled 
by a global economic governance architecture that prioritises corporate 
interests over citizens’ rights. The structural viewpoint supported by 
TrustAfrica and its partners lends itself to a more expansive definition 
of IFFs that goes beyond crime, corruption and the illicit to also in-
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terrogate the equally damaging licit flows that have become standard 
corporate practice to reduce tax liability and the share of revenues that 
remain in host countries. This expanded definition enables advocates to 
advance a more comprehensive economic justice agenda and to interro-
gate the root and structural causes of gross resource leakages as part of a 
more holistic developmental and redistributive agenda, one that seeks to 
ensure that African populations in general – and not rich shareholders 
and politicians inside and outside the continent – become the biggest 
beneficiaries of the continent’s resources. 
Convening dialogues and connecting different actors
As most stakeholders working on IFFs would attest, a longstanding 
weakness of the African lobby on IFFs has been the absence of a coordi-
nated voice. Given that the issue of IFFs from Africa is characteristically 
broad and composed of distinct country dynamics, arriving at a consen-
sus was always bound to be a difficult undertaking. However, through 
convening and collaborative work, TrustAfrica has played a leading role 
in creating platforms that bring together civil society organisations for 
strategic consultations and for knowledge and experience sharing. As 
part of these efforts, TrustAfrica supported the formation of a Working 
Group on Illicit Financial Flows and Africa’s Development. The working 
group brought together leading African organisations including the Afri-
can Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET), 
the African Regional Organisation of the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC-Africa), TJNA-A, the African Forum and Network 
on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), and TWN-A. It serves as a plat-
form to strategise and operationalise coordinated responses. These ef-
forts have contributed to a working convergence around the need to fo-
cus more on collective movement building and coordinated campaigns 
and advocacy instead of the tendency towards working in silos and re-
maining disconnected from grassroots constituencies. 
Over the past three years TrustAfrica has organised, participated in 
and contributed to at least seven major convenings. These meetings 
brought together diverse stakeholders working on IFFs, including lo-
cal communities, advocacy organisations, academics and policymakers. 
They ranged from high-level policy platforms such as the ‘Pan African 
CSO Conference on Tax, DRM and IFF’ to ‘Building a People’s Move-
ment to curb IFF in Southern Africa’ held as part of the Southern Africa 
People’s Summit. The major thrust of these platforms has been for ad-
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vocates to coordinate strategies, explore collaboration and facilitate the 
emergence of a coordinated African voice. The harmonisation of efforts 
has been instrumental not only in putting IFFs on the policy agenda in 
a more coherent way but also in enhancing African narratives as to how 
IFFs can be addressed. At the same time, the investment in convenings 
has enabled the emergence of a solid core of connected pan-African or-
ganisations with the technical capability and legitimacy to effectively 
shape and influence decision-making around IFFs. 
Citizen mobilisation and policymaker engagement
Going beyond specialist policymaking platforms, TrustAfrica has also 
maintained fidelity to its commitment to broaden the movement of ad-
vocates on IFFs and bring the masses into the conversation. To this 
end, it has been working to weave elements of its interventions into 
a coordinated popular campaign, ‘Stop the Bleeding’. With the target 
of mobilising one million signatures to demand action by African pol-
icymakers, TrustAfrica has partnered with a core group of civil society 
organisations across the continent to drive popular messages on IFFs 
and mobilise citizens to take action. The thinking behind the campaign 
is that policymakers will be compelled to act if citizens demonstrate that 
they care about this issue and unequivocally demand action from their 
leaders. The TrustAfrica approach is consistent with the findings of the 
High Level Panel on IFFs from Africa which concluded that ‘political 
will is an essential ingredient’ to policy change.
From the initial continental launch in Nairobi in June 2015, the cam-
paign has been rolled out to West and Southern Africa sub-regions. In 
each sub-region a core group of partners is responsible for mobilising 
civil society and coordinating efforts to engage with policymakers at 
the national and regional economic community levels. Working with 
its partners TJN-A and TWN-A, TrustAfrica successfully made sure that 
IFFs featured prominently during the UN Third International Confer-
ence on Finance for Development (FFD3) in Addis Ababa in July 2015. 
As a result of these efforts, prominent figures, including former South 
African President Thabo Mbeki and United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Africa Executive Secretary, Carlos Lopes, endorsed the cam-
paign; it has also received support from Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ley-
mah Gbowee and UN Goodwill Ambassador, Yvonne Chaka Chaka, as 
well as from the global solidarity community, in particular groups such 
as the AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Center, Jubilee USA and US-Africa Network. 
Claiming Agency: Reflecting on TrustAfrica’s first decade
84
Given their technical nature, raising popular awareness about IFFs 
has required advocates to adjust their messaging as they discover which 
aspects of the issue carry most popular appeal. The challenge is that it 
is remarkably difficult for ordinary people to establish the connection 
between multinational corporations, some of whom are the makers of 
beloved household brands, and the systematic bleeding of public re-
sources. In response to this challenge, TrustAfrica has harnessed music, 
film, poetry, regalia and other forms of creative expression. In 2016, the 
campaign won, through a popular online vote, the Honesty Oscar for 
Best Activist Anthem. The stated aim of the Honesty Oscars Awards is 
to ‘name and fame’ those doing important work to bring about account-
ability. This is one indication that the campaign has effectively broken 
new ground in terms of reaching out into mass public consciousness be-
yond traditional organised civil society. The implications of this break-
through is that the campaign can effectively be broadened through other 
mass mobilisation activities and bring grassroots voices to the forefront 
of IFFs advocacy. 
Concurrent with citizen mobilisation, TrustAfrica has been invest-
ing in supporting civil society’s direct engagements with policymakers. 
As a result of growing spotlight on IFFs, African leaders have been ex-
ploring various initiatives to respond to the problem. One such initia-
tive is the High Level Panel on IFFs, which was established by African 
leaders motivated by the need to seek alternative sources of develop-
ment financing to fulfil service delivery commitments in the context of 
declining economic growth and foreign direct assistance. This conver-
gence of interests between African governments and independent ac-
tors in confronting IFFs might presuppose the emergence of improved 
state-civil society relations. On the contrary, TrustAfrica’s experience 
has been that of progressive engagement with the African states at a 
continental level, and often fractious engagement at the national level. 
This is hardly surprising given the advocacy agenda of TrustAfrica and 
its partners which highlights the failure by African nations to shift 
from tax competition to tax cooperation; the complicity of some po-
litical elites in facilitating IFFs, particularly in the extractive sector; 
and the failure of African governments to agree on standard regulatory 
frameworks and accountability mechanisms for corporations in their 
jurisdictions. In spite of this challenging relationship with many na-
tion states, TrustAfrica has continued to support initiatives to engage 
policymakers at the national level including legislators, revenue au-
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thorities and law enforcement agencies.
TrustAfrica has used platforms to engage with policymakers as 
opportunities to share research and policy recommendations coming 
from partners working on the ground. This kind of engagement has 
contributed to shifting the thinking of policymakers in many ways. In 
particular, African policymakers did not fully appreciate the need for 
a home-grown discourse on IFFs, thinking simply that the proposals 
that were coming from the OECD and Western governments would 
provide global solutions that would work for Africa as well. Now, 
there is an increased appreciation by policymakers of the need to nu-
ance the ‘African specificities’ of IFFs and produce local data to guide 
action (UNECA, 2013). While getting policymakers to take decisive 
action is a daunting challenge, some traction is evident from TrustAf-
rica’s efforts to support partner’s participation in national forums and 
continental initiatives that provide important platforms to secure Afri-
can policymakers’ buy-in. 
Whilst African actors have striven to rally behind their policymakers 
in efforts to combat IFFs, African policymakers have tended to display 
misplaced confidence in the global economic governance system’s com-
mitment to policing IFFs. This confidence has been incentivised some-
what by various initiatives on IFFs promoted by the World Bank, the 
IMF and the OECD. These organisations have over the years launched 
flagship initiatives on IFFs, mostly centred on tax rules and anti-corrup-
tion measures which in many ways represent a reaction to the extent 
to which the rules of international financial institutions are routinely 
subverted by IFFs. However, these initiatives characteristically do not 
go as far as questioning the asymmetrical power relations embedded 
in the rules that govern the global economic order. Whilst welcoming 
the important efforts of Western-dominated institutions to fight IFFs, 
TrustAfrica’s chief concern is about the risks associated with outsourc-
ing the resolution of Africa’s developmental challenges to other actors. It 
is therefore not surprising to see across all of TrustAfrica’s interventions 
the principle of African agency as the core driver of solutions to African 
problems. 
Reflections on missed opportunities
Undoubtedly, TrustAfrica’s efforts have ‘shaped the game’ through very 
positive influences in many respects. Perhaps most significant is its con-
tribution to reframing the discourse on IFFs from an African perspective. 
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This has made the IFFs advocacy grounded, and relevant to African civil 
society and policymakers alike. Equally important, TrustAfrica’s work 
has been instrumental in fostering collaboration among African institu-
tions and in the process has contributed to the emergence of a coher-
ent movement of African voices. However, there are also shortcomings, 
and missed opportunities. In particular, the project is in its third and 
final year of guaranteed funding without a clear plan of how the work 
will continue. TrustAfrica’s partners on the ground whose projects are 
coming to an end are also not clear on where things will go from here. 
Perhaps TrustAfrica could have invested more in anticipating the end of 
guaranteed funding and worked more to build a diverse pool of funding 
beyond the initial funder. It appears as if from the onset TrustAfrica took 
a project support approach that meant mostly one-year agreements with 
partners – though this needs to be seen within the context of the yearly 
funding that TrustAfrica was receiving from its own donor. This short-
term approach appears to have severely limited TrustAfrica’s partners’ 
ability to think more strategically beyond annual project timeframes. 
Further, the short-term thinking seems to have limited TrustAfrica’s 
contribution to core support and sustainability of institutions working 
on IFFs. 
In some instances, mostly due to limited funding, TrustAfrica has 
had to move away from projects at the end of the one-year project im-
plementation period, even if they were clearly successful. This contra-
diction between a commitment to building and sustaining a long-term 
movement on IFFs and the reality of short-term project modalities limits 
continuity and connectedness of interventions. Moving into the future, 
TrustAfrica may want to consider working with partners on a minimum 
three-year cycle and to stay with successful partners. 
Conclusion
As the first three-year cycle of TrustAfrica’s work on IFFs draws to an end 
its legacy is a growing movement of trained people and a credible body 
of knowledge making the case that IFFs are one of the most pernicious 
development challenges confronting the Africa today and that stopping 
them requires the concerted efforts of a movement of empowered ac-
tors from the continent. TrustAfrica’s role in catalysing the emergence 
of such a movement and popularising the issue of IFFs in three years 
is a phenomenal achievement and a strong basis to build upon future 
endeavours in pursuit of a more just and accountable global economic 
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governance system. The body of work under review demonstrates with 
remarkable clarity not only the impact, but also the resourcefulness of 
African institutional responses to problems affecting the continent. Spe-
cifically, interventions that are rooted in an understanding of the speci-
ficities of Africa’s challenges can strike at the root and structural causes. 
This points to the difference that can be made by a philanthropic organ-
isation that is based on the continent and focused on African agency. 
It is demonstrated by the wholly original conceptualisation of TrustAf-
rica’s IFF interventions that put people’s lives at the centre of analysis, 
research, and subsequent action. In so doing, it has galvanised a new 
constituency – and helped organisations to coalesce around a movement 
whose growing influence has made important inroads in undermining 
the pervasively negative impacts of IFF on the African continent.
References 
Baker, R. (2005) Capitalism’s Achilles’ Heel: Dirty money and how to renew the 
free market system. London, John Wiley and Sons.
Baker, R. (2013) IFF from Developing Countries: Measuring OECD Respons-
es IFFs from Africa: A hidden resource for Development, available on 
www.gfintegrity.org 
Ndikumana, L. and J.K. Boyce (2011) Africa’s Odious Debts: How Foreign 
Loans and Capital Flight Bled a Continent, London, Zed Books.
Cobham, A. (2016) ‘Breaking the vicious circles of illicit financial flows, con-
flict and insecurity’, Great Insights Magazine, 5(1). 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2013) ‘Illicit Fi-
nancial Flows: Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows 
from Africa’. Addis Ababa, UNECA.
Global Financial Integrity (2013) IFFs from Africa: A hidden resource for devel-
opment, available on www.gfintegrity.org 
Goïta, M. et al. (2015) ‘Synthetic report of five studies on Illicit Financial Flows 
(Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Niger)’. Bamako, IRPAD.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2014) 
‘Illicit financial flows from developing countries: Measuring OECD 
Responses’. Paris, OECD.
Ritter, I. (2011) Illicit Financial Flows: An Analysis and some Initial Policy 
Claiming Agency: Reflecting on TrustAfrica’s first decade
88
Proposals, Frankfurt, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
UNDP (2011) Illicit Financial Flows from Least Developed Countries 1990 – 
2008, New York, UNDP, available on http://www.undp.org/content/
undp/en/home/librarypage/povertyreduction/trade_content/illicit_fi-
nancialflowsfromtheleastdevelopedcountries1990-2008.html
89
6
Opening up the Policy Process:
TrustAfrica’s work to include
the voices of smallholder farmers
Chipo Plaxedes Mubaya 
Introduction
In Africa, the only region in the world where poverty and hunger are 
on the rise, agriculture remains critical for poverty reduction. Yet the 
continent’s agricultural productivity is on the decline, and in some cases 
has stagnated (ADB, 2012; Practical Action and PELUM, 2005). This sit-
uation is compounded by a multiplicity of challenges, including limited 
access to agricultural inputs, water, markets and knowledge as well by 
the effect of climate change (Boko et al., 2007; Mano and Nhemache-
na, 2008). For these reasons, aid and investment remain important, yet 
European Commission aid to African agriculture is declining. Further-
more, existing aid and investment tends to undermine poor farmers, 
who constitute 60% of African smallholder farmers (Practical Action 
and PELUM, 2005). This is a cause for concern, given that more than 
two-thirds of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa is based in rural ar-
eas, and of those, 70% depend on crop and livestock farming for their 
livelihood (ibid.). 
In this context, implementing policies to increase smallholder ag-
ricultural productivity is a strategy that promises to achieve pro-poor 
growth (Birner, 2010). This will require macroeconomic policies such as 
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removing the agricultural taxes that threaten African farmers, improving 
services and investments in agricultural technology, and boosting agri-
cultural performance through the engagement of farmers’ networks and 
organisations (Binswanger-Mkhize and McCalla, 2010). The continent’s 
leaders have voiced their support for smallholder support, but with rare 
exceptions they have failed to make the necessary investments. Progress 
on this front requires concerted action to improve the ability of farmers’ 
networks and civil society organisations to influence policymaking.
Since 2009, TrustAfrica has leveraged donor funds in order to build 
an effective advocacy movement for smallholder agriculture, and to 
increase farmer participation in decision making regarding agricultur-
al policies on the continent. This chapter seeks to explore the impact 
of that work. It frames the discussion in terms of African agency, and 
reflects on whether it has made a difference to have an African-led, Af-
rica-based philanthropy operating in this space. The chapter was in-
formed by academic research, a review of grant documentation, and 
interviews with TrustAfrica’s funded partners, donors and staff. 
Agency in agriculture
The literature on agency highlights the duality of structure: that the 
agent both shapes, and is shaped by, the structure in which it exists 
(Chambers, 1989; Giddens, 1984, 1991, 1994, 2009). Moreover, group 
actions constitute an important element of processes of social cohesion 
and innovation in responding to environmental, social, economic and 
political threats (Mutopo, 2014). This contrasts with dominant and nor-
mative thinking of the poor as hopeless, a construction that is consistent 
with dependence on donors and other external agencies at the expense 
of people’s own agency (Kithiia, 2010). 
Alternative literature highlights the need to understand agency in the 
context of agriculture in Africa – in which farmers are highlighted as 
innovators, and technical and socio-cultural creators – as opposed to ap-
proaches that rarely take into account the ability of farmers to respond 
to shocks that threaten agricultural productivity (Crane et al., 2011). In 
this context, agency in agriculture is best understood in the realm of ‘ag-
riculture as performance’, which recognises farmers’ creative capacities 
to respond to socioeconomic and environmental challenges – that they 
react to challenges and opportunities as they arise in agriculture systems 
(Richards, 1989, 1993). 
This literature on ‘agriculture as performance’ views agricultural 
Opening up the Policy Process
91
knowledge as something that is held with some degree of spontaneity, 
as opposed to an intellectual expertise that is employed to reach a deci-
sion. Agency in agriculture is thus best understood as farmers’ actions 
transcending specific planned technical behaviours on farms to per-
forming roles as members of social networks and collectivities (Crane 
et al., 2011). TrustAfrica’s work in smallholder agriculture builds on 
this understanding by focusing on building the capacity of smallholder 
farmers, their associations and unions, and civil society formations to 
advocate for improved policies and locally owned and led agricultural 
development agendas.
TrustAfrica’s work in agricultural advocacy
TrustAfrica serves as an intermediary, a Southern-based organisation 
that provides funding to other African organisations, a role hitherto 
largely played by Northern institutions. Even as it disburses funds that 
originate in the global north, its presence on the continent results in a 
different way of operating, according to organisation staff and partners. 
TrustAfrica’s philanthropic work recognises the importance of agency 
and is based on the premise that equitable and sustainable agricultural 
development is possible through concerted advocacy by African stake-
holders. This approach tends to align itself with alternative forms of 
operations that empower local level structures and institutions to play a 
greater role in self-mobilisation processes (Mubaya et al., 2015).
TrustAfrica took into account a number factors when initiating its ag-
riculture policy advocacy work. These include the importance of build-
ing skilled, networked, and active agricultural advocacy organisations 
across the continent; the need for credible and inclusive platforms and 
forums to foster transparent and productive policy dialogues amongst 
all stakeholders; and the imperative to pilot innovative strategies in 
selected countries that present learning and replication opportunities. 
Ultimately, TrustAfrica aimed to create a vibrant agriculture advocacy 
movement.
The context in Sub-Saharan Africa
Current policymaking processes on the continent limit the meaningful 
engagement of civil society and smallholder voices, including limited 
conceptualisation and recognition of policymaking spaces and limit-
ed opportunities to engage these voices (Bank, 2011; Kithiia, 2010). 
Local governments and farmer organisations have not been adequately 
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empowered through fiscal decentralisation and community-driven de-
velopment. Dr. Lindiwe Majele-Sibanda, a leading farmer advocate and 
CEO of FANRPAN,1 observes that although Africa has an oral culture, 
Africans do not talk enough when and where it matters most – at the 
local, national and regional levels. Rather, the dialogue happens more 
at the international level, where the few speak for the majority (Ma-
jele-Sibanda, 2013). 
TrustAfrica saw an opportunity to make a difference in this regard. 
In July 2003 all 53 African governments at the African Union summit in 
Maputo agreed to make agriculture a top priority in national develop-
ment, signing on to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP). Parties to the agreement made a commitment to 
‘increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum of 10% of their 
national budgets’ and to ‘improve the productivity of agriculture to at-
tain an average annual growth rate of 6%, with particular attention to 
smallholder farmers, especially focusing on women,’ by the year 2015 
(NEPAD, 2003). 
But in the years since 2003, little had been done and few leaders 
had lived up to the rhetoric. In this context, TrustAfrica recognised the 
importance of agency to improving agricultural performance in Afri-
ca. Indeed, a review of CAADP’s first phase noted challenges that lend 
weight to the TrustAfrica drive: a lack of clarity about the roles and 
responsibilities of different stakeholders; difficulties with the integration 
of gender-related issues and indicators into the plan; and inadequate 
coordination structures at all levels.
Elements of TrustAfrica’s agriculture advocacy work
In 2009, TrustAfrica launched a programme in partnership with the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation with the stated aim of building a 
more effective advocacy movement for sustainable agriculture in Africa. 
This programme recognises the importance of agency in agriculture and 
farming organisations in Africa by strengthening policy advocacy capac-
ities within smallholder farmers’ unions, associations and intermediary 
NGOs. TrustAfrica implemented this program in three sub-regions of 
Africa: West (Ghana and Nigeria), East (Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya) 
and South (Malawi). In 2013, TrustAfrica initiated the second phase of 
the project, ‘Advocacy for Smallholder Farmers’, in which it seeks to re-
1 FANRPAN, the Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network, is a pan-Af-
rican organisation based in Pretoria, South Africa.
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solve the uneven participation that has characterised policy reform pro-
cesses and to ensure that chosen policy and strategy interventions are 
acceptable to the smallholder community and sustainable within mutual 
accountability (a key aspect of the second CAADP phase). A key aim was 
to build an African movement for policy advocacy and to raise aware-
ness about the CAADP. While in the first phase TrustAfrica focused on 
one of the four CAADP major pillars2 – food supply and hunger allevi-
ation – staff broadened their focus in the second phase to include the 
issue of markets. TrustAfrica settled on these pillars mainly as a strategic 
imperative but also because its funding could only address so much. 
TrustAfrica initialised the first phase of the project through a system-
atic scoping study to identify civil society organisations in Africa that 
are engaged in agriculture policy advocacy.3 During the course of the 
project they hosted a series of convenings for all funded partners. One of 
these, in Lilongwe, aimed to help build the capacity of partners to par-
ticipate in the formulation and implementation of agricultural policies, 
particularly within the CAADP framework. It also helped to familiarise 
partners with agricultural policies, networking and budget processes. 
TrustAfrica funds and activities sought to mobilise local-level participa-
tion in policy processes, and improve advocacy capacities for the bud-
geting and extension work.4 
Outcomes and achievements of the work 
Awareness raising and policy advocacy within the 
CAADP framework
A key achievement at the start of the programme was the identification 
and engagement of civil society and farmer organisations, some of which 
2  The four pillars focus on land and water management, market access, food supply and hunger 
alleviation and agricultural research.
3  The country scoping studies were published in a volume entitled ‘From Rhetoric to Policy 
Action: An Analysis of Agricultural Policy Reform in Six African Countries’ (available at www.
trustafrica.org). 
4  For instance, a range of these projects focused on sensitizing and educating farmers on CAADP 
(SEND Ghana, ECASARD, Farmers Union of Malawi, NASFAM, Centre for Land Economy and 
Rights of Women (CLEAR)), building capacity and understanding in budgeting processes and en-
gaging local governments in the process (Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana (PFAG), NAS-
FAM), extension (Farmers Union of Malawi) and communicating policy processes through the 
media (Jamaa Resources Initiative, Resource Conflict Institute for Land and Environment (REC-
ONCILE), PFAG).
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were rarely visible on the national scene but which had some potential 
to engage in policy advocacy. Importantly, the targeted organisations 
directly represent smallholder farmers’ interests, engaging with farmers 
on the ground as opposed to reaching them indirectly through other 
organisations. One such organisation in Malawi, for instance, has more 
than 110,000 members across the country and is owned by farmers 
themselves. The role of this organisation is to encourage smallholder 
farmers to approach farming as a business and to conduct activities in 
groups. Many of the selected organisations had policy advocacy as a pri-
mary mandate (for some, research also formed part of their core work) 
making it easier to build in additional policy advocacy components as 
opposed to having to introduce the concept. TrustAfrica staff believe 
that these factors make it more likely that the work will not only be 
sustained but expanded as association members bring their knowledge 
of CAADP processes and principles and their policy advocacy skills to 
other groups with which they are affiliated. For the most part, partner 
organisations had not heard of CAADP before, despite the fact that as 
smallholder organisations they were the ultimate beneficiaries of its ac-
tivities. CAADP now has better visibility and has been popularised at 
lower levels in the project districts and countries.
Reflections from funded partners indicate that this not only helped 
enlighten these partners on CAADP processes and principles, but did 
so in a way that ensured that the individuals and organisations involved 
became aware of the importance of advocacy. Furthermore, interviews 
with partners show that the widening of their knowledge base, when 
combined with enriched core activities and improved project ideas, led 
them to engage in policy advocacy in relation to CAADP. 
Enhancing organisational capacity
As discussed above, partner organisations found the training offered 
to be appropriate and timely, and their enhanced capacity can be seen 
in their contributions to a number of policy initiatives undertaken in 
the various project countries. It can also be seen in the increased vis-
ibility enjoyed by some of the organisations that were previously little 
known. It helped that TrustAfrica deliberately chose partner organisa-
tions which, with a few exceptions, had the capacity to engage with large 
numbers of smallholder farmers. This ensured widespread participation 
in important agriculture-related activities, resulting in higher visibility 
and potentially contributing to long-lasting impact at the national level. 
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An example was a partner in Malawi that was able to successfully engage 
farmers to identify challenges related to agricultural policy advocacy and 
later take up the priority challenges in a high-level workshop. In Gha-
na, respondents noted that no organisation had hitherto succeeded in 
bringing farmers directly into the agriculture policy spaces, reflecting 
the value of TrustAfrica’s support in enabling new voices to enter the 
policy discourse. Interviews further revealed that partners have man-
aged to garner further support to carry forward agriculture policy work 
with farmers.
Building an effective advocacy movement for smallholder agriculture
Further evidence of partners’ enhanced capacity can be seen in the in-
creasing number of farmers who took part in negotiations and engage-
ment with higher-level institutions involved in agriculture policymak-
ing. As momentum began to build, and groups saw the need to work 
together and also collaborate with policymakers, a loose movement be-
gan to take hold. Examples include Ghana, where three partners were 
working and reports describe how engaged farmers have developed the 
confidence to request information from the district officials regarding 
the budget process and other issues. They also report improved collab-
oration between the district director of the Ministry of Food and Ag-
riculture (MoFA) and farmers within the district. Projects centred on 
intensifying agriculture extension services and training farmers in their 
districts. In the same context, two partners highlighted that local level 
advocacy groups among farmers and NGOs were created and nurtured 
through the second phase of the project, where farmers were able to give 
input into the 2016 national budget, which reflected a 17.8% increase 
over the 2015 budget. Also in Ghana, one of the three partners indicated 
that they established a powerful Women Agriculture Advocacy Team 
that has managed to engage government through district structures, 
with farmers making presentations to policymakers. In this seemingly 
small but ultimately significant way, TrustAfrica initiated the process 
of bringing farmers to collaborate with relevant national policymaking 
teams. 
At the end of the day, perhaps the most gratifying factor in any 
planned intervention is the ability to sustain activities beyond the fund-
ed intervention. Reflections from partners indicate that the Women 
Agriculture Advocacy Team and farmers’ group have been involved in 
other activities beyond the TrustAfrica-funded project activities and the 
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same groups were brought on board in the second phase of the project. 
These reflections resonate with those coming from Malawi and Uganda, 
where the training of trainers has created a pool of community trainers 
on agriculture policy related issues. Building local capacity in this way 
enables training to be done on an ongoing basis by fellow farmers rather 
than relying on external funding. 
Collaboration
TrustAfrica’s efforts illuminate the potential to build and sustain nation-
al movements through organisation-based collaboration. In Ghana and 
Malawi, there is evidence that collaboration was beginning to foster such 
movements at the national level. Two organisations in Ghana collabo-
rated at the end of the first phase to prepare a joint project proposal for 
the second phase, which was eventually funded. Partners in Ghana and 
Malawi advanced collaboration in their projects by participating in each 
other’s activities, for example through workshops that the collaborating 
organisations co-hosted under the TrustAfrica-funded projects. Clearly, 
TrustAfrica did catalyse collaboration among smallholder farmer organ-
isations and can further facilitate this process to enhance sustainability.
Challenges and lessons learnt
While TrustAfrica’s approach towards policy advocacy has started to 
register success in terms of enhancing national movements for agricul-
tural policy advocacy, the processes have not been smooth. Several chal-
lenges have been noted by TrustAfrica staff and its partners, some of 
them consistent with documented challenges to policy advocacy across 
Africa. Some of the gaps faced in the first phase are currently being ad-
dressed in the second phase of the project. 
Insufficient and short-term resources 
Limited funding and resources regularly threaten the success of proj-
ect implementation in agriculture policy advocacy (Schönfeldt and Hall, 
2013). In this case, partners lamented the limited logistical support for 
agriculture budget tracking and advocacy activities. While there have 
been significant efforts to link farmers with the national budget and pol-
icymaking processes, there has been little support for farmers’ follow-up 
activities with government after the budget and policy documents have 
been finalised. The critical point is the farmers’ ability and capacity to 
track policy and determine the extent to which they are contributing 
to the policy processes. Partners highlighted that from their experience 
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in implementing projects, advocacy activities may require funding for 
two or three years. Any funders considering implementing similar work 
need to take into account the need for an improved funding base and 
extended project period that has the potential to result in meaningful 
impact and, ultimately, transformation. Examples given by partners in-
clude limited capacity to conduct more local-level activities on the ground 
with farmers as well as the national level activities that TrustAfrica funded.
TrustAfrica and other philanthropic organisations may thus need to 
reconsider the amount and period of funding that they extend to their 
partners in order to address the challenge of limited capacity to follow 
through initiated activities. However, within this context, it is important 
to consider the funding dynamics for TrustAfrica, which is in reality 
both a funded and funding institution. This factor has implications for 
the nature and extent of directed resources and subsequently sustain-
ability and continued funding for partners; it implicitly calls for long-
term collaborations with other funding organisations to enable wider 
coverage and further depth of funding. In addition, TrustAfrica may 
need to consider other options such as diversifying its funding sources, 
building a stronger endowment fund, and funding partnerships with 
public and private financing. TrustAfrica and other funding organisa-
tions may also need to consider facilitating more effective local level 
community resource mobilisation for development. 
Weak stakeholder engagement and relations 
State and non-state actors are often in competition with each other when 
they operate within the same advocacy spaces. This competition can 
degenerate into conflict, especially with the increasing role of non-state 
players such as the private sector. TrustAfrica may have occasionally 
failed to anticipate and prepare for this challenge. This is important 
given reports of suspicion between civil society organisations (CSOs) 
and government institutions, which limited the extent to which civil 
society could engage in public policymaking, along with weak institu-
tions and inadequate platforms for such engagement. Ideally, the roles 
of these two stakeholders are complementary, in that while CSOs can 
make policy more relevant, the government is better placed to serve 
farmers. TrustAfrica may need to consider investing in building rela-
tions between state and non-state actors in addition to building farmer 
capacity. Within this context, there is merit in understanding the role 
of the media in balancing smallholder farmer interests against political 
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interests. For example, one organisation in Ghana made extensive use of 
the press to highlight farmer activities.
In Uganda and Kenya, reports indicated limited engagement of farm-
ers with government due to factors at project, organisational and nation-
al levels. These included poor organisation by partners, bureaucracy, 
and fragile political situations. In other instances limited organisational 
integration of the projects beyond individual staff members led to a loss 
of project memory due to high staff turnover. Other disturbances were 
due to changes of governments. TrustAfrica and other funders may need 
to consider the potential for such changes to affect project implementa-
tion and stability. 
High partner expectations
The complexities involved in multiple contracts and partnerships come 
with challenges that TrustAfrica and other funders must take into ac-
count. One of these is stakeholder perception management, as when 
partners’ high financial expectations were accompanied by what some 
perceived as limited transparency regarding TrustAfrica’s funding plans 
and capacity. It appears that TrustAfrica may not have adequately 
spelled out the extent of its support to partners. Communication with 
partners is therefore critical at an early stage. It may help to make clear 
that project funds are not intended to cover the organisations’ admin-
istrative costs. On the other hand, some partners need such assistance, 
and including a budget line for it could make a difference in terms of 
increasing their capacity to manage and implement projects. Another 
way TrustAfrica and other funders can circumvent this challenge is to 
engage partners at an early stage in the design of their projects. 
In addition, donors should complement traditional funding sourc-
es with more innovative approaches revolving around community re-
source mobilisation. In particular, youth and women are key, as they 
are at the centre of agricultural activities and may constitute powerful 
pressure groups for this process. In this context, conducting power anal-
yses and making use of champions from farmer groups has the poten-
tial to advance agriculture policymaking. Funders may then be able to 
deal with stakeholder perception management more easily through a 
shared responsibility and local empowerment to promote community 
responsibility for the project. In addition to dealing with high stake-
holder perceptions, this has the potential to limit the subordination of 
communities to external agencies.
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Limited baseline engagements and assessments
While TrustAfrica does not play an agenda-setting role for partners, it 
certainly should play a role of encouraging evidenced-based project de-
sign. The research component that is usually important as a precursor 
to agriculture policy advocacy may have been given limited attention 
in the funded projects. There were reports that while TrustAfrica itself 
did a wide scoping study (mentioned earlier) it did little to encourage 
and sensitise its partners to the importance of conducting baseline rapid 
assessments of targeted smallholder farmers at the beginning of projects 
in order to understand farmers’ priorities for advocacy. One way that 
TrustAfrica and other funders can ensure that this happens is to make 
baseline studies a pre-condition for grant awards at the proposal stage, 
since some of the partners did not see the need for this assessment.
It should be noted that one of the partners in Ghana and another one 
in Uganda did conduct baseline assessments as a precursor to the im-
plementation of their projects. In Uganda, this included a participatory 
baseline stakeholder engagement process to understand seed varieties 
and appropriate agronomic practices with the assistance of research in-
stitutions, thus enabling more targeted activities. One of the partners 
in Malawi highlighted that ‘good advocacy is normally that which is 
evidence and priority based’, but said that limited funding did not allow 
for this process. TrustAfrica could consider creating incentives for part-
ners to initiate farmer engagement activities with no financial support. 
This can be done through the provision of non-financial incentives. For 
example, TrustAfrica could award grants to those partners who show 
evidence of initiating community engagements and baseline studies into 
existing projects. Another way of promoting alternative resource mobil-
isation strategies is by encouraging partners to leverage existing grants 
with other, new, partners, as was done by one of the organisations in 
Ghana. 
Limited focus on women and gender
While a few partners had a deliberate focus on gender and women, most 
did not. This focus is important given the central role that women and 
youth play and can play in increasing agricultural productivity. Women 
are employed in the agriculture sector and produce nearly 90% of the 
food on the continent (FAO 2012) yet they have little voice in the de-
velopment of agricultural policies. It is thus critical for TrustAfrica and 
other funders to empower small organisations that deal directly with 
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smallholder farmers in terms of human resources management and in-
stitutional strengthening (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2012;  Schönfeldt 
and Hall, 2013). Women also carry a disproportionate burden of look-
ing after and feeding the family. Meanwhile, youth constitute a signifi-
cant percentage of the population in Africa and face high levels of un-
employment (FAO, 2016). 
In the current phase of this work, TrustAfrica has funded projects with a 
significant focus on women-specific movements for policy advocacy and 
equitable resources and markets, for instance in Burkina Faso. But since 
this work has only recently been initiated, it may be premature to focus 
on any achievements and challenges at this point. In Ghana, the project 
focuses on strengthening smallholder – and particularly women’s – ca-
pacity and role in budget advocacy and monitoring increases in public 
investment for the targeted delivery of extension services.
Towards an effective framework for agriculture 
policy advocacy
In order to sustain its work to support advocacy campaigns and make a 
significant impact on agriculture policy in Africa, TrustAfrica may con-
sider the following strategies and options. 
Engagement of the media to help advance visibility 
While it is important to connect farmers with government and other 
CSOs and NGOs working in agriculture, it remains critical to create 
awareness and to disseminate intervention-related information to the 
general public, farmer organisations and other development partners. 
To this end, TrustAfrica and other funders could support their part-
ners to develop an advocacy, media and communication strategy either 
individually or in collaboration. Media engagement forms part of the 
advocacy campaign as their representatives have the potential to par-
ticipate in agriculture advocacy fora. Traditional media, website and 
multi-media have the potential to raise the profile of farmers’ activities 
and impact. For agriculture advocacy to remain relevant, it is important 
to focus on dynamic forms of media engagement, among them social 
media and other new platforms that capture the interest of socio-eco-
nomic groups such as the youth, who also potentially have a role to play 
in agriculture advocacy.
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Transnational collaboration on advocacy
For TrustAfrica and other philanthropic organisations to achieve the 
goal of building continental movements of policy advocacy, it is import-
ant to consider deliberate efforts to engage in transnational advocacy 
activities. These partnerships may work in collaboration to challenge 
state control of information and making use of technology to empower 
transnational advocacy through the efforts of new actors, among them 
smallholder farmers. Negotiating for policy change is an activity that 
requires coalitions of actors at various levels and with substantial mo-
bilisation of resources for the strategic actions that direct outcomes of 
the process (Marfo and Mckeown, 2013). As opposed to international 
relations, transnational advocacy is advanced by non-state actors and 
can have a profound effect on domestic policy. TrustAfrica has stated its 
interest in contributing to the process of building a continental move-
ment by facilitating, where appropriate, a unified voice for its partners 
and the organisations and farmers they represent. 
TrustAfrica will need to analyse and understand the range of par-
ticipation and accountability that a transnational campaign can pursue 
for optimum continental policy advocacy, and will need to take into 
account the difficulties of transnational advocacy, among them the geo-
graphical and culture distance between players (Meierotto, 2009) and 
the dynamics of the potentially problematic relationships among trans-
national NGOs and their networks (Jordan and van Tuijl, 2000). 
Enhanced focus on direct smallholder participation
Reflections on the current efforts by TrustAfrica and others documented 
in literature (Meierotto, 2009) agree that there may be inherent chal-
lenges to local inclusion and participation in policy advocacy, particu-
larly if the locals are not involved right at the beginning of the process. 
TrustAfrica may need to further enhance its focus on direct smallholder 
representation and participation as a way of advancing people-centred 
regional integration on agriculture policy in a framework where parlia-
ments and non-state actors are all taken on board in shaping the con-
tinental agenda. The literature recommends baseline assessments that 
account for different value systems and perceptions of reality, including 
smallholder farmer prioritisation of issues and decision making within 
heterogeneous contexts (Poole and Msoni, 2013). The premise is that 
one must understand the context as seen by those people who experi-
ence it, and explore the constraints and strategies to deal with them at 
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an early stage, as this is likely to result in more relevant and sustained 
outputs and outcomes (Forrester et al., 2008). 
Conclusions 
TrustAfrica’s theory of change is centred on leveraging resources and 
ideas and building movements to advance equitable development and 
democracy in Africa. In its work in the agriculture sector, TrustAfrica 
has engaged with national smallholder farmer organisations to facilitate 
farmer agency in a unique way. This strategy is unique; in the past, it 
is larger CSOs that have engaged government on pro-poor policies that 
address smallholder farmer challenges. 
This chapter has provided the context for TrustAfrica’s efforts and 
highlights the traditional dichotomy between policy advocates and 
farmers. Policy advocates have been at the forefront of the policymaking 
process, largely without active involvement of the farmer on the ground. 
In contrast, TrustAfrica has created a platform that supports farmers’ 
agency, engaging smallholder farmer organisations that are themselves 
made up of farmer organisations and representatives. 
It is worth noting that this Africa-led and Africa-based philanthro-
py has given space for African smallholder agency at the lowest level, 
as opposed to conventional approaches that attempts to reach farmers 
through higher level intermediaries. TrustAfrica recognised that sustain-
able and equitable development policies are largely the result of a com-
bination of advocacy efforts between grassroots-based actors (move-
ments), intermediary NGOs and policy research institutions. However, 
the least influential stakeholders in the agricultural field are poor small-
scale farmers, the majority of whom are rural women. Their lack of in-
fluence is a major obstacle to equitable and sustainable agricultural de-
velopment in Africa. 
Despite efforts to engage and empower government and farmer organ-
isations, a scan of the policy advocacy landscape in Africa indicates that 
a lot more effort still needs to be made. This includes the transformation 
of the architecture of advocacy-oriented organisations to strengthen the 
participation of civil society in regional policy dialogue. For instance, 
the Southern Africa Trust is working on the development of structured 
mechanisms to enable civil society voices to be heard in regional policy 
processes. Equally important are strategic efforts by FANRPAN to place 
policy research at the forefront of the regional agenda, along with ca-
pacity building, institutional collaboration, resource mobilisation and 
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information and communication management. While TrustAfrica has in 
the past engaged in similar efforts through its broader governance work, 
it has much to learn in applying such efforts to its specific work on agri-
culture policy advocacy. These complementary efforts can go a long way 
towards ensuring that the voices of the poor are heard in the agriculture 
policy formation arenas.
Elsewhere in the region, in Zambia, the creation of a multi-stake-
holder platform the Agriculture Consultative Forum (ACF), made up 
of government players, civil society, farmers and the private sector, 
significantly shaped the way the agricultural sector has been run in 
the country since 2003. Among the achievements of the ACF are the 
facilitation of stakeholder input into the development of the Zambia 
CAADP Compact, which was later signed in 2011, and the support for 
the development of the agriculture chapter of the 5th and 6th National 
Development Plans. This provides a potential model for transformation 
in other African countries. While TrustAfrica intervention countries can 
learn from this the importance of developing multi-stakeholder plat-
forms, the Zambian ACF can learn from the TrustAfrica model by more 
significantly engaging smallholder farmers, who form the bulk of the 
farmers in the country.
This chapter has presented evidence to the effect that TrustAfrica’s 
approach has made considerable strides in bringing the farmer closer 
to the policymaking process. This approach subscribes to the agency 
and ‘agriculture as performance’ thesis put across at the beginning of 
the chapter, in which farmers have, unlike before, been afforded an 
opportunity to contribute to national budgeting and decision-making 
processes. TrustAfrica has also engaged marginalised socio-economic 
groups, particularly women, through partner organisations. However, 
TrustAfrica’s approach would be more complete with further engage-
ment of the youth who have potential for providing both real stability 
and positive transformation. In essence, African philanthropy that is 
committed to African agency must put even more emphasis on being 
inclusive to ensure that its efforts reach the local-level marginalised 
groups in society.
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7
Resourcing Women’s Rights in 
Francophone Africa
Hakima Abbas
Introduction
From 2009 to 2011, TrustAfrica embarked on a project called Enhanc-
ing Women’s Dignity, funded through a grant from the Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs as part of the ministry’s support for meeting UN Mil-
lennium Development Goal 3 (MDG3), to promote gender equality and 
empower women. This chapter explores the impact of this work, not as 
an evaluation but rather as an analysis of the strengths and gaps in the 
conceptualisation and implementation of the project as well as an explo-
ration of its longer-term ripple effect and sustainability. The intention is 
to undertake a broader reflection on African philanthropy, TrustAfrica’s 
positionality and the possibilities for just funding. Through a feminist 
and pan-Africanist lens, the chapter begins by establishing a conceptual 
framework around African philanthropy, resourcing, and transformative 
change for women’s rights and gender justice. Second, using qualitative 
primary data and by analysing grant documents and other materials, 
the chapter seeks to understand the strategy, achievements and lessons 
of TrustAfrica’s work on women’s rights and dignity and to reflect on 
the impact and sustainability of the project on feminist and women’s 
rights movements as well as on feminist transformative change. Finally, 
the chapter offers a critique and recommendations for future work that 
draw from the lessons of the Enhancing Women’s Dignity project as well 
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as from the possibilities inherent in the unique position and mandate of 
TrustAfrica. 
Conceptual framework
Over the last seventy years, transformative change for women’s rights 
and gender justice in Africa has been significant, though uneven. The 
African feminist movement has grown in size, scope and influence while 
in policy and practice, women’s rights have been established as a corner-
stone of development. Nevertheless, the patriarchy embedded in formal 
and informal institutions from the nation-state to community level, con-
tinue to impede the full realisation of African women’s rights and gender 
justice. The systemic oppression of women, girls and other oppressed 
genders is compounded by the intersecting oppressions of class, ethnic-
ity, religion, national status and ability, amongst others. 
I talk throughout this chapter of women’s rights and gender justice in 
acknowledgement of a feminist framework that recognises the non-bi-
nary character of sex, the social construction of gender and that the sys-
tem of patriarchy impacts multiple genders including women, trans and 
intersex people. For the purposes of this chapter, I use a people-cen-
tered and pan-Africanist view of rights that foregrounds the interests of 
the people of Africa, advocates a self-determination framework and cen-
tralises the democratisation of rights, which Shivji (1989) frames as the 
‘right to organize’. While borrowing the anti-imperialist and rejection 
of neo-liberal ideology in Shivji’s attempts to enhance the codification 
of the right to self-determination, the conceptualisation underlying my 
analysis and recommendations incorporate African feminist frameworks 
of self-determination left out of Shivji’s approach. 
Autonomous social movements are critical to transformative change. 
Social movements are not composed of one organisation or group, but 
are made up of several networked nodes in a constellation of actors driv-
en by a shared vision and propelled by collective action. I use the term 
movement or social movement throughout this paper not to describe 
the informal organisation of large groups of people for political mobil-
isation as it is sometimes used, but to describe the sets of people, or-
ganisations, groups, collectives, constituents, intellectuals etc. that work 
towards a common political agenda over a period of time (Batliwala, 
2008). Movements are important because they create the potential for 
sustained change by not only institutionalising reform but also by con-
solidating transformation by reshaping relations (people-ising change) 
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(Abbas, 2010). Movements are at the root of collective imagining of 
a just society and at the heart of turning that vision into reality. The 
literature on social movements is divided on which factors or strengths 
account for their influence and power. From my lived experiences with 
and within autonomous social movements throughout Africa, a fluid 
combination of interrelating and intersecting factors, rather than one 
alone, account for a movement’s ability to realise change. What is more, 
any theoretical formula for impact is only an approximation for the 
messy reality of transformation. What is consistent is that social move-
ments need clear political frames or ideologies, networks, identity, and 
material and non-material resources. In other words, social movements 
that create change are clear about their vision of a just world, able to 
draw others to this vision and allow others in turn to shape the collective 
vision; they are clear about their strategies for achieving new relations 
and are networked with others who share their political vision within a 
spectrum of frames; and finally their efforts are resourced with energy 
and material. Importantly, the local and global political, social and eco-
nomic contexts within which movements engage play a significant role 
in the extent to which a social movement is able to collectivise the vi-
sioning of new power relations and mobilise action towards their vision. 
In a global study on violence against women (VAW), Htun and Wel-
don (2012) showed that ‘the autonomous mobilization of feminists in 
domestic and transnational contexts – not leftist parties, women in gov-
ernment, or national wealth – is the critical factor accounting for policy 
change’. The study demonstrated that feminist movements are the key 
political force in creating change in the policy and practice around vio-
lence against women. The authors note that violence against women is 
an issue that hits at the heart of patriarchy by challenging gender roles 
and cisgender male power defined by patriarchy. ‘In the case of VAW, 
autonomous feminist movements are the primary drivers of change be-
cause they articulate social group perspectives, disseminate new ideas 
and frames to the broader public, and demand institutional changes 
that recognize these meanings.’ (ibid.) The study further recognises that 
the role of autonomous social movements on the issue of VAW chang-
es over time as dominant ideas and political frames shift in response 
to the movement’s demands. As institutions encode policies to address 
violence against women, the role of autonomous social movements 
becomes important in ensuring that policy turns into practice and be-
comes the vehicle for people to appropriate and give normative meaning 
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to these policies and laws. 
The literature is less clear on women’s political participation and its 
long-term impact on building a society free from gendered oppression. 
The theory that women in political power will transform the condition 
of women in general relies on the assumption that women in these 
positions will advance women’s rights and gender justice while also in-
stituting feminist policy in all areas. A ‘critical mass’ of women in gov-
ernance, in turn, is expected to achieve systemic change in the political 
culture of representation and accountability (Batliwala, 2008; Hassim, 
2010). However, as Nzomo (2015) notes: ‘there persists unresolved 
structural impediments in the governance system, that are impervious, 
unresponsive and tend to block gender equality and democratic justice 
initiatives’. The patriarchy and colonial framework in the foundation 
of the structures and institutions of political systems in Africa begs the 
question whether transformation is possible from within these frame-
works of power. McFadden (1992), referring to African nationalism as 
the foundation for state power, writes that ‘nationalism can be under-
stood as essentially a male defined and patriarchally rooted ideology 
which emerge[d] at a particular time in the history of a people, as a re-
sponse to oppression and external domination’. McFadden argues that 
the insertion of individual women into these positions may, at best, 
narrowly challenge androcentric power in governance and at worst 
work against the demands of a feminist movement seeking to subvert 
patriarchy, among other axes of oppression. A concerted effort from 
many quarters to increase the number of women in political power 
and leadership across power bases, has led some to decry the exercise 
as a numbers game without substance, leading many feminists to see 
the tactic of increasing women’s political participation and leadership 
as only one part of a broader strategy to subvert the norms and prac-
tices of state power. One response is the building of a feminist base of 
‘leaders’ with access to political power working as part of, in concert 
with and accountable to the feminist movement across the continent.
 Engaging different terrains of struggle, the state being one of them, 
without privileging it as the sole site for change-making, has the po-
tential in the short term to enable and support feminist movement de-
mands and to shift the dominant culture of these systems. As Nzomo 
(2015) notes: ‘This entails paying more attention to the process and 
criteria of selecting political leaders and setting enforceable account-
ability mechanisms for holding accountable political office seekers 
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and power holders. It also requires gender champions and committed 
democrats to eliminate the patriarchal institutional norms and values 
that normalize inequalities and undermine the advancement of gender 
and democratic agendas, and the enforcement of accountability mech-
anisms.’ However, whether this strategy will also enable the demise of 
the very governance systems which are being used, and the renewal of 
direct democracy, remains to be seen. 
Social movements shift power when they exist in their totality – the 
full spectrum of formations – rather than as a single formation or sub-
grouping. However, organisations (and typically non-governmental 
organisations) and in some instances even individuals have been the 
primary targets of the growing funding sector. This focus on organisa-
tions has shifted the locus of change for many movements, sometimes 
fragmenting and siloing different expressions of peoples’ resistance or 
alternative building and centreing power in professionalised, often ur-
ban, organisations. Conversely, the over-reliance on the funding sector 
to resource civil society has left many organisations, and even move-
ments, vulnerable to funding shifts and external agendas. To understand 
these dynamics one must also understand the diversity of the funding 
sector. A whole industry has flourished globally to distribute financial 
resources for civil society. It is composed of a myriad of actors from 
multilateral and bilateral agencies to corporate philanthropy and private 
philanthropy. 
Philanthropy in Africa is at times simplistically understood to consist 
of charity or the aid architecture, which most troublingly is centred on a 
narrative of the global north helping Africa. This narrative is ahistorical 
and, as I have argued elsewhere, reinforces the very asymmetry of power 
that needs addressing to shift the root causes of global inequalities and 
impoverishment (Abbas, 2009). A deeper look at African philanthro-
py gives a much wider understanding of the ways in which resources 
are generated, transmitted and collectivised for social good, if not for 
social change, in the continent. Bhekinkosi Moyo (2010) attempts to 
create a framework for African philanthropy that embraces the lifelong 
dynamics of benefitting and bestowing from African collective support 
systems both new and old. He argues that most Africans are themselves 
philanthropists and that the social fabric of African societies has been 
woven across time on the basis of mutual exchange between individuals 
and collectives. New forms of philanthropy continue then to be shaped 
by new forms of need. However, the question remains as to how these 
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exchanges of resources, material and non-material, can be put to use to 
shift systemic oppressions. Indeed, it is clear that just and sustainable 
societies will be built in Africa only with our own knowledges and our 
own resources (Moyo and Ramsamy, 2014). Given that resources yield 
agenda-setting power, their distribution cannot be dictated by people or 
entities removed from the contexts and with interests that may or may 
not align with those of African peoples. 
Formally institutionalised African philanthropic entities are re-
sourced in different ways. Some obtain all of their funding from local 
sources. Others have a mix of local and international sources and yet 
others rely predominantly on funding from the global North. While 
African resources (material as well as non-material) will certainly be 
the leverage of African transformation, little scholarship has emerged 
to significantly attest to the impact of African philanthropy and fund-
ing engines in comparison to those of Northern-led entities. Empirical 
evidence suggests that African philanthropic vehicles provide more 
opportunities to determine priorities based on need because of their 
proximity to the societies and contexts they are attempting to support 
and therefore their ability to make more informed and relevant choic-
es. Indeed, this logic is not limited to African foundations, but also 
to the array of women’s, LGBTIQ, youth and other funds that serve 
and lead particular movements and constituencies, examples of which 
include Mama Cash, FRIDA and the African Women’s Development 
Fund. These foundations have made innovative and creative attempts 
at ensuring that their agendas are indeed responsive to the needs of 
their constituencies rather than those of their funding sources by using 
participatory funding approaches including peer grant making mech-
anisms and constituency leadership in their governance, staffing, etc. 
Importantly, one of the distinctions between these funds and the, of-
ten larger, funding sources from outside of the movements, is the ideo-
logical base of their approach, in the case of women’s funds, resting on 
feminist principles, and in the case of some African funds, resting on 
the principles of pan-Africanism. 
Nevertheless, a strong critique of the current model of African foun-
dations is that they often remain as pass-through vehicles for North-
ern-based resources due to the fact that they themselves in some in-
stances are vulnerable to Northern funding trends and priorities, thus 
limiting their power or positionality to determine their own priorities. 
Unfortunately, philanthropy of all kinds have been plagued by the same 
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model inherited by Northern funding approaches that attempt to fix 
the symptoms of systemic oppression without radically transforming the 
system itself, a necessary feat deemed by some funding actors to be con-
troversial. As Bhekinkosi Moyo suggests ‘the geographic location alone 
doesn’t change the dynamic of a donor, conditions apply even when the 
donor is African. What we must do is generate our own income.’1 De-
spite these challenges and learning, community-based, movement-led 
and other African foundations have been well received by African actors 
across the board and have been steadily growing in number, scope and 
scale. 
Despite the need for significant shifts to guarantee the rights of Af-
rica’s women and girls and the centrality of women’s rights and femi-
nist movements to achieve this change, this movement continues to be 
severely under-resourced. This trend is, however, not only localised in 
Africa; the funding landscape for women’s and girls’ rights and devel-
opment has historically been sorely lacking throughout the world and 
across financing sectors. A 2010 global survey conducted by the Asso-
ciation for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) found that, of the 
740 women’s rights organisations surveyed, the median annual income 
was just $20,000 a year. Of these organisations, 48% had never received 
core funding and 52% had never received multi-year funding. In Africa, 
excluding the countries of North Africa, AWID’s research found that 
the median income of women’s rights organisations was significantly 
less than the global median at just $12,136 annually, thus signaling a 
severely under-resourced movement. 
It is important to note that feminists stress the importance not only 
of the amount of funding but the quality of funding necessary to sustain 
feminist activism and movements. Quality of funding refers to the abil-
ity of multiple types of formations within a movement (i.e. collectives, 
groups, associations, academics, organisations etc.) to access funds 
through open, transparent and contextually accessible processes that do 
not dictate their work or priorities. Core funding that allows for organ-
isational or institutional building, sustainability and resilience is also a 
key element of quality funding. Linked to this, multi-year (preferably 
medium- to long-term) flexible funding is a critical ingredient to enable 
and accompany movement formations through processes of transforma-
tion which tend to be non-linear, require learning and shifts, and take 
significant time (Clark, et al., 2006).
1 Interviewed by the author on 7 June 2016.
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The MDG3 Fund 
In 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs) in an attempt to set time-bound goals to com-
mitments on development. Many critics of the MDGs rightly pointed 
out that they set bare minimum standards, reduced development to an 
apolitical process by ignoring the systemic causes of inequalities that 
are deep rooted and intrinsic to global capitalist systems, and were ad-
opted without popular dialogue, consultation or participation to be 
imposed, for the large part, on the global South. While goal 3 of the 
MDGs enshrined gender equality in its own right and as necessary for 
development, feminist critiques went further to point out that (i) the 
MDGs failed to recognise, and rather reduced and diluted, existing com-
mitments on gender equality, (ii) failed to make gender a cross-cutting 
theme across all goals, and (iii) were devoid of a human rights frame-
work and reduced systemic economic inequality inherent in the aid, 
debt, trade and global financial architecture to a request for increased 
donor assistance (Barton, 2004). 
In Africa, the predictions of the pitfalls and opportunities related to 
the MDGs came to fruition. While the goals were minimalist, African 
states on the whole struggled to attain them: some much needed atten-
tion and important gains were made in relation to some of the goals, 
while others remained mostly unfulfilled. Civil society critiqued the 
goals and the lack of participation in the drafting process but played an 
important role in turning the goals into reality by providing services and 
making relevant demands on power holders. The African feminist and 
women’s rights movement in particular engaged the goals in formal and 
non-formal ways, not only focusing on the three goals widely considered 
gender-related (goal 3 on gender equality, goal 5 on maternal mortality 
and goal 10 on HIV/Aids) but also adopting and gendering the other 
goals through various campaigns and other actions. This engagement by 
civil society created the necessary adaptation to contextual realities and 
therefore potential popular ownership of the goals’ aims, while ensuring 
that the reductionist agenda wasn’t the end but rather a means. This was 
evident for example in the pan-African maternal mortality campaigns 
led by the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights (SOAWR) coalition 
that invoked goal 5 while also stressing the obligations made within the 
Maputo Protocol2 and other international commitments. 
2 See: http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/
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Immediately evident in the MDG process was the need for the goals 
to be resourced. While many accompanying processes and commitments 
on financing for development were aligned to the MDGs, as AWID’s re-
search states, ‘it was clear that none of them were likely to be achieved 
unless the world’s rich nations, and bilateral, multilateral and private 
funding agencies, committed serious resources to their realization’ (Bat-
liwala et al., 2013). This was particularly true for the women’s rights 
and gender equality related goals where women’s rights and feminist 
movements are severely under resourced. Bearing this in mind, and 
during a moment of consultations on the future of Dutch development 
cooperation in 2007, there was ‘recognition that abolishing the stand-
alone budget for women’s rights and gender equality in the early years 
of the new Millennium had not been a wise decision’ (IOB, 2015). As 
was acknowledged in these consultations, the rise in fundamentalist op-
position to women’s rights and gender justice in the global South and 
the severe under-resourcing of feminist and women’s rights movements 
were creating a situation where even the minimal goals of the MDGs 
would be mere aspirations. 
In an attempt to redress this lack of funding, the Dutch Ministry of 
Development Cooperation created an €82 million global MDG3 Fund 
in 2008 that specifically targeted the realisation of women and girls’ 
rights; it was the largest fund ever created specifically directed at civil 
society working on women and girls’ rights. The awards were given to 
45 projects or institutions around the world through an open and com-
petitive process in a grant cycle of about three years. The fund was built 
around four themes: securing property and inheritance rights for wom-
en, increasing women’s participation in politics and public administra-
tion, promoting employment and equal employment opportunities, and 
ending violence against women and girls. However, the themes were 
loosely interpreted, allowing a wide range of funding partners to secure 
the resources. Two-thirds of the funds were provided to Southern-based 
organisations and a significant portion to re-granting organisations, in-
cluding women’s funds, in an attempt to multiply the reach and im-
pact of the funds (IOB, 2015). As AWID’s evaluation of the MDG3 fund 
overall observes ‘by supporting a number of women’s funds, commu-
nity foundations, human rights funds, and women’s organizations with 
re-granting functions, the Fund has helped to channel much needed 
resources to over 3,600 small, community-based women’s organizations 
… [that undertook] critical interventions for grassroots women’s aware-
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ness, empowerment, mobilization, and assertion of their rights’ (Batli-
wala et al., 2013).
Enhancing women’s dignity: An analysis
TrustAfrica was one of the intermediary organisations that received 
funding from the MDG3 Fund to implement the Enhancing Women’s 
Dignity project. At the time, TrustAfrica’s programme had three pillars: 
democracy and civil society, an area of work across the continent that 
sought to create the conditions for citizen participation; equitable de-
velopment, which sought to respond to the economic conditions on the 
continent; and philanthropy as a means of resourcing movements for 
the other two objectives to be achieved. The programmatic work was 
multi-stakeholder in the sense that it created links and bridges between 
civil society, policy makers, the private sector and the funding commu-
nity. 
Having been awarded a three-year grant of €992,700 in 2009 from 
the MDG3 fund, TrustAfrica provided grants through the Enhancing 
Women’s Dignity project to 19 organisations and networks working on 
women’s political leadership or on violence against women and girls 
(or both) in seven Francophone countries of West and Central Africa. 
TrustAfrica documents reflect that the project design of the intervention 
was deliberate and holistic, including leadership development, capacity 
building, research, network building and funding. However, the theory 
of change of the project was not precise and its outcomes not as concrete 
and specific as would be necessary to achieve longer-term impact. In 
fact, this critique seems to have been leveled similarly at the MDG3 fund 
more globally. According to the independent evaluation conducted by 
IOB: ‘In its design of the [MDG3] Fund, the ministry adopted a project 
approach but without a clear overall programme strategy (currently re-
ferred to as “theory of change”) of what milestones would be needed to 
realise the overall objective of realising “concrete improvements in rights 
and opportunities for women and girls in developing countries in Africa, 
Latin America and Asia”’ (IOB, 2015; emphasis in original).
The organisations receiving the funds through TrustAfrica’s Enhanc-
ing Women’s Dignity fund employed various tactics in their work, in-
cluding knowledge generation and research, capacity-building, aware-
ness-raising, advocacy and lobbying, as well as participatory media, 
art and communications. The organisations were diverse in terms of 
their reach and scope: CAFOB, in Burundi, was a national network 
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with membership throughout the country; CRIGED, in Burkina Faso, 
had a presence largely in the capital; CLVF, in Senegal, had field offices 
throughout the country, and others, like FEMNET Mali, were regional 
or national offices of larger pan-African organisations or networks. Not 
all of the organisations had specific feminist or women’s rights mandates 
and missions, nor were all women-led, though the majority did and 
were. 
There was an attempt in each country to fund at least two organisa-
tions and to ensure that each addressed at least one of the priority is-
sues (women’s participation in political leadership and violence against 
women and girls). It is important to note that violence against wom-
en and girls was approached broadly, and included supporting work 
against female genital mutilation, sexual and gender-based violence in 
schools, and access to services and medical care for women or girls in 
need of fistula repair. Similarly, the approach to women’s political par-
ticipation didn’t solely focus on women in politics. As Codou Bop of 
GREFELS, one of the grantee partners, noted: ‘we addressed a central 
question in the citizenship of women, which is the registration of girls. 
Without birth certificates, they are invisible and cannot enjoy any of 
their rights as citizens, let alone the opportunity to run for elected of-
fice or to elect candidates. These activities took place in rural areas and 
specifically targeted young women who showed interest in politics. An-
other remarkable aspect of the project was the use by young women 
of community media, broadcasting in national languages, particularly 
community radio.’3 The inclusion of young women as constituents in 
the portfolio is noteworthy, as it potentially contributes to shifting the 
locus of knowledge and power, which tend to be centralised in old-
er generations in African feminist movements. Diversity also existed in 
relation to the organisations’ annual budgets, with some struggling for 
funds while others had a stable multi-year income. Similarly, the port-
folio mix ranged from an organisation established that same year to one 
that was over 20 years old. 
Despite this diversity, support was offered only to NGOs and not to 
other formations within civil society. As I noted above, in order to shift 
violence against women and enhance women’s political leadership in 
Africa, systemic change needs to be led by diverse movement actors. For 
this reason, funders looking to contribute to such transformative change 
must consider supporting an ecosystem of movement actors working 
3  Interviewed by the author on 2 August 2016.
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from different spheres of struggle and in a variety of formations over 
the longer term to respond to the gains, losses, shifting roles and tar-
gets to accomplish this change. My interviews with former TrustAfrica 
staff members suggest that the capacity of the foundation to grant to 
non-registered organisations or other types of formations is limited by 
its institutional policies. However, in respect to the MDG3 fund specif-
ically, given the vastness of the region covered, the diversity of tactics 
employed and the limited resources, this limitation may not have had 
a significant effect on the potential for impact of the portfolio across 
movements. Another mitigating factor may have been the engagement 
of informal and formal institutions and sites of power by several of the 
NGOs funded. Examples include working within community structures 
and institutions to shift attitudes, or with state structures to shift policy 
and laws. 
TrustAfrica’s funding was also important given the fact that social 
justice movements in francophone countries are severely under-funded. 
Headquartered in Dakar, Senegal, TrustAfrica has made significant steps 
in rectifying this, and in ensuring a multilingual approach. Few large 
foundations have a mandate, significant funding portfolios or offices in 
the regions. Women’s rights organisations and networks there tend to 
receive most of their funds from bilateral or multilateral organisations 
such as the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie and the Ca-
nadian International Development Agency, while others receive theirs 
from smaller, more specialised funds such as the New Field Founda-
tion. Mama Cash and the African Women’s Development Fund are two 
women’s funds which have had longer engagement in the region and 
have provided important core and project based funding to women’s 
rights organisations, groups and networks. The fact that TrustAfrica’s 
Enhancing Women’s Dignity project contributed to filling an important 
gap in the funding landscape made it a significant intervention with the 
promise of important impact. Yves Niyiragira of Fahamu4 also empha-
sised this key contribution: ‘TrustAfrica funding in francophone coun-
tries was important as organizations in these countries are not on the 
radar of many donors, particularly those in countries such as Cameroun, 
Niger and Mali. The project funded in these countries.’ 
A related achievement of TrustAfrica’s intervention, is the creation of 
a network of women’s organisations working on VAW in francophone 
Africa (Batliwala et al., 2013). As Akwasi Aidoo, TrustAfrica’s founding 
4  Interviewed by the author on 24 March 2016.
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executive director, contends, TrustAfrica is in ‘the business of making 
a forest out of trees and building a dense ecosystem of organizations, 
communities, and borderless fields’ (Barya and Richardson, 2012). In 
order to achieve this networked community, TrustAfrica included in 
the design of the Enhancing Women’s Dignity project, annual work-
shops for grantees to learn new skills and share lessons and strategies. 
The project also set up a listserv and blog to maintain communication 
across grantees. Unfortunately, the network of grantees does not seem 
to have been sustained beyond the life cycle of the project in any formal 
sense, perhaps because of over-reliance on TrustAfrica, and the poor 
ICT permeation in the regions. As Fahamu’s Yves Niyiragira argues: ‘The 
email group or blog didn’t survive because we didn’t explore what we 
could work on together and how that joint work could be resourced. 
They didn’t start with the work.’5 However, Niyiragira feels that Fahamu 
played some role in expanding the networks available to the grantees 
and reckons that TrustAfrica was correct to include them in the portfolio 
for that reason. As he notes: ‘part of our funding was to strengthen the 
access of the other grantees to the African Union. We did this by working 
through the SOAWR coalition, which we were already a part of. In the 
end, two organizations in the TrustAfrica portfolio from Cameroun and 
Mali became members of SOAWR’.6 It is beyond this chapter’s scope to 
assess whether an informal network amongst the organisations has been 
created and whether previously existing relationships were strengthened 
through the project. It may be pertinent for TrustAfrica’s future project 
design to explore whether any collective action or joint work was taken 
up nationally between the pairs of organisations in the grantee cohort or 
across geographies with those working on similar themes and whether 
the project led to deepened connectivity nationally, regionally or across 
the continent. 
The Enhancing Women’s Dignity project began with knowledge 
building, with the thought that it had the potential for long-term use 
and value for multiple uses within the movement, including securing 
further funding. Thus the project focused on the production of knowl-
edge about the capacities, agendas and lessons learned of women’s rights 
organisations, and documentation of the stories of women changemak-
ers. Karima Grant Abbott of ImagiNation Afrika, who ran the capacity 
building and leadership development workshops of the initiative, notes 
5  Interviewed by the author on 24 March 2016.
6  Interviewed by the author on 24 March 2016.
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that the research component was important, as ‘it put the work in con-
text’. Indeed, the documentation of feminist knowledge, realities and 
analysis is key to enabling the type of power analysis needed to create 
meaningful change. Examples of these outputs included a database of 
women’s rights organisations, the profiles of ‘women leaders’ and an 
illustrated training manual on communications and strategic advoca-
cy.7 Although these outputs are available online, with the exception of 
the database, none seem to have been widely disseminated beyond the 
project grantees, a seemingly lost opportunity for feminist knowledge 
generation and learning. Nevertheless, TrustAfrica’s policy of beginning 
portfolios by generating knowledge, usually through convenings, on the 
context and priorities of the movement allows for movement-led grant 
making. As Sandra Zerbo, formerly of TrustAfrica and programme offi-
cer for the project, noted regarding the funds for Enhancing Women’s 
Dignity: ‘What we did with the money is what was needed.’8 Indeed, as 
she suggests, funding priorities were determined by the priorities of the 
movement through the knowledge building process and the work done 
with grantees in the application process. Similarly, TrustAfrica remained 
attuned and flexible to changing realities and unforeseen priorities as 
the grantees interviewed for this chapter attested. On the flip side, this 
model also means not accepting unsolicited proposals, which in turn 
runs the risk of approaching the movement ecosystem too narrowly. 
Moreover, while this approach suggests a potential shift from externally 
driven priorities, it also creates a framework for project-driven funding 
rather than funding that is based on movement support and strategy 
and that offers core and long-term support – key elements of quality 
funding.
TrustAfrica provided project-specific funding for organisations in the 
Enhancing Women’s Dignity portfolio. Yves Niyiragira reports appre-
ciating the flexibility, discussion and advice on the projects to be im-
plemented, as well as the relative ease of the application and reporting 
processes. And while grantees were allowed to include overhead or core 
support in their budgets, it appears that this was only in the region of 
10% of the total grant. AWID’s research suggests that best practice fund-
ing for women’s rights necessitates a much larger portion of core sup-
7  This manual is permanently archived on IssueLab at http://www.issuelab.
org/resource/women_s_political_participation_training_manual_communication_
and_strategic_advocacy
8  Interviewed by the author on 28 July 2016.
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port over the long term (Clark et al., 2006). The MDG3 grant cycle was 
three years, but the Enhancing Women’s Dignity grants seem to have 
been distributed on an annual cycle. A three-year commitment would 
have been of significant value for many organisations whose income is 
often determined on a year-to-year basis and whose work attempts to 
shift entrenched norms and systems. Indeed, Niyiragira noted that the 
year-to-year funding cycle was disruptive and created uncertainty that 
made it difficult for organisations to make long-term projections. While 
acknowledging this ideal, TrustAfrica staff note that the project design 
did not build in the timeframes needed for TrustAfrica to make the ini-
tial medium term commitment to the grantee partners.9 Multi-year core 
funding is key to ensuring the long-term viability of systemic change 
for women’s rights and gender justice in Africa. Women’s rights organ-
isations need to be able to sustain campaigns, projects and initiatives 
as well as their own organisational development in order to build the 
necessary networks and strategies for systemic transformation. Resourc-
es need to be replenished and flexible in order for change to be main-
tained, intensified and adapted to the lessons learned of the intervention 
and changing contexts. Indeed, one of the limitations of grant making 
globally is that organisations are limited to dealing with the current con-
text and realities, playing the proverbial role of firefighter, and not given 
the time and resources to design innovative projects that could enable 
them to develop their visions and create new realities – the difference 
between resisting and building. As Karima Grant Abbott said: ‘I wonder 
if funding and funders like TrustAfrica can come in earlier and give 
women-led organisations a good amount of time and resources to de-
sign with their communities, across their organisations, to innovate, plot 
and plan together’.10 The potential of such a design would be collective 
impact and leveraging collective power. 
Aware of the three-year cycle of the MDG3 funds, TrustAfrica built 
into the project  discussions on sustainable resourcing, including cre-
ative strategies such as crowdfunding. Project documents do not indi-
cate the prior existence amongst TrustAfrica MDG3 grantees of funding 
models outside of seeking grants from multilateral or bilateral agen-
cies and foundations, with the exception of the Association Nigérienne 
pour le Progrès et la Défense des Droits de la Femme (ANPDDF) in 
Niger, which collects dues from its membership. The project attempt-
9  Interviewed by the author on 28 July 2016.
10  Interviewed by the author on 24 March 2016.
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ed to support diversification of funding for example through a creative 
crowdfunding campaign led by TrustAfrica for HEAL Africa. The project 
accompaniment and capacity building also enabled grantees access to 
UN agencies such as UN Women and UNDP, and included a fundrais-
ing workshop led by the African Women’s Development Fund, thus 
leveraging TrustAfrica’s social and political capital in the service of its 
grantees. It is not clear how many organisations were able to sustain the 
projects beyond the availability of TrustAfrica funding. However, there 
is no available indication that grantees implemented new methods of 
resource mobilisation following the grant cycle. 
Importantly, TrustAfrica was not able to continue a partnership with 
the majority of organisations in the project beyond the availability of 
the MDG3 funds. This is despite internal discussions exploring the pos-
sibility of making these issues an organisational focus to allow for ‘a 
more sustained approach and continuation of the project’s work beyond 
June 2011’, as expressed in a 2010 interim project report. TrustAfrica 
made an important choice in funding feminist and women’s rights or-
ganisations in West and Central Africa but the resources should have 
been maintained if real change was to be sustained. The dedicated sup-
port for women’s rights and gender justice may have been discontinued 
by TrustAfrica because this focus was not initially in their strategy, but 
was rather a consequence of TrustAfrica’s successful application for the 
Dutch MDG3 fund. This speaks to the limitation of donor-led priorities 
and their sustainability. 
Ultimately, despite TrustAfrica’s desire to engage on women’s rights 
at its core, this has not translated into significant funding for women’s 
rights organisations across its portfolios, and TrustAfrica has not suc-
ceed in raising further funding for similar support. TrustAfrica might 
have continued women’s rights and gender justice movement building 
in the region by ensuring that its own capacities were developed during 
the period of the project to use a women’s rights and feminist lens across 
its work. The foundation might also have considered creating partner-
ships with women’s funds in Africa for joint work on a particular theme. 
Indeed, many of the issues currently being addressed by the work of 
TrustAfrica have significant gendered impacts and could benefit from 
the knowledge and analysis from this perspective. Women’s organisa-
tions and initiatives are part of TrustAfrica’s early learning and agricul-
ture advocacy portfolios, but women have only recently come into focus 
across the board of other portfolios, such as the work on illicit financial 
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flows. A former staff member suggests that TrustAfrica might have con-
sidered a gender policy or strategy formulation that ensured the contin-
uation of funding for gender justice and women’s rights by guaranteeing 
the allocation of a portion of budget funds to women-led organisations 
or women’s rights work. This policy might also extend to the internal 
working of the foundation, such as procurement and research policies. 
Nevertheless, the sustainability of the impact of the Enhancing 
Women’s Dignity project is also possibly embedded in the accompany-
ing work done during the funding cycle. Through the project, TrustAfri-
ca provided leadership and capacity building for grantees which allowed 
peer-to-peer learning and exchange as well as skills and knowledge 
building. According to Karima Grant Abbott, ‘there is an inherent pow-
er in bringing African women together. The women in the TrustAfrica 
group were deeply engaged and made full use of the space provided 
them, the rare opportunity to be together, to reflect and to learn; they 
turned every workshop into work sessions, immediately applying what 
they were learning and digging deep into the learning to draw what they 
could for their work. They fully grasped the potential impact for them 
to develop better organisations.’11 
Examples of this included training on African human rights frame-
works like the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, support for 
the participation of grantees in African Union summits where they could 
advocate for policy changes, and the targeted and customised advocacy 
assistance to 14 grantees. Grant Abbott said that TrustAfrica staff un-
derstood that resourcing for movement building goes beyond funding, 
to include a transformative leadership training approach: ‘TrustAfrica 
really invested resources in designing a process that used a systems ap-
proach and looked at what are the principles behind what we do, what 
are the lessons we draw and what drives change.’12
While an initiative’s successes should not depend on individuals 
alone, but on institutions more broadly, those interviewed for this chap-
ter singled out Sandra Zerbo as a young African woman with strong 
capacities, vision and feminist analysis. She was known to be accessible, 
committed and a valuable resource to grantees, and her leadership en-
abled a shift in donor and grantee interaction to a relationship of trust 
and support. Karima Grant Abbot noted: ‘The women were excited to be 
in a different space, to engage differently with a donor, to feel respected 
11  Interviewed by the author on 24 March 2016.
12  Interviewed by the author on 24 March 2016.
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by a donor… TrustAfrica were very ethical, engaged and committed. 
This was evident when other staff of the foundation also attended one 
of the trainings, including the leadership, and gave space to listen and 
learn.’13
Conclusion
As I mention in the introduction, this chapter is by no means an exter-
nal evaluation of the Enhancing Women’s Dignity initiative, nor does it 
profess to come to absolute conclusions about the work that was done. 
Rather, it is a basis for analysis and reflection of the realities and poten-
tial of an African-led fund in supporting change for women’s rights and 
gender justice. 
TrustAfrica’s mandate and vision remain acutely relevant in a world 
with ever shrinking democratic and civil society space and in a conti-
nent still struggling to attain the aspirations of social, economic, po-
litical and environmental justice. The manifestations of multiple forms 
of fascism and anti-rights ideologies in Africa find common ground 
with sustaining patriarchy. The logic of domination targets women and 
LGBTIQ communities in particular but intersects with multiple forms of 
domination that perpetuate impoverishment and keep the aspirations 
of liberation elusive for all. In this moment, the need for a strong con-
tinental feminist movement that is able to tackle oppression and build 
visions of freedom is essential. Organised political change is possible 
through women’s rights NGOs, trade unions, farmer and peasant asso-
ciations, political parties, policymakers and academics. This movement 
will need to be resourced and networked – a role that TrustAfrica can 
play with significant impact if it maintains its vision of being a pan-Af-
rican fund, generating and redistributing resources, with connectedness 
to the movements it serves. Quality resourcing will also demand long-
term core support that is responsive to the changing context and role of 
the movement. 
Sandra Zerbo elaborated some of the key strengths of TrustAfrica: 
‘Interpretation of the landscape, the flexibility to change course, the use 
and ethics of re-granting and the attention to the outputs and outcomes 
of grants.’14 Current funding and movement architectures, and their un-
certainty, maintain a level of patronage that will only shift with a deep 
change in mindsets and systems. A social justice agenda is one that re-
13  Interviewed by the author on 24 March 2016.
14  Interviewed by the author on 28 July 2016.
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quires risk and vision, which are not necessarily a priority for many 
corporations, donors and individuals with access to large amounts of 
money who often prefer to address the shorter term symptoms of injus-
tice rather than the systems that perpetuate it. However, social justice 
as an agenda has the potential to be popular, and leveraging collective 
peoples’ power can be a way to correct the imbalance between those 
who hold the purse strings and those who believe in redistribution of 
resources. In this sense, the project design, relationships built and care 
taken in the detailed implementation of the Enhancing Women’s Dig-
nity project point to TrustAfrica’s commitment to shifting the locus of 
power and patronage of dominant funding landscapes. In the ten years 
that TrustAfrica has been in existence, it has successfully built important 
social and political capital with a range of African and global actors. This 
success is not to be minimised. Accompanied in the next ten years by a 
significant endowment and independent resources, this combination of 
capital, and the framework within TrustAfrica for it to be leveraged in 
the service of movement building, could be a game changer in Africa. 
However, as many of the interviewees noted, in the long term 
TrustAfrica’s success will depend on the foundation’s ability to be-
come financially independent and sustainable. It is important to note 
that TrustAfrica has yet to have a long-term strategy funded by a set of 
donors, and that some of its recent large portfolios such the Enhanc-
ing Women’s Dignity project and the Early Learning portfolio, were re-
sponses to donor calls rather than originating from a long-term strategy. 
While TrustAfrica still relies on international donors for much of its 
income, a critical component of the fund’s potential to provide flexible 
core funding for social justice activists, groups, organisations and col-
lectives will be its ability to generate and control African resources and 
create a significant endowment. This is indeed key to the foundation’s 
own sustainability and resilience, as well as to its ability to be indepen-
dent and autonomous. 
To achieve women’s rights and gender justice in Africa will require 
profound change being built piece by piece by the many feminist move-
ments and actors across the continent using an array of tactics. Nor-
mative and systemic change will require an intersectional analysis and 
substantial resources. In fact, any agenda for social justice in Africa that 
doesn’t include these will be unable to make the inroads that our conti-
nent, context and social justice aspirations require. TrustAfrica, through-
out its work, must ensure that women’s rights and gender justice are at 
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the heart of its mandate and that a feminist framework is used through-
out the work, in the power and impact analyses, in setting priorities, in 
grant making, in knowledge building, and in internal mechanisms and 
ways of working. As TrustAfrica celebrates its 10th anniversary, the foun-
dation must also reflect on its successes and challenges and steer the 
organisational boat towards the next ten years with a firm commitment 
in principle and practice to the centrality of women’s rights and gender 
justice to achieve its vision of a just Africa. 
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Re-imagining Agency in Africa 
Tendai Murisa
Introduction
The continent has in the past three decades gone through what we com-
monly refer to as the ‘winds of change’ – shorthand for the transitions 
from one-party states and military dictatorships to multi-party political 
systems. The changes were mostly driven by ordinary citizens. It was 
one of the loudest statements made by Africans concerning their aspira-
tions for a more just political order, and it benefitted from the collapse 
of the former Soviet Union: African politics was geared for significant 
and unprecedented change after the end of the bipolar world. 
This chapter examines, from an insider’s view, the basis upon which 
TrustAfrica has acted over the past decade, and reflects broadly on our 
contributions. The second half of the chapter is largely based on stra-
tegic work within the organisation about what we think will deepen 
African agency and contribute towards moving the needle on a number 
of issues currently inhibiting the achievement of political and socio-eco-
nomic justice on the continent. 
Significance of the winds of change
Beginning in the early 1990s, pro-democracy movements – sustained 
mostly by labour unions – emerged across the continent demanding 
constitutional reforms to allow for multi-party democracy. Unlike in 
other regions, however, there was a missing piece in the equation – 
thriving civil society institutions working to mediate the rapid changes 
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taking place. Although our continent was and remains very association-
al in nature, we did not have an adequate infrastructure to cope with 
the complex challenges that attempts at democratisation and economic 
liberalisation were about to throw at us. All of a sudden we had new so-
ciety-wide obligations and responsibilities, for instance around civic ed-
ucation to ensure that democracy can become a lived reality. We had to 
concern ourselves about how we would be organising elections, through 
voter-education and election monitoring, for instance, as the sitting gov-
ernment could not be trusted with such responsibility. We also needed 
non-state organisations that could defend human rights and also en-
sure that state excesses are curtailed. Although we had democratised we 
learnt through the experiences of others that state-based political elites 
could not be left to exercise power alone. Most of us in Africa knew by 
then that the temptation for abuse of office is always high and can only 
be curtailed through ongoing public scrutiny. 
We were suddenly confronted with the withdrawal of the African 
state from the provision of public goods which had been described as in-
efficient and too bureaucratic to deliver development. In fact, although 
the ‘winds of change’ specifically referred to changes within the politi-
cal systems we also experienced these winds within the socio-economic 
space through the adoption of the Bretton Woods Institutions imposed 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) which literally marked the end 
of any romantic notions of socialism but instead saw most of us adopt-
ing market oriented reforms under what has been referred to as the 
Washington Consensus.1 We had to think of new ways of re-organising 
the delivery of public goods such as education, health and sanitation, 
and also dealing with new problems such rapid urbanisation.
Although there are many actors within what can be called broadly 
civil society it was the emergence of a thriving NGO sector that was both 
spectacular and significant in many ways. It gave us a new way of doing 
things and also the hope that citizen based formations could respond to 
the new challenges. Although NGOs were new,2 and many were small 
1  The term Washington Consensus was coined in 1989 by economist John Wil-
liamson to describe a set of specific economic policy prescriptions that constituted 
the ‘standard’ reform package promoted for crisis-wrecked developing countries 
by Washington, D.C.-based institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and the 
US Treasury Department. The prescriptions encompassed policies in such areas 
as macroeconomic stabilisation, economic opening with respect to both trade and 
investment, and the expansion of market forces within the domestic economy.
2  NGOs have been active Africa since the 1950s but had mostly played a peripheral 
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in size, we welcomed the possibility of their creating new opportunities 
for engaging with the state.
TrustAfrica: catalysing agency
When TrustAfrica was established in 2006 we were fortunate enough 
to find a vibrant civil society spread – albeit unevenly – across Africa. 
Both the board and the staff of TrustAfrica were made up of people who 
had invested time and experience in this civil society, and so the organ-
isation quickly benefitted from the already existing networks and rela-
tionships. We committed ourselves to working alongside a broad move-
ment comprising NGOs, membership associations and unions, policy 
oriented think tanks and other grant-making institutions. We saw civil 
society as the arena in which the rights of citizens would be defended, 
the power of political elites be subjected to some modicum of discipline, 
and the function of markets be given public scrutiny. This would be the 
place where history was made. 
From the inception we were very clear about our mission: as an insti-
tution steeped in the centuries-old traditions of African philanthropy we 
would model interventions through partnership and nurturing ties of 
solidarity aimed at strengthening civil society to achieve the twin goals 
of democracy and development. We have since then worked to resolve 
policy-embedded challenges such as gender inequity and patriarchy, 
systemic violence and oppression of citizens by the yesteryear liberators, 
addressing the transformation challenge within smallholder agriculture, 
growing concerns about impunity, improving prospects for domestic 
resource mobilisation by curtailing illicit financial flows and also nur-
turing African philanthropy. Ours was also an attempt to promote ini-
tiatives led by Africans, informed by an objective appreciation of the 
continent’s social, economic and political context. We hoped that our 
work would contribute towards reaffirming confidence in the agency of 
Africans seeking solutions to the continent’s most endemic problems. 
We placed our bet on civil society in its broader manifestation, and saw 
it as a space where deficits in our democracies and development could 
be addressed. 
There are five areas that have been particularly exciting for us as an 
organisation: achieving the mission of enhancing citizen-based agency 
for democracy and development, ensuring that we are credible land-
welfare role. In the new dispensation they had to take a more prominent role in both 
service delivery and advocacy.
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scape interpreters, understanding our partners (civil society), the sup-
ply-chain (philanthropy) and reflecting more on how we have worked 
and what we could have done differently. We were very clear from the 
beginning that there was no silver bullet that would resolve Africa’s chal-
lenges. Instead, we would need to invest in catalytic initiatives whose 
impact would be felt well beyond our initial efforts. 
In our first strategy document we clarified our role as that of catalyst 
and collaborator. We stated that we would ‘… foster dialogue, and sup-
port projects that address Africa’s democratic and developmental chal-
lenges … by strengthen[ing] the capacities of civil society organisations 
to be more effective and to secure the democratic space in which they 
operate’.3 This was based on the conviction that a vibrant civil society 
was a necessary component of the democracy and development equa-
tion. As already mentioned, the continent had just made the shift to 
more democratic and civilian governments than at any other time in the 
last century. It was indeed a moment of great hope for the continent, 
but even then we realised the need for a vibrant civil society effective-
ly engaged in speaking truth to power and continuously exposing the 
excesses of governments. We sought to defend the new realities and en-
sure that the people of Africa benefit from the transition to civilian and 
democratic governments. We were also not alone, for there were credi-
ble voices calling for such reforms and urging Africa to stay the course, 
including advocates for Pan-Africanism such as the late Tajudeen Abdul 
Raheem, Adebayo Olukoshi, Thandika Mkandawire and Issa Shivji, and 
institutions such as CODESRIA, Third World Network-Africa and Pam-
bazuka.
Catalysing agency for democracy and inclusive socio-eco-
nomic systems
We have noted that although the continent is culturally diverse there is 
a deep-rooted philosophy of community and solidarity which plays a 
very important role in the organisation of rural production, determining 
access to natural resources, welfare and the establishment of checks and 
balances to avoid the excesses of power. At the centre of this framework 
is the element of local collective agency and solidarity, referred to as 
Vuk’uzenzele (‘wake up and do it for yourself’) in southern Africa and 
as Harambee in Kenya and Ujamaa in Tanzania. These are an approxi-
mation of modern day civil society or civic engagement. Aina and Moyo 
3  TrustAfrica (2006) ‘Catalysing African Agency: A Strategic Plan’. Unpublished.
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(2013) provide a continent-wide analysis of these forms of solidarity 
as the bedrock of what we are referring to as the endogenous norms of 
African philanthropy. Furthermore, African society is dominated by as-
sociational activities – in many cases these forms of solidarity have been 
replicated in urban areas through formations such as burial societies, 
savings clubs, and associational activities within religious groups whose 
main purpose revolves around promoting solidarity and collective eco-
nomic agency. Whilst we acknowledged the global nomenclature on 
civil society we also pursued any Africanist appreciation of the meaning 
of civil society not only as a site of contesting and mediating the influ-
ence of power but as one of organic solidarity and collective agency. Our 
approach has entailed nurturing and strengthening associational life as 
we believe that it is an integral pillar of democratic governance. We have 
also worked tirelessly on broadening the meaning of democracy beyond 
civil and political rights and freedoms to economic, social and cultural 
rights and indeed into social justice. Our concept of democracy includes 
freedoms from repression, conflict, vulnerability, hunger, disease and 
ignorance. 
Our partnerships on the continent
From the beginning we appreciated that there was no way we could 
address the continent’s most pressing challenges without working with 
others. We have since then positioned ourselves as a facilitator of pro-
cesses of change on the continent. We view ourselves as a credible land-
scape interpreter and an honest broker responsible for helping forge alli-
ances. We are also a respected convener, providing space for reflections 
and learning, and are continuously improving our work collectively and 
individually as social change agents on the continent. We have mostly 
worked with civil society partners and university-based researchers; our 
contact with governments has been very limited. We had a very success-
ful collaboration with the government of Senegal over the hosting of the 
Higher Education Summit and have worked with a number of govern-
ment-based investment promotion agencies, but we are primarily a civil 
society focused foundation.
When we began operations, civil society organisations in our target 
areas were, for the most part, relatively nascent and had few or no plat-
forms for networking and collective action. We were very clear from 
the onset that we would be focusing on ensuring policy improvements 
to achieve the twin goals of democracy and development. We further 
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made a commitment to consult widely through convenings and scoping 
studies that we would commission. In many instances these convenings 
provided an opportunity for the development of broadly shared agendas 
as well as the development of loose networks with the capacity to raise 
resources beyond the initial funding from TrustAfrica.
It is important to note that in many instances our partners face an ex-
istential threat at two levels, namely financial sustainability and shrink-
ing public spaces (Moyo, 2011). Our partners have had to constantly 
navigate between dealing with resource limitations and threats to their 
personal freedoms, and in some cases the closure of their organisations 
due to changes in the operating environment; for instance, in many 
countries governments are considering a cap on how much of an in-
stitution’s budget can be funded from outside. At times donor interests 
shift, further deepening the challenge to organisations depending on a 
single funder. We have occasionally had to provide emergency grants to 
help some of our human rights partners to move to into safety in the face 
of threats from state agents. We have also come to celebrate the creative 
ways in which our partners have leveraged the small grants we have ad-
vanced them to unlock more resources. For instance, in 2011 we gave a 
small grant to an association of smallholders in east and southern Africa 
and they used it for convenings with parliamentary committees on agri-
culture. In the process their efforts caught the attention of a bigger do-
nor who then gave them a grant of €1.8 million to carry out similar work 
in the region. Our role has always been to go beyond simply issuing a 
grant; we walk with partners through processes of co-creation, and have 
been amazed at how some of our partners have reciprocated by opening 
doors for us in spaces where we had not made inroads. In relation to our 
illicit financial flows work, for example, our initial partnership with the 
Southern Africa Trust (SAT) has evolved into assisting the Southern Af-
rica Development Community (SADC) to develop a strategy on domes-
tic resource mobilisation, which in turn has ensured that illicit financial 
flows are part of the sub-region’s development agenda.
In 2011 we began an initiative aimed at ensuring that the reduction of 
crimes of impunity was prioritised and that the perpetrators of political 
violence be brought to book.4 Initially we were criticised for being pro-
ICC but I am glad to note that, together with our partners working in 
Uganda, Kenya and Ivory Coast, we have managed to turn the debate to 
focus on victims’ rights and are beginning to see policy traction in those 
4  See Sipalla in this volume.
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countries. The recent trial of Hissène Habré here in Dakar, which we 
fully endorse, will hopefully contribute towards increased confidence in 
the administration of justice through African institutions. The emerging 
consensus on illicit financial flows as one of the biggest drivers of social 
and economic injustice also derives from the groundbreaking work of 
our partners. When we ventured into the arena of fighting against illicit 
financial flows in 2013, to the best of our knowledge there were very 
few African groups working on this issue and there was no significant 
pan-African network dedicated to the it. We give credit to our partners 
who have made sure that most domestic resource mobilisation processes 
now officially recognise IFFs as an issue requiring urgent attention.5 The 
majority of the changes we are seeing in areas such as smallholder agri-
culture in Ghana and Malawi are due to the work of our partners who 
have gone beyond the call of duty to ensure that governments remain 
accountable to their citizens.6 
However, this journey has not been without challenges. One of the 
early observations that we made had to do with what I call the ‘myth of 
civil society in Africa’. There are many reasons why civil society cannot 
address all of the continent’s problems.
First, there is an inadequate and uneven supply of CSOs across the 
continent. We have found that anglophone countries tend to have stron-
ger CSOs than francophone countries. Interestingly, francophone coun-
tries tend to produce strong social movements that are not necessarily 
supported by philanthropy, raising questions about whether philanthro-
py captures, modifies or even distorts actors such as social movements.7
Second, local non-state policy research capacity has not yet had any 
significant impact on policymaking. Full use is not being made of re-
search findings generated in Africa when decision makers formulate 
policies (Ajakaiye, 2007: 19). Governments’ policy making processes 
are currently ad hoc in nature, and are often driven by either political 
or donor interests. 
Third, we have come to realise that civil society responses to gov-
ernment’s weak policies can at times be also inadequate, very formu-
laic and, quite frankly, at times do not create viable alternatives. The 
continent has gone through campaigns for budget literacy, especially 
5 See Ngirande in this volume.
6 See Mubaya in this volume.
7 This is a critical organising question which is perhaps best discussed  within the 
emergent discourse on organic vs. artificial civil societies.
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with women’s lobby groups demanding gender sensitive budgets. 
This was followed by the ‘percentage’ movement: 15% for education, 
10% for agriculture, etc. In the meantime, Africa was losing close to 
$60 billion annually through illicit financial flows and very few in 
civil society were addressing this problem. In countries such as Ma-
lawi, Lesotho and Tanzania – because of their significant dependence 
on direct budgetary support – we were uncritically swallowing donor 
prescriptions. 
Fourth, despite the evident systemic and structural causes of most of 
the problems that Africa faces, most of civil society was working in rigid 
silos. These developed around how organisations positioned themselves 
and were perceived; also – widely acknowledged but not openly dis-
cussed – competition for donor funding has discouraged a more collec-
tive approach to solving issues. There were, and still are, many layers of 
silos, starting with those established by thematic areas of work, such as a 
focus on one set of rights vis-à-vis another. There are divisions between 
policy reform/advocacy and service delivery; between think tanks and 
advocates of change. There are silos with a regional focus and those with 
a national focus. The list goes on. These silos are not natural, but over 
time they have become a normal way of organising within the formal 
civic space. The more professional the space becomes, the more silos we 
will see. These silos unfortunately limit the manner in which we frame 
or understand a public problem and also how we consequently con-
ceive and craft solutions and harness collective action. They eventually 
create privileged islands in a sea of poverty and injustice. The World 
Social Forum and various sub-regional forums attempted to break the 
silos by bringing together actors focused on progressive social change 
into a single conversation, but the energy in this space has also waned 
considerably.
Fifth, the connection between partner organisations and the com-
munities that they serve is limited. The era of the concerned communi-
ty organiser starting a movement around an issue such as safer streets 
for girls is slowly being replaced by the more sophisticated approach 
that starts off with offices before creating a credible connection with 
the community. In fact, community based organisations have rarely fea-
tured as a significant constituency of philanthropy’s grant-making pro-
cess – perhaps because we are pitching change at a policy level which 
requires certain expert skills.
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Addressing supply-side challenges: The promise of African 
philanthropy
African philanthropy is best captured when understood as a form of 
agency, especially in a context where the dominant narratives were of an 
Africa that was conflict-ridden and hopeless. We felt the need to force-
fully display African agency, and our knowledge products and platforms 
contributed towards the repositioning of Africa as an engaged continent. 
A major focus of TrustAfrica’s work over the past ten years was on grow-
ing the field of African philanthropy.8 Our energies have been devoted 
towards producing knowledge that affirms the historical and culturally 
embedded forms of giving popular across Africa. We have produced a 
volume of essays9 on the subject and contributed book chapters, jour-
nal papers and conference papers. We have also, working together with 
others such as Southern Africa Trust, Kenya Community Development 
Fund and AWDF, led the process of establishing the Africa Philanthropy 
Network (initially called the African Grantmakers Network) and partic-
ipated in many forums focused on advancing the practice of what we 
loosely referred to as African philanthropy. There are two broad ten-
dencies within African philanthropy; one is largely horizontal and spon-
taneous and can be called peer-to-peer giving;10 the other attempts to 
replicate global practices of the high net worth individuals who establish 
formal vehicles to give away some of their wealth to causes they identify 
with. Our approach has not been to seek to replace one with the other 
but to find ways in which both global and African philanthropy can 
co-exist and create synergies where necessary. 
We have faced a number of challenges in our efforts to nurture and 
stimulate African philanthropy. For instance, we are yet to raise any 
meaningful resources from Africa-based philanthropists despite the 
increased giving from this group. The shortage of local funding, and 
the consequent reliance on the global north, inevitably raises question, 
about the authenticity of African foundations. However, evidence from 
Aina and Moyo (2013) shows that even with funds from global philan-
thropies, a foundation rooted on the continent and well grounded with 
local communities can add enormous value to development processes. 
In a recently completed performance review of TrustAfrica, it was noted 
8 See Moyo in this volume.
9 See Aina and Moyo, 2013.
10 Wilkinson-Maposa et al. (2013).
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that we face the risk of being seen as pushing a foreign agenda on the 
continent because of our reliance on non-African resources. This is a 
challenge that many organisations face. Indeed, reliance on non-African 
resources has been used in attempts to delegitimise civil society work 
that makes the state uncomfortable, such as the promotion of democra-
cy and good governance, accountability and transparency. In Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, for instance, our work against impunity has been challenged 
as part of broader ‘regime plots’ orchestrated by imperial forces, in the 
process forcing us into a defensive position. 
There are a number of reasons that may explain why African philan-
thropy is yet to play a significant role. First, the Africa Rising narrative 
that is feeding the assumptions about the growth of the middle class, 
and especially of the high net worth individuals (HNWIs), may be more 
of an ephemeral moment than a sustained process of growth. The pres-
ident of the Ford Foundation rightly observed that the basis of most 
American philanthropic foundations is a well-functioning market econ-
omy. African approaches to economic liberalisation have rarely focused 
on developing a national entrepreneurial class, rather they have focused 
on opening their economies up for foreign direct investment, which 
is usually driven by multinational corporations whose contribution to 
philanthropy on the continent is insignificant. As a consequence, Africa 
has not seen the emergence of a broader entrepreneurial class as seen in 
Malaysia, South Korea and China. 
Second, although there is recognition of the importance of philan-
thropy, very few national governments have taken steps to create an 
enabling environment by providing tax incentives, or easing registration 
requirements. A study carried out by the Southern Africa Trust in seven 
southern African countries found that outside South Africa there is no 
tax incentive for giving. However, evidence from TrustAfrica and UBS 
research suggests that tax and other conducive regulatory environments 
are not currently a key driver or incentive to many existing HNWIs 
(Mahomed et al., 2014). 
Third, the platforms for creating a community of practice amongst 
HNWI foundations remain limited. Conversations on how to give, 
where to give and who to work with either do not exist or have very 
narrow outreach. The need for such platforms becomes even more crit-
ical in light of the fact that many HNW philanthropists have preferred 
to keep their giving decisions internal. While the benefits of such fora 
have not been adequately understood by HNW philanthropists, these 
Claiming Agency: Reflecting on TrustAfrica’s first decade
138
challenges could also be due to the infrastructure sector not having de-
termined how to get the attention of HNW philanthropists to engage 
more with them.
Giving by Africa’s HNWI remains largely untracked, but for the most 
part it focuses on addressing the symptoms and not the underlying 
causes of inequality. While there are certainly exceptions to this, and 
these exceptions are slowly increasing, many of the African HNWI foun-
dations are focused on issues such as scholarships for under-privileged 
children, access to medical care, feeding schemes and relief in times of 
disasters. Others are engaged in infrastructure projects. However no-
ble these causes, they do not address the underlying systemic causes 
of inequality and poverty. Furthermore, there is a worrisome trend of 
Africans giving to universities within the global north and not to those 
in Africa or the global South. For instance, a Nigerian billionaire, Mo-
hammed Indinmi, donated $14 million to Lynn University in Florida.11 
The promise of African agency
Ultimately, agency lies with the citizens, and institutions like ours can 
only contribute to strengthening what already exists. We have always 
looked at African agency as made up of two pillars, philanthropy and 
civil society. We have reason to believe that the next ten years will be 
a period of consolidation in both. Despite the prevailing less-than-sat-
isfactory state of African philanthropy, we still view it as an important 
development that requires careful and committed nurturing. We have 
seen a slow but exciting growth of Africans giving to important causes 
and we are in a period of maturation of CSOs making important contri-
butions towards the deepening of democratic practice and the achieve-
ment of social and economic justice. The active contribution to national 
and regional policy processes has begun to bear fruit in terms of policy 
realignment and state delivery.  
The potential of African philanthropy
There is a growing recognition of the role that philanthropy can play 
in Africa’s quest for equitable and democratic transformation. In the 
past decades, many have viewed philanthropy as a type of aid, a form 
of support from outside the continent. To be sure, the story of Africa’s 
liberation and even early post-independence development initiatives 
11 http://nigerianuniversityscholarships.com/nigerian-billionaire-donates-4-2-bil-
lion-naira-american-university/ 
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would have been very different if it were not for the investments made 
by philanthropic foundations based abroad. However, there is a new 
excitement in the continent, centred on the possibilities of the contribu-
tion of home-grown philanthropy. Many important strategy documents 
have considered the key role that philanthropy can play, at continental 
level in the AU’s Agenda 2063, in the regional SADC Industrialisation 
Strategy and Roadmap 2015-2063 and in national level strategies such 
as in Rwanda.12
The growing importance of African philanthropy is grounded in the 
emerging breed of entrepreneurs, a significant number of whom are 
committed to the continent’s development. The number of dollar mil-
lionaires rose from around 130,000 in 2013 (Mahomed et al. 2013), 
to 165,000 in 2016.13 These millionaires established more foundations 
across the continent during this period than ever before, and have made 
significant philanthropy investments in the areas of health, education, 
entrepreneurial development and infrastructure improvements (ibid.). 
Despite the mounting interest in African philanthropy, we remain 
very cautious for a number of reasons. In addition to the issues raised 
in the previous section, we are yet to see the foundations established 
by the HNWIs being independently run and setting up an endowment 
for perpetual existence like their northern counterparts. Further, these 
foundations are yet to provide support in a manner that demonstrates 
a reduced contribution from the global north. It is ironic that even 
TrustAfrica, which was established to cultivate the practice of African 
philanthropy and agency, still finds itself dependent on northern donors. 
The potential of civil society
We have witnessed a commendable growth of CSOs that are driving 
pro-poor policy positions. These have varying capacities in terms of 
framing policy options, generating datasets to justify policy positions 
or to evaluate impact, and advocating for policy reforms. However, the 
proliferation of such organisations with policy research capacity has not 
yet had a significant impact overall on policymaking, especially in terms 
of opening the process and improving the content of those policies. 
However, we have reason to believe that the trend is changing. In the 
past few years we have seen the AU and a number of African govern-
12  See Moyo in this volume.
13  http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/3632320/the-africa-2016-wealth-
report
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ments beginning to implement recommendations made by CSOs, such 
as the adoption of the Africa Mining Vision (AMV). 
As already mentioned, some of the dominant actors within civil soci-
ety are not sufficiently linked to the grassroots and may not adequately 
nurture active citizenship. One of the most significant challenges to de-
mocratisation is that the most citizens feel powerless, or do not see the 
need to participate in national processes of electing leaders or exercising 
control over their communities’ and national futures. Levels of voter 
apathy in national and local government elections have been on the rise 
since the 1990s. The dominant approaches in electoral democracies 
have created a schism between the rulers and the ruled. The rulers have 
over the years either made concessions on what citizens can do or have 
curtailed processes of broader citizen mobilisation. This has created an 
environment of uncertainty about what is permissible. We need to take 
advantage of various AU protocols aimed at enhancing citizen participa-
tion in national political processes, regardless of class, race and gender.
Human and political life happens within local communities, and 
democracy can and should be nurtured at this level. Furthermore, the 
re-imagining of the public space should include a new understanding 
of democracy itself in order to capture what others such as Mkandaw-
ire (2001, 2011) have called developmental democracy. Developmental 
democracy acknowledges the importance of civil and political rights and 
freedoms, but  also accords equal weight to the socio-economic imper-
atives for equitable development within the country. Such a position 
can potentially lead to a more comprehensive political contract between 
the governors and the governed. It also raises the bar of performance 
amongst public officials.
It is worth reiterating that transforming the state as well as strength-
ening civil society cannot be fully accomplished in the absence of foster-
ing a culture of responsible citizenry, which feeds both civil society as 
well as the governmental and political process (Daubon, 2007). While 
some citizens can respond individually to changes in economic con-
ditions, in many instances of cooperation the effect of their collective 
action is greater than the sum of the different parts. 
Furthermore, we note that participation in political processes has 
often been reduced to tokenism, with functionaries ticking a box to in-
dicate that they have ‘engaged’ with a community before embarking on a 
public programme. The limited participation of previously marginalised 
groups such as women and youths has been identified as inhibiting the 
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potential benefits of a thriving democracy. Many countries have begun 
to embrace women’s participation in politics, but they still remain un-
der-represented. The youth on the other hand are restricted by con-
stitutional provisions that have set age limits on who can participate. 
We need to broaden participation in politics beyond periodic elections, 
being in parliament and the capture of state power; instead, we need to 
position it as a value that every citizen needs to embrace. Democracy is 
only meaningful when it is substantive, inclusive and responsive to the 
people’s needs. 
The challenge that Africa faces is to rethink our politics as everyday 
interactions that can only be enhanced by the provision of effective plat-
forms for inclusive citizen participation. The prevailing system of peri-
odic elections needs to be complemented by an engaged citizenry that 
is meaningfully consulted and given appropriate spaces to deliberate on 
public affairs. An inclusive and participatory government framework, 
from the local to national levels, is central to this process. Local govern-
ment is especially important in rural areas where the despotism of tra-
ditional authority and the ineffective post-independence decentralised 
structures have only served to further marginalise rural communities.
Conclusion 
Beyond boundaries: Fostering collaboration
Our ten years of working on the continent have taught us a number of 
things which will not only help us sharpen our way of doing things but 
will also influence the sector as a whole. Some of the criticisms of our 
work have to do with a failure to provide long-term funding and an in-
ability to include marginalised voices. The lack of a gender specific lens 
has also been raised as a weakness. 
We take pride in being a learning organisation, and most of the mea-
sures that we have taken to reorganise ourselves have been based on 
such open reflections. Some of the issues that we are perhaps guilty 
of have to do with our position within the philanthropy chain: at the 
beginning we were meant to be an autonomous foundation, but we sub-
sequently found ourselves at the mercies of the bigger global founda-
tions and the methods of support that they use, such as project based 
funding. We, together with others, were established to resolve identi-
fiable issues that are public in nature and the deployment of carefully 
designed interventions should ideally lead to resolution of the problem. 
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However, we were also alert to the complexity and inter-connectedness 
of the problems that the continent has to address, and mid-way through 
the first decade – after realising the futility of a large portfolio made 
up mostly of very small grants – we made a decision to support fewer 
organisations but with significantly larger grants. Furthermore, we en-
couraged our partners to work within collaborative networks and ad-
vocacy movements. Our approach is based on a strong conviction that 
whilst agency is the fuel, the vehicle that will deliver on the aspirations 
for a more just order is a developmental and democratic African state. 
We see civil society based organisations as the arena of change where 
history will eventually be made, but we do not claim to have all the 
solutions. We realise the current limitations within the philanthropy 
sector, but we are not overwhelmed. Inasmuch as we have realised the 
need for collaboration amongst CSOs we also see the need for it amongst 
like-minded philanthropy institutions. We are wary of a grants only 
approach and are positioning ourselves as an organisation that spans 
boundaries. Collaboration amongst philanthropy institutions is very 
limited, but the islands of best practice feature those that are focused on 
experience sharing. Since 2009 we have managed three donor collabo-
rations, on international criminal justice, anti-corruption in Nigeria and 
democracy in Zimbabwe. There is reason to believe that such approach-
es, if properly constituted with clear operating procedures, may have a 
bigger impact on the systemic issues we are trying to address. Whilst 
these collaborations have been relatively easy because they are single-is-
sue focused, we hope to establish more sophisticated models addressing 
matters such as socio-economic justice, education, health and employ-
ment. We have devised a more comprehensive suite of tools that we 
refer to as ‘beyond grants’, and we will deploy these to ensure that we 
are enhancing the capacities of civil society organisations as frontline 
actors of change for social, economic and political justice. Our goal is to 
break the current false division between funders and develop a commu-
nity of collaborative changemakers. We are conscious that the agenda 
described above could be too big for one institution and so we see the 
need to work towards the creation of sustainable collaborations that will 
yield the synergies necessary to address the systemic challenges faced by 
the continent. 
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Just as important as 
TrustAfrica’s use of philanthropic 
resources to advance African 
agendas and agency, has been its 
harnessing of African intellectual 
and human resources to raise the 
profile of African experience and 
innovation in philanthropy for 
social change and justice.
Theo Sowa
A robust, confident and 
independent African civil 
society will be a principal 
ingredient of the Africa rising 
narrative and Claiming Agency 
is essential reading for anyone 
interested in the pivotal role 
of African philanthropy in the 
years ahead.
Gerry Salole
Claiming Agency is relevant to all 
those who practice philanthropy 
on our continent, especially those 
intent on ensuring that people have 
a say in the decisions that shape 
their lives. Undoubtedly, the most 
redeeming and enduring change in 
the lives of people, communities and 
societies is what comes from within.  
Akwasi Aidoo
